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This dissertation considers how geographic scale shapes the theory and practice of 
politics. It develops a dynamic, relational approach to scale that finds folds and overlaps 
between micro- and macro-processes. The project asks how subjects negotiate non-
concentric political domains: bodies, localities, cities, nations, the globe, and the planet. 
In contrast to hierarchically nested models of belonging, it emphasizes transnational, 
transversal, and eccentric forms of ethical and political interconnectedness. Attending to 
the elaborate interactions between the embodied, local, urban, global, and planetary 
complicates state-centric images of politics as well as those that present a flattened, 
reductive approach to globalization.  
By tracking an undercurrent in political theory through readings of Machiavelli, 
Michel Foucault, Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, David Harvey, and Manuel De Landa, 
the project renders explicit a theory of scale that has remained at the margins of work on 
each of these thinkers. It connects this geographic formulation within political theory to 
bodies of literature focused on the polis, contemporary studies of cities, and urban 
interconnection. In contrast to predominant approaches to political theory and 
international relations that privilege either the national or global scale, this project takes 
the city as the starting point for an inquiry into the ethics and politics of a globalizing 
world. By selectively emphasizing the political space of the city and its complexities, it 
pursue the areas of overlap and intersection between multiple scales with rough edges. 
Urban theorists, such as Harvey and De Landa, have envisioned the city as a multiscalar 
space. This analysis locates similar tendencies in thinkers less frequently noted for their 
writings on cities. Machiavelli, Foucault, Hardt, and Negri reflect on the city as a site in 
   
iii 
 
which a people, a multiplicity, or a multitude is organized in a world of intersecting 
scales. The dissertation thus focuses on the city as a strategic point of departure in order 
to ask how shifts at one scale reverberate through politics elsewhere and how these 
relations are in turn reflected in the material and social composition of cities. 
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How many maps, in the descriptive or geographical sense, might be needed to deal 
exhaustively with a given space, to code and decode all its meanings and contents? It is 
doubtful whether a finite number can ever be given in answer to this sort of question … It 
is not only the codes – the map’s legend, the conventional signs of map-making and map-
reading – that are liable to change, but also the objects represented, the lens through 
which they are viewed, and the scale used – Henri Lefebvre1 
 
Within contemporary political theory, an emerging focus on geography and 
spatiality has begun to conceptualize the multiple, irreducible scales of politics. 
Transformative projects of social and ecological justice in contemporary thought require 
attention to scale. Labor, environmental justice, housing, and anti-war movements must 
navigate the interplay of bodily, local, urban, national, global, and planetary scales.2 As 
these movements shift across scales, distinct power dynamics come into focus. Scalar 
crossings reconfigure the coordinates of political thought and action. This complex 
interweaving of spatiality differs from an image of politics in which a nested set of scales 
centered on the human subject form concentric circles of belonging. In such an image, 
scales of politics, serving as neatly bounded sociospatial containers, produce hierarchies 
of ethical connection and political solidarity. In place of this image, this project offers a 
                                                 
1 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing, 1991), 85 – 86. 
2 In the case of the environmental justice movement, it seeks alternatives to fossil fuel-driven 
energy policies at the national scale and harmful consumption habits at the scale of individuals. It 
faces the uneven geography of capitalism at the global scale as it promotes ecological thinking on 
a planetary scale in order to address climate systems at a tipping point. Advocates of 
environmental justice are not alone in negotiating an elaborate political spatiality. The 
contemporary anti-war movement encounters an equally complex set of scalar arrangements in 
the form of the “military-industrial-media-entertainment network” (MIME-NET), a war-making 
complex woven together out of multiple geographic scales. James Der Derian, Virtuous War: 
Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network (New York: Routledge, 2009), 
xxxvi. Within the MIME-NET, a transnational security industry interfaces with multiple national 
security states. Arms flows move from national militaries to state and municipal police. Media 
and aesthetics target the scale of the body and subjectivity. 
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non-centric, entangled approach to multiple scales with rough edges. Through such an 
approach, neglected spatial relations come into view. Seemingly unlikely resonances, 
hidden disparities, and nonlinear relationships between scales now appear as 
indispensable facets of contemporary political life. 
As a starting point for theorizing this relationship between politics and spatiality, 
Nancy Fraser elaborates the role that geographic scale plays, often implicitly, in defining 
the scope and substance of justice. Fraser focuses on the ways in which scale, “the 
geographer’s metric for representing spatial relations,” informs notions of redistribution 
and recognition.3 Scale separates those who are able to make claims within a political 
order from those deemed outside the bounds of ethical and political consideration. It 
defines constituencies and determines what counts as an “externality.”4 Furthermore, 
scale helps to determine the spatial and geographic coordinates of political perception and 
action. The spatial relations between political forces, processes, and subjects come into 
view through the scale employed in the mapping of political life.5 
Contemporary political thought, nonetheless, tends to prioritize the state and the 
national scale. As Fraser emphasizes, within this state-centrism, theories of the state 
range from atomistic homogeneous units of political authority to variegated bodies with 
complex internal dynamics. Regardless of their particular content and structure, state-
                                                 
3 Nancy Fraser, Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 1. 
4 Fraser, 149. 
5 Mapping has come to refer to both the production of maps, as specific geographic artifacts and 
forms of knowledge, and to the relations of constituent parts in a structure or system. Frequent 
invocation of the terms “map” and “mapping” tend to blur these two meanings with everything 
becoming a map. Rather than emphasize the disambiguation of these two uses of the term, I find 
the current ambiguity in social thought productive, particularly in the inquiry into the 
spatialization of socio-political structures and systems.  
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centric approaches prove reductive. Privileging the scale of the nation-state results from a 
“Keynesian-Westphalian frame.”6 This frame naturalizes the national scale and, by 
extension, positions state spaces of the national economy as privileged sites of politics: 
“arguments about justice were assumed to concern relations among fellow citizens, to be 
subject to debate within national publics, and to contemplate redress by national states … 
[I]t went without saying that the unit within which justice applied was the modern 
territorial state.”7  The Keynesian-Westphalian frame confines the conversation about 
justice by privileging the rights claims and economic conditions of citizens within a state. 
Inhabitants of spaces outside the state fall beyond the zone of ethical obligation. Thus the 
world is divided into “domestic” and “international:”  “Whereas ‘domestic’ space was 
imagined as the pacified civil realm … subject to … obligations of justice, ‘international’ 
space was envisioned as … a warlike realm of … devoid of any binding duties of 
                                                 
6 Fraser, 12. Fraser acknowledges that under colonialism and neocolonialism the Keynesian-
Westphalian frame never accurately captured the degree to which forces exceeding the 
boundaries of the state exercised political control (Fraser, 95). She qualifies this claim by arguing 
that the Keynesian-Westphalian frame nonetheless set a framework for inclusion of the colonized: 
“[I]t seemed that in correlating publics with political citizenship, one simultaneously captured the 
forces of the all affected principle. In fact, this was never truly so, as the long history of 
colonialism and neocolonialism attests. From the perspective of the metropole, however, the 
conflation of membership with affectedness appeared to have an emancipatory thrust, as it served 
to justify the progressive incorporation, as active citizens, of the subordinate classes and status 
groups who were resident in the territory but excluded from full political participation” (Fraser, 
95). As Fraser’s “appeared” might telegraph, the repeatedly qualified and conditional grants of 
sovereignty to the colonized and formerly colonized within the Westphalian frame render the 
“emancipatory thrust” of this system doubtful. See for instance Antony Anghie, Imperialism, 
Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004) and Siba N’Zatioula Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns, and Africans: Race and 
Self-Determination in International Law (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996). 
7 Fraser, 12 – 13. Fraser clarifies that her use of “Westphalian” does not denote that the Treaty of 
Westphalia served as the formative event in the constitution of the modern territorial state. 
However, she notes, it nonetheless played a formative role in the modern political imaginary, a 
conjunction of thought and practice, “that mapped the world as a system of mutually recognizing 
sovereign territorial states” (Fraser, 160 – 161).   
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justice.”8 This state-centric approach to politics privileges citizens of a “domestic” space 
as living within the confines of law while relating to the occupants of international space 
in the ethically limited terms of humanitarianism or the instrumental and often brutal 
terms of security. 
A profusion of events have thrown the validity of the Keynesian-Westphalian-
national frame into question. Global warming, the spread of disease, non-state 
international violence, superpower unilateralism, expanded media, neoliberal capitalism, 
and transnational social movements all lead to a world in which, according to Fraser, 
“many believe that their chances for living good lives depend at least as much on 
processes that trespass the border of territorial states as on those contained within them.”9  
The bias of social scientists toward the national scale and the Keynsian-Westphalian 
frame not only reproduces a map of sovereign states, but it deems non-political a vast 
array of emerging political spaces, flows, and potential crises. Cities, slums, “free 
speech” zones, refugee camps, borders, checkpoints, fortifications, empires, networks, 
virtual environments, economic summits, social forums, and flows of persons, 
information, commodities, weapons, financial instruments, and viruses inhabit a political 
world irreducible to the Keynesian-Westphalian frame.10 The structures of political 
                                                 
8 Fraser, 4.  
9 Fraser, 14. Yet in the face of numerous transnational and global shifts, the Westphalian frame 
continues to hold prominence. The result is what Fraser calls “misframing … as when the 
national framing of distributive issues forecloses the claims of the global poor” (Fraser, 144). In 
her example of the injustice committed to the global poor, the reduction of the global economy to 
a Keynesian-Westphalian frame renders those affected by global capital flows and transnational 
ecological harm without a political space in which to express their grievances.  
10 Much of this list is drawn from Jodi Dean’s review of Fraser. See Jodi Dean, “Book in Review: 
Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space Globalizing World, by Nancy Fraser,” Political 
Theory 38 (2010): 303. Dean sees Fraser ignoring the vast literature in multiple disciplines – 
anthropology, geography, and sociology to name a few – pointing to the proliferation and 
reconstitution of political spaces. While I concur with Dean that Fraser should be pushed further 
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spatiality that result from these bodies, flows, places, and processes require more vivid 
imaginings of the scalar domains enabling political mobilization and action. 
Two contending tendencies guide Fraser’s approach to scale and politics. One 
inclines toward pluralization, multiplying the scales at which claims for justice may be 
made and complicating ossified understandings of the political. She begins to admit 
transformations in the structure of political spatiality through her observation of “multiple 
non-isomorphic structures, some local, some national, some regional, and some global, 
which mark out a variety of different ‘who’s’ for different issues.”11 Here, politics occurs 
on multiple, irreducible scales that take on non-isomorphic properties. That is to say, the 
local, national, urban, regional, and global are not simply nested processes organized 
concentrically. Instead, each scale enables and constrains political possibilities in 
different ways. For instance, the urban scale produces different constituencies from the 
national scale. Urban organization may frequently rely on face-to-face encounters, tap 
into a sense of place felt by fellow urban citizens, and forge formal solidarities and 
informal connections with other cities. In contrast, the national scale organizes 
encounters through state institutions, legal apparatuses, and patriotic national identities. 
Rather than homology between the two scales, the national and urban exhibit 
entanglements between scales with different edges. The task of political theory becomes 
one of assessing the “levels and kinds of effectivity” that emanate from multiple scales of 
politics.12  
                                                 
in discussing political spaces beyond the transnational democratic arena, Fraser’s work provides 
an important starting point for elaborating on the concept of scale in political theory.  
11 Fraser, 39. 
12 Fraser, 40. 
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There exists both politics at a certain scale, in which governance, power, struggle 
and contestation unfold through a particular socio-spatial domain, and a politics of scale 
in which the framings of governance, power, struggle, and contestation are structured and 
contested. Clarifying the politics of scale, Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing suggests that rather 
than scale being given in advance: 
Scale is the spatial dimensionality necessary for a particular kind of view, whether 
up close or from a distance, microscopic or planetary… [S]cale is not just a neutral 
frame for viewing the world; scale must be brought into being: proposed, practiced, 
and evaded, as well as taken for granted.13 
 
Tsing sees scales and politics as mutually constitutive. Scale denotes a relative size, a 
“spatial dimensionality,” bringing this dimensionality into being and reproducing it as a 
space of struggle, contestation, cooperation, and power. For Tsing, specific scales do not 
precede political life but emerge through practices. Politics also operates through the 
neglect or evasion of particular scales. For instance, the elision of the planetary scale in 
neoliberal discourse reinforces strict boundaries between global capitalism and the quasi-
independence of geological, climatic, and ecological systems that recoil back and forth 
upon each other. By avoiding the discussion of a planetary scale in which capitalism 
operates, neoliberals position these larger systems as “externalities” outside the purview 
of social and political concern. 
The aim here is not to argue that scales are rationally calculated, perfectly 
instrumental, or ideological in nature. Rather, as Keil and Mahon argue, “scales are 
socially produced and reproduced through myriad, sometimes purposeful, sometimes 
                                                 
13 Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005), 58. 
  Introduction 
7 
 
erratic, social, economic, political, and cultural actions.”14 We might add that nonhuman, 
planetary processes play a role too. Scales emerge through deliberate political action 
combined with unintended consequences and unforeseen cumulative effects. New scales 
may emerge, for instance, through efforts to render intelligible the sociospatial relations 
of a constituency. Scales bring into focus collectivities that include not only human actors 
but nonhuman “nature,” built environments, (systems of) belief, material practices, and 
flows of things, ideas, concepts, and habits. Following on this expanded definition, a 
scale is a sociospatial formation of bodies, somatic dispositions, and flows that is 
partially shaped by political life. It denotes a set of relations between human and 
nonhuman constituents bound loosely together in a political network.  
The second tendency in Fraser’s thought is a contrary inclination that constricts 
the political. It appears in her insistence upon the formalization of political practices, 
their “binding authority,” and the enhancement of “administrative capacity.”15 Instead of 
investigating the ways in which spatial connections at multiple scales complicate political 
action, this second move transposes state-centric institutions and practices onto a global 
scale. Although Fraser’s reimagining of political space differs from predominant forms of 
                                                 
14 Roger Keil and Rianne Mahon, “Introduction” in Leviathan Undone? Toward a Political 
Economy of Scale, eds. Roger Keil and Rianne Mahon (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), 8. In 
Leviathan Undone? Keil and Mahon attempt to condense and make explicit the conversations on 
scale within critical geography and political economy. The defining work on the topic is Neil 
Smith, Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space (Athens: University 
of Georgia Press, 2008). Smith’s approach has been adopted, with slight modification by a 
number of critical geographers. Andrew Herod, for instance, contends in his political geography 
of labor movements, “social actors create geographic scales through their activities” (Andrew 
Herod, “Labor Spatial Praxis and the Geography of Contract Bargaining in the US East Coast 
Longshore Industry, 1953 – 1989,” Political Geography 16 (1997): 147). Within this body of 
thought, Erik Swyngedouw also suggests “scale is not politically neutral, but embodies and 
expresses power relationships” (Erik Swyngedouw “Neither Global nor Local: “Glocalization” 
and the Politics of Scale” in Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local, ed. 
Kevin R. Cox (New York: Guilford Press, 1997), 140). 
15 Fraser, 67, 98. 
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cosmopolitanism, it nonetheless envisions a shift from state sovereignty to global justice 
as an extension of the institutions and authority of sovereignty and democracy without 
qualitative change. Her vision of global democracy and sovereignty involves geographic 
and territorial expansions that fail to think through their fundamental political 
transformations at different scales.  
Although the formal, decisive capacities for political action within the institutions 
emphasized by Fraser should not be neglected, they represent only a small portion and 
relatively late formation of what constitutes the political. The insistence upon formal 
qualities within emerging fields of power and resistance understates the cumulative 
effects of seemingly small political shifts. This move risks funneling new political 
formations, emerging from scales below, over, above, or beside the state, into familiar 
institutional procedures. Multiple scales of political life give way not only to unforeseen 
injustices but also to new practices of political struggle, organization, and collective life. 
These new practices exceed the existing political vocabulary. Furthermore, new or simply 
unacknowledged organizations of bodies and spaces within, across, and between 
territorial states do not always fit the criteria of formal institutions with binding authority 
and administrative capacity. They nonetheless have profound effects on political life.16 
As such, political action requires not only the expanded workings of formally recognized 
                                                 
16 To her credit Fraser takes such tensions within her own work seriously and grapples with the 
conflict between these two tendencies. She worries about the possibility of setting a “new 
normal” frame for justice in place of the Westphalian frame and its attendant political language. 
She aims instead to institute a form of “reflexive justice” capable of “entertaining urgent claims 
on behalf of the disadvantaged, while also parsing the meta-disagreements that are interlaced with 
them” (Fraser, 73). She seeks at once to facilitate a nuanced understanding of the political and 
harness this complexity as an important resource for egalitarian projects. However, her insistence 
upon institutionalization remains in need of opening or expansion to micropolitical, bodily, urban, 
and planetary scales of political life that have resounding effects at state and global scales.  
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political institutions but also entails what William E. Connolly refers to as “multiform 
activism … that folds an ethos of cultivation into political practices set on several 
intercoded scales: local, familial, workplace, state, theological, corporate, global, and 
planetary.”17 Activism across multiple scales moves in and out of formal institutions. 
This mode of political action involves cultivating forms of attunement and 
responsiveness to previously unforeseen developments as they manifest at different 
scales. Working through a multiscalar political geography involves working on political 
subjects even as those subjects attempt to engage their political world. 
Amplifying the first dimension of Fraser’s project while working against the 
second tendency, I pursue a geographic approach to politics in which multiple scales 
overlap, fold, and jostle each other. This processual approach to scale asks how subjects 
negotiate within and across non-concentric political domains: localities, cities, nations, 
and the globe. An examination of scale discloses multiple relays between micro- and 
macro- processes of politics. Attending to the complex interactions between the local, 
urban, and global is to complicate state-centric images of politics as well as flattened, 
reductive approaches to globalization. This multiscalar political geography intensifies the 
tendency toward pluralization, thereby emphasizing “multiple, non-isomorphic 
structures” of political spatiality. Once the Keynesian-Westphalian frame is cracked, 
scales begin to proliferate. The appearance of scales traversing the national state throws 
into question what counts as political thought and practice. Politics may emerge 
experimentally, contingently, or even accidentally. As Rob Nixon notes, scale poses 
“decisive challenges” for contemporary critical work, which must explore how we can 
                                                 
17 William E. Connolly, Fragility of Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 6. Emphasis 
in original. 
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“imaginatively and strategically render visible vast force fields of interconnectedness 
against the attenuating effects of temporal and geographical distance."18 New modes of 
thought and practice are required to intervene in a political field extending beyond the 
map of territorial states and outside the confines of formal institutions.  
This is a political spatiality in which, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, "every 
politics is simultaneously a macropolitics and a micropolitics."19 Micro- and macro- 
scales, or molecular and molar as Deleuze and Guattari sometimes prefer, involve a 
politics of non-isomorphic interplay. Although the structures of micro- and macro- scales 
differ, movement on one scale nonetheless entails reverberations elsewhere. They differ 
not in terms of the quantitative measures of space each occupies, “but by the nature of the 
system of reference envisioned."20 Local or micro-scales may exude intensity, richness, 
or thickness that exceeds the global and macro-structures in which they participate.  
My aim here is not to dispense with notions of systems but, instead, to offer a 
vision of systematization in which local scales remain irreducible to the characteristics 
and determinant forces of their counterparts. Politics often involves multiple scales 
overlapping in a tangled web of relays. In this political geography, micro- and macro- are 
not nested political scales that can be encapsulated by characterizations such as “top-
down” (in reference to hierarchy) and “bottom-up” (as necessarily democratic and 
grassroots). Instead, the socio-spatial organization of political life emanates from multiple 
                                                 
18 Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2011), 38. 
19 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 213. 
20 Deleuze and Guattari, 217. Deleuze and Guattari reject the language of scale. However, this 
seems to refer to a purely quantitative understanding of scale compared to geometric notions of 
size and dimension: "the molar and the molecular are distinguished not by size, scale, or 
dimension" (Deleuze and Guattari, 217). 
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directions and nonlinear relations. We, Deleuze and Guattari say, “are segmented from all 
around and in every direction … Dwelling, getting around, working, playing: life is 
spatially and socially segmented."21 Scale, as I conceptualize it, involves segmentarity – 
social and spatial partitioning that enables certain pathways of connection while 
foreclosing others. Segmentarity delineates the rough edges of scales through 
“compartmentalizations and partial processes that interconnect, but not without gaps and 
displacements.”22 This is a geography of partiality and surplus, fragment and excess, in 
which multiple scales often defy linear order and instead produce a fractal patterning of 
political life.23 
 
Rescaling the Polis 
 
Whereas Fraser begins to open our thinking of scale by outlining deliberative 
practices that question contemporary state-centric images, this dissertation unearths 
resources in the history of political thought that elaborate alternative scalar visions. I seek 
subterranean lines of inquiry and analysis in the past which exceed the Keynesian-
Westphalian political imaginary. As a formative concept of political theory, the polis 
offers a starting point for rethinking historical transformations of political space. For 
classical political thinkers the polis embodies an absolute form of political spatiality in 
                                                 
21 Deleuze and Guattari, 208. 
22 Deleuze and Guattari, 210. 
23 Here, I use the term “fractal” to refer to the fractured dimensionality of these mathematical 
figures, the seemingly infinite length of their line segments that never quite amounts to an area. In 
this sense, they are neither two nor three dimensional. I do not wish to invoke the ways in which 
fractals are isomorphically scalable, a quality I intend to resist in the characterization of political 
life. To reframe my critique of state-centrism in the terms of Deleuze and Guattari, it "is 
constituted not by the abolition of circular segmentarity but by a concentricity of distinct circles, 
or the organization of a resonance among centers" (Deleuze and Guattari, 211). In state-centric 
political thought the centers of all scales, or circular segments, reside at the same point. 
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the sense that space, place, and scale, to borrow the terms of contemporary spatial theory, 
coincide exactly. The polis names the city in general, the space of politics through which 
citizens move, the particular polis (e.g. Athens, Sparta, etc.), the place of politics to 
which citizens belong, and the city-state, the scale at which questions of collective good 
come into focus.24 The polis, as the scale of politics, sets a spatial frame that emphasizes 
some political claims, agents, and spaces while dismissing or excluding others. For 
ancient Greek thinkers, the scale of the polis designates the boundaries of a political 
milieu. This small territorial body with limited population, strict class divisions, and 
established traditions of authority unified the field of political spatiality. 
However, place, space, and scale diverged as the primacy of the polis came into 
question. As Sheldon Wolin suggests, “the polis had ceased to be the politically 
significant unit. It was overlain by giant state forms which lacked the attributes of 
strongly political societies and which, when judged by the canons of classical political 
thought, appeared monstrous aberrations.”25 Here, the emergence of the Macedonian and 
Roman empires challenged the hegemony of the polis and its idealization in classical 
political thought. The ascendance of large-scale imperial forms displaced the polis as the 
locus of political attachment. Questions of public action and common good adopted 
multiple geographic frames as the polis entered into complex relations with emergent 
spatial forms. 
                                                 
24 Mogens Herman Hansen begins to illustrate this ambiguity and its importance: “Polis is the 
ancient Greek word for ‘city’, ‘state’ and the combination of city and state, the ‘city-state’. It has 
often, quite rightly, been said that the polis, as a form of state and society, was the basis of the 
whole of Greek civilization” (Herman Hansen, 1). Mogens Herman Hansen, Polis: An 
Introduction to the Ancient Greek City-State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).  
25 Wolin, Politics and Vision (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 64. 
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Wolin directs attention to the ways in which transformations of political scale 
fundamentally alter what constitutes the political. Changes in structures of political 
spatiality lead to the inclusion of seemingly nonpolitical elements of life. As new spatial 
arrangements emerge they may initially appear gigantic, aberrant, and monstrous. These 
scalar shifts call into question not only the traditional territorial boundaries of political 
geography but also the modes of perception and sensation constitutive of political 
experience. The decline of the polis, for instance, brought with it a transition from visual 
politics, in which encounters between citizens occurred face-to-face, to “‘abstract 
politics,’ politics from a distance” that catalyzed new symbols of authority and practices 
of control exercised over dispersed populations.26 New modes of political connectedness 
and encounter soon appear alongside the emergence of scales of politics that challenged 
the hegemony of the polis as a political form. 
Although the polis as a spatio-political form has largely disappeared, neither its 
legacy for political thought, nor its numerous contradictions, have faded. The 
contemporary state-centric political imaginary continues to be influenced by the 
idealizations and simplifications of territoriality that shaped the understanding of the 
polis in classic political thought. R.B.J. Walker observes “most debates about our 
collective futures remain in thrall to … some vaguely remembered and creatively 
reimagined ideal of the polis.”27 For Walker, the legacy of the polis was inherited by the 
“nation-state” with absolute sovereignty, settled territorial boundaries, and a regulated 
populous of citizens striving to be a nation. This understanding of the state, as a 
                                                 
26 Wolin, 70. 
27 R.B.J. Walker, “Polis, Cosmopolis, Politics,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 28 (2003): 
267. 
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territorially expanded polis, first effaces social and political complexity and then strives 
to fold that complexity into this container.  
I follow Walker’s call to confront the problem “that whatever its merits or 
necessities, the modern polis can no longer be our political home—or at least our only 
political home … this home has brought us interstate wars and is the source of many of 
our most intractable problems.”28 The shortcomings of the polis are both concrete and 
abstract. Imagining the political world as one of contending poleis-become-nation-states 
has produced the system of state sovereignty in which interstate wars continue to grow 
and intensify. The critique of the polis must also convey the inability of any single scale 
to account for the complexities of power, for the nation-state is not the only spatial form 
to reproduce the problems of the polis. Cosmopolitan thought and utopian invocations of 
“globalization” often seek to expand the walls of the polis to the entirety of the globe. 
These ethical and political projects privilege the global scale and efface the multiplicity 
of asymmetrical scales of politics that disrupt each other as they enter into dissonant 
intersections.29 The idealization of the cosmopolis envisions a concentric world at which 
questions of collective good come into focus through a series of nested circles. Adopting 
the cosmopolis as either an ethical project or an analytic frame for politics imposes 
restrictions on political spatiality similar to those of state-centrism. The spatial frame of 
the cosmopolis is tied to predetermined constituencies and either flattened or nested 
understandings of power and sovereign authority. Neither the polis nor its expanded, 
                                                 
28 Walker, 268. 
29 While Fraser differs from the identified targets of Walker’s critique, she nonetheless seems 
prone to this tendency. 
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homologous variant, the cosmopolis, suffices to comprehend the socio-spatial domains of 
politics: 
It is a great mistake to assume that our futures lie either with the polis or with the 
cosmopolis. We confront, rather, ongoing struggles to resituate and politicize 
sites of political authority. We already know that the old distinctions between 
global and local or urban and rural or north, south, east, and west are being 
renegotiated very rapidly. These negotiations imply the need to renegotiate our 
understandings of both the polis and the cosmopolis.30 
 
Both polis and cosmopolis prove inadequate for a world of inequalities and conflicts tied 
to the curvatures and entanglements of political space. The construction of a cosmopolis 
will not simply transcend the conceptual and political limitations of the polis by 
expanding the geometric space under consideration. Instead, it flattens the understanding 
of power and submerges emergent sites of politics. 
Although received by contemporary theory as either national state or global 
polity, the polis also contains within it a potentiality unexplored by either of these 
trajectories. The polis, understood as a city, constitutes an indispensable line of political 
analysis neglected by contemporary thought. The city rarely appears as an autonomous, 
fully-realized, or sovereign political body. Instead, it embodies a complex assemblage of 
constituent parts moving at multiple rhythms in close proximity. Casting aside the figure 
of the city neglects contemporary formations of power in which fortified built 
environments of steel and concrete dot deindustrializing urban landscapes and create 
disparities of territorial access and spatial mobility. The city has also become the site for 
struggles articulating alternative political worlds. The rallying cry of a right to the city 
echoes through movements that contest the routines of neoliberal capitalism. My analysis 
thus focuses on the city as a strategic point of departure in order to ask how diverse scales 
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interweave, how shifts at one scale reverberate through politics elsewhere, and how these 
relations are in turn reflected in the material and social composition of cities. 
I turn to the urban scale as the starting point for an inquiry into the ethics and 
politics of a globalizing world. It offers an opening through which to map the 
impingement of cities upon territorial politics, global processes, and planetary systems. 
Such an approach draws intellectual sustenance from Henri Lefebvre’s notion of the 
urban. Lefebvre distinguishes between the urban and the city; the city denotes “a clearly 
distinguished, definitive object,” whereas the urban refers to a process of reorganizing 
social space.31 The city, in Lefebvre’s terms, forms a relatively coherent social body. In 
contrast, urban process stretches built environments, power relations, and modes of 
production formerly associated with cities across a larger social field. This urban process 
produces “growths of dubious value: suburbs, residential conglomerations and industrial 
complexes, satellite cities that differ … little from urbanized towns. Small and midsize 
cities … [become] dependencies, partial colonies of the metropolis.”32 Highways, oil 
fields, supermarkets, strip malls, and vacation homes contort and stretch the urban fabric 
into a web varying in thickness and density that covers the surface of the globe. 
The urban scale, or mixed level as Lefebvre prefers, embodies the intersection of 
private and global levels, his terms for micro- and macro- processes.33 The global level 
includes state exercises of power and broader political strategies of supra- and multi-
                                                 
31 Henri Lefebvre, The Urban Revolution, trans. Robert Bononno (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2003), 16. 
32 Lefebvre, Urban Revolution, 4. 
33 Neil Brenner identifies the importance of two terms within Lefebvre’s lexicon that speak to the 
scale question: niveau (level) and échelle (scale). Neil Brenner, “The Urban Question as Scale 
Question: Reflections on Henri Lefebvre, Urban Theory and the Politics of Scale,” International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research 24.2 (2000): 368. 
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national bodies. Its expressions in the built environment include “buildings, monuments, 
large-scale urban projects, new towns” as well as the management of circulations through 
transportation within and beyond the city.34 The private level appears in the built 
environment as all forms of housing. The private level is both the space of human 
habitats and what Lefebvre calls “habiting,” the dynamic qualities of lived experience 
that vastly exceed attempts from the global level to constrain vital forces of individual 
and collective bodies.35 The mixed level refers to the city or the “specifically urban.”36 Its 
projection into the built environment appears as “streets, squares, avenues, public 
buildings such as city halls, parish churches, schools, and so on.”37 Here, the urban 
constitutes a unique political terrain. It is an intersection between micropolitics and 
macropolitics and an interface between bodies and society. The urban embodies the 
condensation of power and resistance in built form. Consequently, one sees in the shape 
of the built environment “a veritable urban civil war … in the ‘global North’ as well as 
the ‘global South,’ inside the outside as well as outside the inside; it is a war of walls and 
ramparts, of bankers and banlieues.”38 Inequality and marginalization within built 
environments become weapons of war by other means. Gated enclaves of the wealthy 
replace fortresses of former sovereigns. High-rise developments tower over adjacent 
favelas. Former manufacturing cities become postindustrial zones of sociopolitical 
abandonment.   
                                                 
34 Lefebvre, Urban Revolution, 79. 
35 Lefebvre, Urban Revolution, 80 – 81. 
36 Lefebvre, Urban Revolution, 80. 
37 Lefebvre, Urban Revolution, 80. 
38 Andy Merrifield, The New Urban Question (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), xiii. 
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Inspired by the work of Lefebvre on the urban level, contemporary urban theorists 
have envisioned the city as a multiscalar space. For instance, Warren Magnusson calls 
attention to self-organizing and non-linear properties of urban order in which politics 
functions through “a multiplicity of authorities operating in different registers and at 
different scales.”39 Magnusson begins to cultivate attunements to different spatial 
domains, thereby altering the coordinates of political perception. In place of state-
centrism, he appeals to political scientists to “see like a city,” honing our sensitivity to the 
forms of social complexity at work in cities while situating the urban scale in its 
entanglements with other scales of political life.  
This dissertation pursues similar tendencies in thinkers less frequently noted for 
their writings on cities. Niccolò Machiavelli, Michel Foucault, Michael Hardt, and 
Antonio Negri reflect on the urban as a site at which a people, a multiplicity, or a 
multitude is organized in a world in which processes at multiple scales intersect. Tracking 
this undercurrent through readings of Machiavelli, Foucault, Hardt, and Negri, I render 
explicit a theory of scale that has remained at the margins of work on each of these 
thinkers. I then connect it to contemporary thought on political space within the work of 
David Harvey and Manuel De Landa. I find each thinker responding to the complexities 
of social and political life with rich imaginings of spatiality. These readings of a tendency 
in each find multiple scales – the body, local, urban, national, regional, global, and 
planetary – agitating political life as they also form intersections. This approach draws on 
the ambiguity of the polis as a term naming both the material cityscape and a scale of 
                                                 
39 Warren Magnusson “Seeing Like a City: How to Urbanize Political Science” in Critical Urban 
Studies: New Directions, eds. Jonathan S. Davies and David L. Imbroscio (Albany: SUNY Press: 
2011), 44. 
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politics. Whereas Fraser seeks to envision transnational institutions that embody the 
contestation of state-centric politics, I reveal a patchwork of political possibilities that 
emerge from a long-standing politics of the city intersecting with other scales. This 
approach examines the impact of urban complexity on the state, globe, and planet while 
also extending the domain of the political in order to account for flows moving over, 
under, and through the urban milieu. 
The aim, here, is not only to proliferate the number of spatial domains available 
for political action. I also wish to suggest that an approach to political geography carries 
with it dispositions to sensation, perception, and thinking. Through attention to the 
relation between scales I seek to cultivate sensitivities to subtle forms of creativity and 
interconnectedness deemed ephemeral and irrelevant by the spatial analytics of state-
centrism and cosmopolitanism. Multiscalar political geography provides a glimpse of 
what Bruno Latour calls a “hidden geography” in which “objects – taken as so many 
issues – bind all of us in ways that map out a public space profoundly different from what 
is usually recognized under the label of “the political.”” 40 This otherwise hidden 
geography temporarily brings into view incipient political forces, ad hoc networks, 
unrealized solidarities, and unexplored potentialities. It enables political thought to 
venture beyond the narrow constraints imposed by the present. It uncovers the possibility 
of political experiments on the self, across the city, within national constituencies, as 
global movements, and in relation to planetary ecologies.  
 
Outline of the Study 
                                                 
40 Bruno Latour, “From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik, or How to Make Things Public” in Making 
Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy, ed. Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2005), 15. 
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In chapter one, “Machiavelli’s Cityscapes,” I examine how Machiavelli, while 
never explicitly employing the term scale, considers relations between bodies, city-states, 
the region, and the cosmos as dissonant, overlapping scales. By reading Machiavelli as an 
urbanist, a layered geography comes into focus within his thought in which he attempts to 
marshal the forces of virtù within a well-organized city-state against the powers of 
Fortuna and end the cycle of civil war in Italy. Whereas Machiavelli’s work is often 
received as a reflection on state sovereignty in its protean, if not full-fledged, form, I find 
in his thought a rich imagining of political geography that begins from reflections on 
power and freedom in the city. This reading of Machiavelli uproots familiar narratives 
about the centrality of the state and begins to provide an adaptive political orientation for 
times of systemic transformation. 
Chapter two, “Scale, Power, and Neoliberal Urbanism,” explores how the concept 
of scale takes on an important, albeit neglected, role in the work of Foucault. I read 
Foucault on disciplinary power and biopolitics as an elaboration of the relations between 
the scales of bodies, cities, societies, populations, and the globe. The chapter complicates 
Eurocentric visions of the state and globalization by bringing into focus the multiple 
scales traversing these entities. It thereby reveals the contingent formation of “national 
state” and “globe” within Euro-American political discourses. Drawing on the 
examination of discipline and biopolitics, I trace the figure of the city through Foucault’s 
thought. I note its disappearance from his later reflections on neoliberalism and consider 
how the insights of his earlier work can contribute to understanding the contemporary 
neoliberal city and its relations to other scales of politics.  
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In chapter three, “Global War and Planetary Democracy,” I think through the 
political phenomena named in the title by turning to Hardt and Negri’s conceptualization 
of Empire, as global war, and the Multitude, as planetary democracy. The chapter reads 
Empire and Multitude as what Timothy Morton calls “hyperobjects,” political formations 
set on a scale so massive that they challenge the capacities of human perception and 
necessitate new concepts of spatial connection.41 By working through the ways in which 
Empire and Multitude operate at local, urban, national, and global scales, I propose a 
multiscalar geography of global war and begin to develop the nonlinear and non-
Euclidean dimensions of planetary democracy. In this geography the city embodies a 
decisive battleground. It faces the siege conditions of global war yet also serves as an 
indispensable site of political organization for planetary democracy. 
Chapter four, “The Urban Question and the Scales of Politics,” theorizes the 
relations between urban politics and larger geopolitical conditions by returning to what 
Marxist geographers have called the urban question, the relation between cities and 
capitalist society. By staging a conversation between urban theories of David Harvey and 
Manuel De Landa, it draws De Landa’s sensitivity to diverse forms of political agency 
into Harvey’s attention to scale in projects for social justice. The relations between 
micro- and macro- processes, as they shape contemporary cities, come into focus. This 
chapter concludes the project by considering the ways in which democratic politics are 
spatialized in an era of global urbanization. It reflects on the ecological sensitivities and 
forms of interconnectedness disclosed by a multiscalar political geography. 
 
                                                 
41 Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology After the End of the World 




 1 | Machiavelli’s Cityscapes 
 
In The Art of War Machiavelli instructs military commanders in the 
practice and importance of map making:  
The first thing he ought to do is get an exact map of the whole country … so that 
he may have perfect knowledge of all the towns and their distance from each 
other, and of all the roads, mountains, rivers, woods, swamps, and their particular 
location and nature. For this purpose, it is necessary to procure by various means 
several persons who are from different parts and who are well acquainted with 
those places; he should question them closely and compare their accounts … In 
addition to doing this, he should send out cavalry parties under experienced 
commanders not only to discover the enemy, but to observe the quality of the 
terrain and to see whether it agrees with his map and the information he has 
received.1  
 
Machiavelli’s “exact map,” granting its user “perfect knowledge,” emerges from the 
assembly of fragmentary parts that have to be questioned, verified, and compared. This 
practice aims to gather the various perspectives of multiple reports into one complex. The 
insistence upon repeated observation and cross-reference treats the terrain of military 
maneuver as a dynamic space that calls for constant remapping as it shifts, rises, and 
folds. Machiavelli thus recommends a cartographic process adapted to an evolving world. 
In this chapter I suggest that a similar cartographic sensibility animates Machiavelli’s 
political work. Rather than establishing a definitive model of politics, he lays out 
practices of mapping political life that accommodate turbulent processes traversing the 
political landscape. In particular, Machiavelli drafts political maps at multiple scales that 
capture the composition of cities, the organization of bodies, and the movements of 
planetary and cosmic forces. For Machiavelli, everyday spaces and practices confront 
transformations at not just local, but also system-wide and planetary scales. A variety of 
                                                 
1 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Art of War, ed. Neal Wood, trans. Ellis Farneworth (Cambridge: Da 
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forces, ranging from the architecture of fortresses to the tempest of fortuna, influence the 
dispositions of a people and the survival of a polity. Tectonic shifts in politics bring about 
the need to periodically splice, revise, and rescale maps of political life. He provides 
maps at embodied, urban, and planetary scales that overlap and interweave in ways that 
defy concentric nesting. 
Machiavelli begins mapping the contours of political life from the formation of 
cities. His vision of the city draws together relations between the people, the political 
order of the city-state (either principality or republic), architectural forms composing the 
built environment of the city, and grand cosmic forces that traverse the urban milieu. His 
account positions the city at the intersection of the everyday practices of civic life, its 
“fortresses,” “laws” and “armies;” the city-state’s caution in relation to other cities; the 
systemic transformations of nearby empires; and the sway of forces that exceed human 
mastery, namely the heavens and fortuna. For Machiavelli, the city represents a space of 
aleatory encounters, the political outcomes are never fully predictable, even to those with 
the greatest virtù. Specifically, the cityscapes of Florence and Rome imprint 
Machiavelli’s thought and provide differing modes of relating to the aleatory events of 
political life. The political antiquity of Rome serves as a guide for cities navigating the 
flux of politics, whereas Florence, under the leadership of Piero Soderini, provides 
Machiavelli with a tale of tragedy in which its inability to adapt brought its defeat and 
conquest. 
Machiavelli’s urbanism, and its connection to his implicit political geography of 
scale, has been largely overshadowed by the debate over his fidelity to republican 
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politics.2 His attention to the aleatory encounters of the city and the relations of power 
that govern them has been all but lost in the dispute, primarily regarding the reading of 
The Prince, over Machiavelli’s commitments to monarchy, republicanism, and the 
emergence of the national state.3 I wish to set aside this line of questioning in order to 
make space for reading Machiavelli as an urbanist, an approach that harmonizes many of 
the seeming conflicts in his texts. Indeed, The Prince and The Discourses are united in 
their emphasis on the political life of cities. As Quentin Skinner argues “it would be a 
mistake to infer that the Discourses are exclusively concerned with republics as opposed 
to principalities … Machiavelli stresses … his interest lies not in republics as such, but 
rather in the government of cities.”4 Here, care should be taken to distinguish 
Machiavelli’s “government of cities” from the “arts of government” as described by 
Michel Foucault, in which restrictive practices of governing everyday conduct 
proliferate.5 Machiavelli’s urbanism operates not primarily by policing or constraining 
                                                 
2 I have, as of yet, found no one who reads Machiavelli as an urbanist. Discussions of space and 
spatiality drawing on Machiavelli appear most frequently within International Relations. His 
influence for the discipline pertains to discussions of territoriality and state formation. See R.B.J. 
Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), Chapter 2. 
3 For one of the most influential studies of Machiavelli’s republican thought see J.G.A. Pocock, 
The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). Gramsci’s essay, translated to English as “The 
Modern Prince,” has been influential for strong monarchical-statist readings of Machiavelli. See 
Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, ed. and trans. 
Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 123 – 
205. 
4 Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 57. My emphasis. 
5 “Arts of government” receive more extensive discussion in chapter 3. See also Michel Foucault, 
Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977 – 1978, ed. Michel 
Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). For an excellent 
examination of Machiavelli’s role as a “negative touchstone” in the formulation of the arts of 
government. See Robyn Marasco, “Machiavelli Contra Governmentality,” Contemporary 
Political Theory (2011): 339 – 361. 
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change, flow, and accident, but rather by affirming them. I argue that his account of cities 
governed by virtù offers us ways to counter the reign of private interests by assembling 
the spaces of cities and the bodies of their citizens into thriving, durable publics. These 
publics provide valuable points of contrast with the political institutions and spaces of 
neoliberalism. The chapter considers Machiavelli’s writings on fortresses as envisioning 
urban spaces at odds the contemporary proliferation of gated communities and fortified 
enclaves that characterizes neoliberal urban development. Furthermore, his insistence on 
the public practice of raising an army, and his resulting aversion to mercenaries, serves as 
a critique of the privatization and outsourcing of war. I find in his thought publics with 
the dynamism and flexibility necessary to survive the pressures exerted upon them by 
turbulent eddies and flows of political life. 
 
The Genesis of Urban Politics 
The city plays a central role in Machiavelli’s thought, yet it remains neglected in 
considerations of Machiavelli’s relevance to contemporary politics. The city serves as his 
site through which to consider questions of contingency and duration in politics and the 
ways in which human freedom can endure. His narrative of social and political origins 
involves cities forming out of multiplicities condensing in particular places. Various 
types of cities appear with differing relationships between territory and political order. In 
Machiavelli’s typology, these urban territorialities include cities built by natives of a 
place, either under the control of a central authority, such as Athens under Theseus, or 
ruled by laws determined by their collective needs for survival, such as Venice. Migrant 
groups settling from foreign lands found other cities in this typology. Some cities are 
impractically built as tributes to the glory of princes, Alexandria being the foremost 
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example. Others are built as cities of free people, where Machiavelli judges the ability of 
the builder by two criteria: “the first is in his selection of a site; and the other is in his 
organization of the laws.”6 As Machiavelli continues, it becomes apparent that the site of 
the city’s founding and its organization cannot be separated. Great fertility in the land 
and “richness of the site” can produce “idle men unfit for any useful activity.”7 These 
spaces require strict regulations, drilling, and training to cultivate subjects of the requisite 
skill and ability.   
Machiavelli’s emphasis on the site of a city has sometimes been read as part of his 
politics of necessity in which natural conditions rigidly dictate the production of socio-
political order.  But Vickie Sullivan, in reading this passage of Discourses on cities and 
sites, pushes the reading of Machiavelli beyond a unidirectional politics of necessity into 
a more intricate relationship between nature and culture: “Nature’s beneficence actually 
comes to view through its provision of infertile places, for the existence of scarcity gives 
human beings the opportunity to subdue their own nature – to subdue their passions. In 
this manner the city, through its laws and with nature’s help, struggles against the 
passions imposed by human nature.”8 Here, natural scarcity produces hardship that 
inclines citizens toward empowering martial and political pursuits. The space of the city 
and the place of the site influence the conditions of urban citizenship. Effective practices 
of governing a city emerge to fill in for the resources, either of materials or virtù, that the 
site does not provide. Urban political life emerges from these imbrications between 
                                                 
6 Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, trans. Julia Conway Bondanella and Peter Bondanella 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 20. 
7 Machiavelli, Discourses, 21. Gendered language in original. 
8 Vickie B. Sullivan, Machiavelli's Three Romes: Religion, Human Liberty, and Politics 
Reformed (DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996), 183. 
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human and nonhuman domains. As organizational practices of human design sediment 
into the strata of geological sites, they form a political landscape composed of human 
subjects and physical terrain. 
In a brief discussion in The Prince, the “free city” appears as a figure of resiliency 
capable of confounding every power of a prince: 
A city accustomed to living in freedom is more easily maintained through the 
means of its own citizens than in any other way … Anyone who becomes master 
of a city accustomed to living in liberty and does not destroy it may expect to be 
destroyed by it, because such a city always has as a refuge in any rebellion the 
name of liberty and its ancient institutions, neither of which is ever forgotten 
either because of the passing of time or because of the bestowal of benefits.9  
 
Here, freedom denotes the condition of living under one’s own laws and outside the rule 
of oligarchs or princes. The freedom of a city cannot be secured through the 
establishment of a definitive, unshakeable order. Instead, Machiavelli affirms a city that 
has become accustomed to “living in freedom,” where freedom is an effect of a certain 
politics of productive encounter with fortuna. The free city is not without distinct forms 
of authority and power relations. However, distinctive organization, history, and the kind 
of power specific to urban citizens and spaces make it resistant to the control of princes.  
Much of the free city’s ability to resist the sovereign powers of a prince rests on 
its enduring memories of freedom.  In Machiavelli’s judgment a prudent prince should 
prefer to conquer a city “accustomed to obedience,” in which the rule of a prince has 
grown familiar.10 In such a city, the people will not cling to powerful memories of civic 
life prior to the imposition of the prince’s new ruling order. The memory of its practices 
and institutions in a free city creates an insurmountable obstacle to the maintenance of the 
                                                 
9 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, Trans. Peter Bondanella, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 19. 
10 Machiavelli, The Prince, 20. 
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prince’s rule. Such practices reverberate beyond the walls of the city allowing free cities 
to endure under the pressure of princes, empire, and fortuna. Machiavelli writes The 
Prince not simply to demonize the subjugation of these cities but to articulate how other 
cities, without histories of a republican tradition, might live in conditions of relative 
freedom. The Prince provides a practical politics for urban-planetary life in which 
principalities will neither crumble under every shift of politics at other scales, nor default 
to conditions of complete domination under the prince.   
Among the cities of which Machiavelli speaks, Florence and Rome stand out, 
albeit for different reasons. Machiavelli’s frustrations, regrets, and personal investments 
come through in his melancholic discussion of Florence. From its founding Florence 
faced spatial and territorial challenges – “it could not in its beginnings undergo any 
growth except that which the generosity of its prince allowed it.”11 While a city’s origins 
present unique challenges, Machiavelli also notes the political pitfalls leading to its 
conquest. In the case of Florence these pitfalls include the events that led to his expulsion 
from public life. Piero Soderini, by allowing Florence to be recaptured and the republic 
abolished, was guilty of “failing to realize that wickedness is not subdued by time nor 
appeased by any gift.”12 Florence of Machiavelli’s time represents a city that 
experimented with practices of virtù only to fall into political idleness. Machiavelli’s 
words of guidance are intended as fragments of practical wisdom drawn from the history 
of his home city.  
                                                 
11 Machiavelli, Discourses, 20. 
12 Machiavelli, Discourses, 253. 
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Rome, on the contrary, serves as an exemplar of adept political practice that 
functions as a synecdoche for all of political antiquity.13 “Rome” names that combination 
of effective urban government, skillful martial practices, and collaboration with 
nonhuman nature. It stands as the model in which “the fertility of the site, the 
convenience of the sea, the frequent victories, and the great size of its empire were unable 
to corrupt it for centuries, and these laws kept it full of as much exceptional ability as 
ever adorned any other city or republic.”14 The Roman republic embodies virtù and its 
capacities.  
In order to elucidate Rome’s exceptional character, Machiavelli sketches the 
image of a cyclical political history, in which republics move from principalities to 
tyranny to aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy, anarchy, and back to principalities.15 
Principality, aristocracy, and democracy rapidly deform into tyranny, oligarchy and 
anarchy. The republic’s ability to endure emerges as the criteria for judging states. A 
more durable republic could only be formed by citizens who “avoided each of these 
forms by itself alone and chose a form of government that combined all … for when in 
the same city there is a principality, an aristocracy, and a democracy, one keeps watch 
                                                 
13 Sullivan finds three distinct figures that Machiavelli refers to as Rome: Christian Rome, Pagan 
Rome, and his ideal-political Rome. She says, “each distinct Rome exists in a state of war with 
the others, as each, informed by its own divergent worldview, threatens to vanquish its rivals; at 
other times they coexist in surprising harmony” (Sullivan, Machiavelli’s Three Romes, 3). My 
discussion comes closest to Sullivan’s third Rome, the one of Machiavelli’s political aspiration. 
However, I differ greatly from Sullivan in that she sees Machiavelli writing first and foremost in 
opposition to the tyranny of Christianity. Furthermore, she sees Machiavelli as having many of 
his own tyrannical aspirations. I generally try to avoid the debates over Machiavelli’s primary 
political aim, those questions that include: Is he a republican or a monarchist? An “immoralist” or 
secretly a Christian? Instead, I seek to elucidate the fugitive political sensitivities, his urbanism in 
particular, that have been occluded as a result of pursuing these questions.  
14 Machiavelli, Discourses, 22. 
15 Machiavelli, Discourses, 24. In this slippage of one regime into the next: “The principality 
easily becomes tyrannical; aristocracy quite easily becomes the government of the few; and 
democracy without difficulty turns into anarchy.”  
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over the other.”16 Rome appears as this republic. However, it does not acquire all that it 
needs to survive through its founding alone. Instead, “so many special circumstances 
nevertheless arose from the conflict that existed between the plebeians and the senate that 
what a founder had not done was brought about by chance.”17 Fortuna smiled on the 
virtù of the Roman citizenry, allowing it to realize a durable state amidst the chaotic 
circumstances from which the polity emerged. The founding moment of Rome represents 
a good encounter between virtù and fortuna. Rome, the prototype of free cities-to-come 
and the break from the cyclical movement of rising and falling regimes, forms in part by 
chance. This founding is an accident but nonetheless a transformative event that changes 
political life irrevocably.  
Louis Althusser emphasizes the importance of Rome as exemplar of political 
practice in Machiavelli. By Althusser’s assessment, “Rome” in Machiavelli refers to the 
city, to the republic, and, most importantly, to antiquity in general. Although “Rome is 
admired in … literature, the arts, jurisprudence, and even medicine,” it is not, says 
Althusser, acknowledged as an exemplar of politics.18 But Machiavelli does speak of 
Roman politics as an organization of a city that breaks from the cyclical rise and fall of 
regimes. This move separates him from Renaissance humanists who invoke Rome as a 
moral exemplar: 
Far from subscribing to the religious, moral, philosophical, or aesthetic myth 
fostered by humanism in respect of the ancients and Rome, to the universal 
ideological celebration of antiquity, Machiavelli vehemently denounces the 
discrimination imposed on it by its official eulogists and priests. He declares that 
his own antiquity is precisely the one sacrificed, forgotten, repressed: the 
antiquity of politics … that of concrete history and practice of politics.19 
                                                 
16 Machiavelli, Discourses, 26. 
17 Machiavelli, Discourses, 27. 
18 Louis Althusser, Machiavelli and Us, trans. Gregory Elliot (London: Verso, 1999), 45. 
19 Althusser, 45. Emphasis in original. 




Here, political antiquity is suppressed as a consequence of moral and religious antiquity. 
Machiavelli’s politics of virtù stands in contrast to moral virtue. Virtù denotes skill, 
adeptness, or virtuousity. Citizens and republics that espouse moral virtue, brought about 
in Renaissance humanism through reference to moral antiquity, hold political antiquity in 
contempt and remain incapable of the realizing the coordinates of a political life 
inhabited by virtù: “[i]f they have contempt for antiquity, it is because their practice is 
contemptible.”20  
Rome provides, in Althusser’s reading of Machiavelli, evidence for a state that 
endures and the coordinates to realize this project in Italy: “the fundamental problem of 
the state, which haunts Machiavelli in his recasting of the classical typology, is its 
duration. Machiavelli is interested in only one form of government: that which enables a 
state to endure.”21 Althusser reframes the question of Machiavelli’s political project. 
Rather than inquiring into the sincerity of Machiavelli’s republicanism, he subordinates 
the discussion of the relative merits of republics and monarchies to the aim of 
formulating a government that will persist in the face of forces that threaten its survival.22 
Thus Rome provides the model for Italy’s liberation: “Rome is par excellence the 
                                                 
20 Althusser, 46. Emphasis in original. 
21 Althusser, 40. 
22 Elsewhere in Machiavelli and Us Althusser indicates that, following Gramsci, he sees 
Machiavelli as a monarchist. While committed to a position in the debate between monarchist and 
republican, Althusser sets aside the centrality of this debate in favor of an emphasis on the 
durability of the republic. The passages quoted above indicate that his focus on monarchy stem 
from a desire to produce a government that will survive. Furthermore, his description of Rome 
coincides with Machiavelli’s depiction of it as a composite government in which principality, 
aristocracy, and democracy coincide: “This centre is Rome, a state that endured. The centre of 
Rome resides in its beginnings. The beginning of this republic was to have been a monarchy, 
endowing Rome with a government conducive to the state’s durability – a composite government 
that persisted under the guise of the republic” (Althusser, 48). 
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observable objective experience of the foundation of a state that endured, and endured for 
specific reasons pertaining on the one hand to its foundation by kings, and on the other to 
the laws given it by these rulers. Rome is thus the formulation of a problem resolved: the 
very problem of Italy for Machiavelli.”23  
Machiavelli’s turn to Rome as political exemplar might seem a conservative or 
melancholic move attached to “returning to tradition” or simply repeating the past. It 
appears, at first, as nostalgia for a previous way of political life, and a return to the 
traditions of antiquity. But for Althusser, Rome’s exemplary status as an enduring state is 
not for Machiavelli a fixed or final model for all states. Its status as exemplar does not 
demand that it be reproduced exactly; rather, its historical actuality demonstrates that an 
enduring state is one capable of navigating fortuna’s currents.  
Second, Althusser defends the novelty of Machiavelli’s political vision by 
contrasting it with the adoption of Roman political discourse by bourgeois revolutionaries 
in France: 
without these mythical examples of the Roman accomplishment of liberty, 
equality and fraternity, without the ideology of Roman political virtue, the 
leaders and protagonists of the bourgeois revolution would not have been able to 
mobilize the masses, would not have been able to mobilize themselves … they 
needed the excess of the past relative to the present, in order to disguise the 
narrowness of the actual content of the bourgeois revolution.24 
 
The invocation of Rome pulls the past into the present, not as an enervating force trying 
to repeat the past, but as “excess” capable of reconstituting the present. In the case of 
bourgeois revolution, the excess of the past produces the pretense for an otherwise 
conservative political act. Whereas both Machiavelli and bourgeois revolutionaries 
                                                 
23 Althusser, 48. 
24 Althusser, 50. Emphasis in original. 
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invoke Rome as an “illusion of utopia,” the Roman utopia invoked in the French 
revolution serves moral ideology rather than politics.25  Bourgeois revolution, “is a 
struggle for state power between two equally exploitative classes … [E]xploited classes 
… mobilized under a utopian ideology [act] in service of the class struggle of the new 
exploiting class.”26 The excess of the past, in the form of Roman (moral) utopia, grants 
the bourgeoisie the capacities to pass off new conditions of exploitation as an act of 
liberation. For Althusser, class positions are secured not only through material conditions, 
but also by a politics of intensities moving through history and temporality. The figure of 
Rome provides an excess to be wielded either for the entrenchment of class domination, 
or following Machiavelli, to energize new modes of political practice. 
Machiavelli turns to Rome as exemplar in order to “subordinate morality to 
politics. He seeks not virtue, but virtù, which has nothing moral about it, for it 
exclusively designates the exceptional political ability and intellectual power of the 
Prince.”27 Machiavelli deploys Rome as a utopia in the service of exceptional political 
skill rather than morality. In order to halt recurrent internal conquests that subordinate the 
region to its neighbors, the cities of Italy must cultivate productive encounters between 
virtù and fortuna. The invocation of the figure of Rome binds the necessary task of 
uniting Italy to the seemingly impossible task of defining the contours of virtù and 
fortuna that make unification possible. Machiavelli’s Rome brings the excess of the past 
to bear on present. In contrast to the language of bourgeois revolution, this invocation of 
political Rome grants, through the excess of its utopian character, the possibility for past 
                                                 
25 Althusser, 49. 
26 Althusser, 49. 
27 Althusser, 51. 
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to overflow the necessity of the present. The excess of Roman political practice realized 
in Renaissance Italian life gives way to a new durable politics undefined by either 
historical moment.  
This unique relation to temporality, expressed through Machiavelli’s invocation 
of Rome as political exemplar, sets Machiavelli apart from thinkers of antiquity unable to 
imagine transformative political action. In a philosophical crowd divided into 
“premodern,” “renaissance,” and “modern” thinkers, Machiavelli stands alone. Althusser 
adeptly notes Machiavelli’s novelty for political thought, his “solitude”:  
This is perhaps the ultimate point in Machiavelli’s solitude: the fact that he 
occupied a unique and precarious place in the history of political thought 
between a long moralizing, religious and idealist tradition of political thought, 
which he radically rejected, and the new tradition of the political philosophy of 
natural law, which was to submerge everything and in which the rising 
bourgeoisie found its self-image.28 
 
Machiavelli resists the moralism of extant religious traditions while pursuing a politics 
distinct from the fledgling capitalism of the emerging bourgeoisie. Here, a homology 
appears between Machiavelli’s relation to the figure of Rome and Althusser’s relation to 
the figure of Machiavelli. Whereas the historical existence of Rome guaranteed the 
possibility of a unified state for Machiavelli, the figure of Machiavelli guarantees the 
possibility of thinking social revolution for Althusser. Just as Machiavelli invoked Rome 
to think against the conditions of a politically fractured Italy caught in stagnating 
moralism, Althusser invokes Machiavelli to think against predatory forms of capitalism. 
The excess that Machiavelli brings to bear on his present by invoking Rome parallels the 
excess that Althusser brings to bear on his present by invoking Machiavelli. Each 
                                                 
28 Althusser, 124. On Machiavelli’s solitude more generally see Althusser, 115 – 130. 
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transcends the contemporary political idiom by resisting the inclinations and 
determinations for the future set by the existing socio-political order. 
While Althusser effectively highlights Machiavelli’s political novelty in his 
relationship to the exemplar of Rome, he underestimates the significance of the city as a 
political form in Machiavelli’s thought. To Althusser, Machiavelli aims to make “a clean 
sweep of existing feudal forms as incompatible with the objective of Italian unity.”29 He 
reads Machiavelli’s exhortation to unify Italy at the close of The Prince as a call for the 
creation of the national state. Machiavelli concludes the exhortation doubtless that a 
move for Italian unity would benefit the country: 
Nor can I express with what love he will be received in all those territories that 
have suffered through these foreign floods; with what thirst for revenge, with 
what stubborn loyalty, with what devotion, with what tears ... Therefore may 
Your Illustrious House take up this task with the spirit and the hope with which 
just enterprises are begun, so that under your banner this country may be 
ennobled.30 
  
Althusser, however, reads this exhortation as a call for politics that emanate from a single 
scale in which the dictates of the national state drive political transformation. Such a 
concentric image of politics, focused on the national state, displaces other scales of 
political action. In dismissing the city-state as a mere “urban form of feudalism,” 
Althusser elides the urban scale from a political future.31 He sees urban spaces as 
“incapable of the economic transformations and expansion, and political conversion, that 
would make them suitable for the task of unifying the national state.”32 I find two 
problems with this claim. The first resides in its reading of Machiavelli and the second in 
                                                 
29 Althusser, 70. 
30 Machiavelli, The Prince, 90. 
31 Althusser, 71. 
32 Althusser, 71 
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its imagination of the possibilities of economic transformation. First, Althusser neglects 
Machiavelli’s location of the origin of political history within the city. More specifically, 
the Roman republic forms “by chance” out of the urban place, space, and practices upon 
which the city is founded. The urban scale of political life provides many of the 
conditions for the formation of a national state. Although Machiavelli’s exhortation for 
the liberation of Italy outlines contours of an emerging nation-state, it represents only one 
of the scales around which political life was organized in the late Renaissance. In contrast 
to Althusser’s state-centric understanding, I find in Machiavelli a textured account of 
political life traversed by multiple scales within and beyond the national state. 
Althusser also underestimates the potential for political and economic 
transformation that exists within the urban form. The relationships between the urban 
scale and political-economic life are numerous. Transformations of global capitalism 
coalesce in the form of the post-industrial city. David Harvey suggests that capitalism 
proceeds through the reinvestment of surplus into the process of urbanization, a claim 
investigated at great length in chapter four.33 Furthermore, contests over urban space 
often coincide with the contestation of neoliberal economics and government.34 Those 
displaced or dispossessed by global capitalism have sought new ways to inhabit cities in 
defiance of the police orders that so often deny them.35 Additionally, the poles over the 
                                                 
33 David Harvey, “Right to the City” New Left Review (2008): 23 – 40. 
34 Seattle in 1999, the Toronto G8/G20 Protests, London Student Protests, and #BlackLivesMatter 
have occupied cities and urban infrastructure in ways that intervened in the everyday workings in 
cities in order to challenge neoliberalism and white supremacy. Informal economies and practices 
often defy police orders in cities in ways that are less visible but no less significant. I address the 
significance of informality in chapter 4. 
35 The Occupy Movement has clearly received the most discussion of this but the (re)occupation 
of urban spaces in opposition to gentrification and systemic racism in housing takes numerous 
forms. For an excellent account of one such land struggle see Max Rameau, Take Back the Land: 
Land, Gentrification and the Umoja Village Shantytown (Miami: Nia Press, 2008).  
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future of political-economic constellations often take on the name of two cities: Porto 
Alegre and Davos.36 Finally, the urban scale will frame the process through which 
ecological crises of neoliberal capitalism are negotiated. Mike Davis explains their 
importance at length: 
Cities in the abstract are the solution to the global environmental crisis: urban 
density can translate into great efficiencies in land, energy, and resource use, 
while democratic public spaces and cultural institutions likewise provide 
qualitatively higher standards of enjoyment than individualized consumption and 
commodified leisure. However, as urban theorists … have long recognized, both 
environmental efficiency and public affluence require the preservation of a green 
matrix of intact ecosystems, open spaces, and natural services: cities need an 
alliance with Nature in order to recycle their waste products into usable inputs for 
farming, gardening, and energy production. Sustainable urbanism presupposes 
the preservation of surrounding wetlands and agriculture.37 
 
Machiavelli does not speak to these issues directly, nor should we expect him to. He 
does, however, leave space for the role of urban politics in coming formations of 
capitalism. He attends to the intricacies of political life, the urban scale in particular, with 
more subtlety than Althusser discerns. For Machiavelli, politics emerges from multiple 
scales irreducible to an image of the state as container in which cities and urban citizens 
are deposited.38 In the next section I pursue the complexity and intricacy that Machiavelli 
                                                 
36 Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2004), chapter 5. 
37 Mike Davis, Planet of Slums (London: Verso, 2006), 134. Davis is note hopeful that we will 
soon realize the ecological promise of cities. Nonetheless, he powerfully states this promise and 
sees cities as an indispensable lens through which to comprehend contemporary environmental 
crisis. 
38 I borrow the reference to the state as a container from Peter Taylor, “The State as Container: 
Territoriality in the Modern World-System,” Progress in Human Geography 18 (1994): 151 – 
162. Taylor argues that conceptualizing the state as a container conceals its permeability by flows 
of wealth and power. I concur with this point but also wish to emphasize the way in which a 
cartographic sensibility focused on the state views the politics of cities as subordinate to national 
state action.  
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ascribes to the city and political life within it. I turn now to his account of the built 
environment of the city and its political effects. 
 
Fortresses and the Fortification of Publics 
In his treatment of the construction of fortresses, Machiavelli parses the 
significance of architecture for the power relations within a political order. Scholars of 
Machiavelli often overlook his attention to fortresses or mention it in passing as part of 
his concern with military affairs. However, I suggest that Machiavelli’s discussion of 
fortresses contains a careful theorization of public space and power as it emerges through 
built environments. He helps us to think through the ways in which built environments 
enable certain conditions of freedom. Elucidating this relationship between the built 
environment and freedom reveals a more complex spatial politics than the concentric 
model often attributed to Machiavelli. 
In the title of his passage on fortresses in The Prince, “Of whether fortresses and 
many things that princes employ every day are useful or harmful,” Machiavelli points to 
a temporality of the everyday that produces political effects.39 By singling out the 
construction of fortresses he ascribes special power to spatial practices, those practices of 
defining spaces and constructing environments that affect subjects inhabiting them. These 
spatial practices represent one of many practices of governing newly conquered cities: 
Some princes have disarmed their subjects in order to hold the state securely. 
Others have kept their conquered lands divided. Some have encouraged 
hostilities against themselves. Others have turned to winning the support of those 
were suspect at the beginning of their rule. Some have built fortresses; others 
have torn them down and destroyed them. And although one cannot render a 
precise judgement concerning these matters without knowing the particular 
                                                 
39 Machiavelli, The Prince, 72. 
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details of those states where some similar decision had to be taken, nevertheless I 
shall speak in as broad a manner as the subject-matter will allow.40 
 
I see Machiavelli’s discussion of the construction and destruction of fortresses as part of 
his interest in practices of governing that include arming or disarming new subjects, 
dividing conquered lands, and inciting or easing hostilities. Machiavelli’s resistance to 
universalize condemnation has two effects. First, it develops his pragmatism by sinking 
into the textured political life of the states in which a set of practices take hold. He 
suggests a politics that resists strict rules of statecraft, leaving room instead for 
uncertainty, accidents, and chance. This politics attends to the specificity of power 
relations at work in a particular urban milieu. The second effect of his refusal to dismiss 
any of these practices outright works more subtly. Machiavelli continues to appreciate the 
concept of fortification while beginning to evacuate the terms of its existing meanings. 
He prepares the concept of fortification for resignification taking this familiar term for 
Renaissance princes and applying it to new political ends. This allows him to capture the 
affects invested in fortification and to bring them into the service of virtù. Consequently, 
his answer to the fortress question emphasizes the special character of the city into which 
they are inserted, while carving out a new role for the concept of the fortress: 
[P]rinces have been accustomed to erect fortresses that may serve as the bridle 
and bit for those who might plot an attack against them, and to have a secure 
shelter from sudden attack. I praise this method, because it has been employed 
since ancient times … Fortresses, then, are either useful or not, depending upon 
the times: if they benefit you in a way, they injure you in another. This argument 
may be dealt with as follows: the prince who is more afraid of his people than of 
foreigners should build fortresses, but one who is more afraid of foreigners than 
of his people should do without them … [T]he best fortress that exists is not to 
be hated by the people. Although you may have fortresses, they will not save you 
if the people hate you, for once the people have taken up arms, they never lack 
for foreigners who will assist them … Considering all these matters, then, I shall 
praise both those princes who construct fortresses and those who do not. And I 
                                                 
40 Machiavelli, The Prince, 72. 
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shall reproach any prince who, trusting in fortresses, considers the hatred of the 
people to be of little importance.41 
 
Here, Machiavelli begins to distinguish the function of the figure of the fortress from the 
fortress’s effects on the built environment of the city. He focuses not on the specific 
location of particular fortresses or whether he considers them defensible. Instead, he 
emphasizes the process of building and destroying fortresses. He directs his concern 
toward the spatial practice of fortification in which built environments have political 
effects on the relations between citizens and a polity. The physical structure of the 
fortress denotes a distrust of the citizenry. The destruction of a fortress may prove a more 
fruitful endeavor by reinforcing the bond between prince and people.  
While Machiavelli wavers on the desirability of fortresses, the concept of a 
fortress and fortification, as a metaphor for the practice of freedom, remains 
indispensable. By deeming the condition of not being hated by the people as the best 
possible fortress, Machiavelli formulates the relation between prince and people 
differently than theories of contract or divine right. He sees the relation between 
governors and governed as a process of fortification that is at once political, martial, and 
spatial. Here, fortification does not mean the construction of walls, barracks, and 
garrisons. It also refers to the process of building political infrastructure necessary for a 
city to endure without being sacked and, furthermore, for that city to provide for the 
relative flourishing of its citizenry. This process of fortification taps the dynamic energies 
of the people, allowing cities to navigate the flux of politics. Such a process of 
fortification does so without the construction of fortresses that produce a built 
environment inclined towards domination, sovereign violence, and cruelty. 
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Machiavelli reserves his more seething criticism of fortresses and their violent 
propensities for the Discourses. The construction of fortresses produces both a predatory 
politics and military vulnerability.  Fortresses prove strategically inadequate in times of 
war while at the same time prompting rulers to become overconfident and abusive toward 
their subjects: 
If you build fortresses, they will be useless in peacetime, because they make you 
more inclined to mistreat your subjects, but in times of war are completely 
useless, because they are assaulted both by the enemy and by your subjects … 
they are especially so in our own times against artillery, the destructive power of 
which makes small locations … impossible to defend.42 
 
The construction of fortresses inserts a space of domination into the built environment of 
the city and intervenes in its affective milieu, thereby altering citizens’ dispositions, 
rewriting bonds of trust, and stoking fears of the people. Stated bluntly, fortresses “make 
you more bold and violent toward your subjects, and then they fail to give you security 
within, which you were convinced would exist.”43  
Furthermore, the fortress serves as the physical expression of the separation 
between the politics of late Renaissance Florence and political antiquity: “if the Romans 
had been made like these Florentines they would have thought about building fortresses, 
but because they possessed a different kind of ability, a different kind of judgement, and a 
different kind of power, they did not build them.”44 The built environment of the city 
embodies the difference between the political apparatus of antiquity and that of late 
Renaissance Florence. Distinct understandings of ability, judgment, and power animate 
                                                 
42 Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, trans. Julia Conway Bondanella and Peter Bondanella 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 221. 
43 Machiavelli, Discourses, 220. However, even in the Discourses he refrains from universal 
condemnation referring to fortresses as “generally much more harmful than useful” (Machiavelli, 
Discourses, 219, my emphasis). 
44 Machiavelli, Discourses, 220. 
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each political order and produce cityscapes inflected by these concepts. Florentine 
government adopted spatial practices of domination, martial practices that deny powers to 
the citizenry, and an understanding of human ability walled in by rigid boundaries.  
Political antiquity proceeds otherwise. It pursues virtù, self-sufficiency, and builds 
no fortresses. It relies, instead, on the fortification of the people. Furthermore, in antiquity 
“the Spartans not only abstained from doing so [building fortresses] but also did not 
permit their city to have walls, because they wanted the exceptional ability of the 
individual man, and no other typed of defence, to protect them.”45 The contrast between 
the cityscapes of Florence and those of Rome and Sparta brings into focus the differences 
between politics and territory in each polity. The political philosophy of Florence 
understands power, ability, and judgment as capacities to be enclosed, constrained, and 
sheltered. It translates this emphasis on enclosure into its fortification of territory. The 
walled-in territory of a fortified city reflects bodies, forces, and subjectivities organized 
around enervating conceptions of power, ability, and judgment. Within the fortified city, 
subjects live in an affective milieu of fear and mistrust. This city, encircled by its 
earthworks and stones walls, confines its subjects and their political capacities within 
those walls. By contrast, Rome and Sparta mobilize power, ability, and judgment as 
flexible forces in need of exercise, honing, and enhancement. Accordingly, they take up a 
relatively fluid relation to the enclosure of territory. In defiance of domination, the 
territory of the city is enclosed not by walls but by the force of skillful political and 
martial practice.  
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Furthermore, the exemplarity of a city without walls contests spatial practices of 
the princely and noble classes. Fortresses represented private defenses, reserved for kings 
and ecclesiastical authorities. Walls were more public in their function, providing some 
protection to the people, but remaining entirely within the order of feudal power relations 
between prince and subjects.46 By celebrating Sparta, a city entirely without walls, 
Machiavelli endorses a radical constitution of public space in which the protection of the 
polity resides in the collective power of the people, the capacities that they derive from 
the organization of their city, and their encounters with fortuna. This collection of 
citizens, built environments, and forces of nonhuman nature resembles Jane Bennett’s 
formulation of the public: 
A public is a cluster of bodies harmed by the actions of others or even by actions 
born from their own actions as these trans-act; harmed bodies draw near each 
other and seek to engage in new acts that will restore their power, protect against 
future harm, or compensate for damage done – in that consists their political 
action, which, fortunately or unfortunately, will also become conjoint action with 
a chain of indirect, unpredictable consequences.47 
 
The formation of a public gathers the bodies of its citizens and the spaces of its cityscape 
in a common response to threat or harm. In a city without walls, power circulates openly 
among the bodies of the citizenry. The defense of the city tests their capacities of political 
and military resiliency and inclines them toward virtù. Open urban spaces fortify this 
public against the centralization of power and consolidation of the capacities of violence 
                                                 
46 The fortress or “castle …represented simultaneously the status, wealth, power and defensive 
needs of the landowning classes…in essence, ‘private’ forms of defence, under an umbrella of 
imperial, royal or princely authority” (Oliver Creighton and Robert Higham, Medieval Town 
Walls: An Archaeology and Social History of Urban Defence (Stroud: Tempus, 2005), 21). Walls 
were marginally more communal,. They served as defenses for the entire town rather than 
protecting the landowning classes. 
47 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 101. Emphasis in 
original. 
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represented by the prince shut within his castle. Cities without walls require their citizens 
to form into a force of virtù or face being conquered. 
Machiavelli’s work on built environments resonates with studies of architecture 
and radical democracy in political theory. In particular, built environments utilized by 
socialist and democratic organizations in early twentieth century Italy have received 
substantial theorization for their ability to question existing power relations.48 These 
“houses of the people” enabled more equitable forms of worker organization and 
municipal government.49 As “an important intervention in the symbolic landscapes,” a 
house of the people “was part of a polemical challenge to the authority and dominance of 
the church, the state, and private capital.”50 These features of the built environment 
created political possibilities that exceeded concentric ordering of structures in which 
they were embedded.51 In similar fashion, Machiavelli sees the built environment as an 
essential part of a free city. A city without fortresses exhibits dynamic power relations 
and defies domination by a prince. Fortification of the public, as an assembly of bodies 
acting in response to harm, enables an active urban citizenry and displaces fortresses that 
embody private wealth.  
This vision of a radically engaged public bears closer consideration in our 
neoliberal moment. Machiavelli opposes the privatization of politics that he sees 
spreading across Florence. Privatization for Machiavelli represents not only the pursuit of 
personal interest, but also the condition of being, as Hanna Pitkin suggests, “absorbed in 
                                                 
48 Margaret Kohn, Radical Space: Building the House of the People (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2003). 
49 Kohn, 87. 
50 Kohn, 96. 
51 Kohn, 91. Kohn views the house of the people as a “heterotopia of resistance,” folding a 
number of alternative socialist and democratic visions into a single place (Kohn, 91).   
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… immediate and direct relationships, unable to perceive the larger whole.” 52 It involves 
an enclosure of both space and the political imaginary, restricting one’s vision of concern 
to the horizon of the self. This form of privatization resembles the neoliberal assault on 
public spaces as embodiments of collective, social life. In built environments of cities, 
privatization appears as gated communities, high rise condominiums, and fortified 
enclaves. Such contemporary fortresses represent an assault on “living structure[s] of 
relationships among citizens.”53 They serve as spatial barriers between citizens and social 
barriers committed to individualistic politics. 
This assault on collective life arises from an ontological commitment to security 
and predictability. In his reading of Machiavelli, Sheldon Wolin argues that the built 
environments of fortresses reflect an ethos of political life committed to fighting tooth 
and nail against mobile, shifting forces in the world. For Wolin:  
the symbol of man’s illusions was the armed fortress. The fortress, in all of its 
seeming solidity, dramatized the false hope that there could be points of fixity, an 
unchanging basis of political and military security in a restless world. But there 
is a further lesson to the symbol. Deceived by the impressive exterior of his 
fortress, the ruler comes to believe himself invincible and is tempted into cruel 
and extreme acts. The illusion of security thus releases the psychological springs 
of ambition and domination. This example gives point to one of the principles of 
the new science: vice, in a political sense, is often the function of illusion, virtue 
the product of clear-sightedness.54  
 
                                                 
52 Hanna F. Pitkin, Fortune Is a Woman: Gender and Politics in the Thought of Niccolò 
Machiavelli (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 48. Pitkin traces the masculine 
dimensions of public life in Machiavelli’s thought, arguing that his notion of privatization entails 
a sense of attack on the manliness of civic life. I do not endorse Machiavelli’s version of public 
life without reservation. Rather, I wish to excavate in conversation with contemporary work on 
the formation of publics as a resource for thinking about the emergence of publics at multiple 
scales. 
53 Pitkin, 48. 
54 Wolin, 191. My emphasis. Gendered language in original. 
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The fortress provides an illusion of fixity in a world replete with dynamism. Deluded by 
fantasies of invulnerability, rulers engage in acts of cruelty against their citizens. Fortified 
urban architecture leads a ruler to neglect the process of securing the dynamic energies of 
the city’s populace, the lone fortress capable of navigating the turbulence of politics. A 
prince or governor must shift their practices from the construction of fortresses to the 
fortification of urban publics. The first militarizes urban space, eliminates powers of the 
citizenry, and consolidates the capacities for violence solely in the hands of the prince or 
governor. The latter constructs built environments and establishes civic practices that 
cultivate the mobile forces of bodies and the lost conceptualizations of power, ability, and 
judgment. Fortified urban publics nourish virtù rather than suffocate it through enclosure. 
The spaces and practices of a fortified urban public overcome the proliferation of private 
interests and harmonize political skill and adeptness with formulations of the common 
good. 
Wolin observes the difficulty of this transition: “Men find it difficult, Machiavelli 
noted, to accept a world of becoming; they hunger for constants.”55 Indeed, the 
Florentines and other city-states of Italy had lost sight of a politics of virtù capable of 
navigating a turbulent world of becoming. Spatial practices represent one of many 
techniques for altering the ethos of political life. In elaborating on the creation of fortified 
urban publics Machiavelli also turns to the somatic scale of political life that organizes 
bodies and their dispositions. 
 
Organizing Bodies for Politics and War 
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Machiavelli emphasizes the somatic scale at which bodies are organized as 
necessarily involved in the acquisition of adequate political knowledge and effective 
political practice. He engages the relation of citizen activism and embodiment through his 
notion of virtù. This gendered concept “raises the problem of the relationship of 
republican, activist politics not merely to fascism, but also to misogyny and what we now 
call machismo.”56 The aim in a close consideration of virtù and embodiment is not an 
unqualified endorsement of Machiavelli’s masculine formation of citizenship, but an 
engagement with the ways in which passion, interest, and cultivated skill enable political 
action. Through his discussion of the body and virtù, Machiavelli provides a starting 
point from which to think about the dispositions of citizens, collective compositions of 
bodies within cities, and their relationship to the expansion of empire and perpetual war.  
The healthy organization of the human body serves as Machiavelli’s metaphor for 
a strong body politic. He sees the body politic accumulating the equivalent of choler, 
phlegm, or black bile that must be released through the practice of public indictments. 
Here, the theory of a body inhabited by multiple humours that must be kept in balance 
informs his understanding of the body politic. The indictment of citizens “provides a 
release for those humours that arise within cities … the variability of those humours that 
agitate the republic has a means of release that is instituted by the laws.”57 Similarly, 
Machiavelli ranks parts of the body politic through a metaphor of the human body. When 
considering the parts of the republic vital to its defense, “the heart and vital organs of the 
body, not its extremities, have to be kept armed, since without the latter the body is alive, 
but if the former are harmed it dies; and these states keep the heart disarmed while 
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arming the hands and feet.”58 Human anatomy and physiology contributes to an 
understanding of the form and function of the body politic. In this metaphor the human 
body serves an important epistemological function; it proves indispensable in the 
acquisition of knowledge about politics at other scales. 
In addition to the metaphor of the body as the structure of the body politic, bodies 
are also included in Machiavelli’s metaphors of politics as mapping landscape and 
traversing terrain. Embodiment is both a feature in this political landscape and a vehicle 
through which politics occurs. Machiavelli’s prince “must always be out hunting and 
accustom his body to hardships.”59 In an effort to rekindle virtù the prince must condition 
his body for effective political practice. Through this appeal Machiavelli rebuts a central 
tenant of Renaissance humanism by bringing the body of the human ruler to the forefront 
of politics. His emphasis on the capacities of the body positions him distinctively in a 
cosmological debate about the relations of the body, mind, and soul.  
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola takes the position favoring the primacy of mind 
and soul over the body when he contends: “Nothing is greater on earth than humans, 
nothing is greater in humans than their mind and soul; if you scale their heights, you will 
transcend the heavens; if you incline towards the body and only just look up at the 
heavens, you will only see yourself as a moth indeed even something less than that.”60 
Pico constructs an anthropocentrism that rests on transcendent capacities of human 
reason and soul. His existential claim insists on the powers of the soul and the mind in 
order to shore up the significance of the human in a cosmos that vastly exceeds it. This 
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cosmos is, by Pico’s account, so vast as to render the human meaningless at large enough 
scales should one approach it from the perspective of the “merely” material body. For 
Pico the body appears as a dull, inert substance subordinate to the viewpoint of the 
heavens.  
Machiavelli proceeds otherwise. He constructs a schema of cosmological forces 
in which virtù encompasses dimensions of what a different theoretical idiom would call 
reason, mind, and body. Machiavelli ascribes a role to bodily practices in the constitution 
of virtù. Bodily practices retain their significance as they enter into relays with thought. 
Machiavelli insists that the skillful prince expose his body to hardships so that he may 
rely on it in politics and war. However, the prince’s practice of hunting and physical 
hardship also serves as the basis for his knowledge of the surrounding political landscape: 
“He should, therefore never take his mind from this exercise of war … he must learn the 
nature of terrains.”61 By attending to the somatic dimension of political life, 
Machiavelli’s prince lays the groundwork for his political knowledge.  
In particular, the prince’s conditioning of body and mind must focus on military 
practice. He advises, “A prince, therefore, must not have any other object nor any other 
thought, nor must he adopt anything as his art but war, its institutions, and its discipline; 
because that is the only art befitting one who commands.”62 The arts of politics and war 
coincide entirely for Machiavelli’s prince, and the conditioning of bodies proves critical 
for both domains. Effective martial practice requires connecting thought, study, and 
knowledge to bodily discipline. It relies on the embodied conditions of thought and 
thought conditions of embodiment. As Machiavelli advises, “the prince must read 
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histories and in them consider the deeds of excellent men. He must see how they 
conducted themselves in wars.”63 The prince must study war in order to bring about new 
conduct, and train his body through hardship in order to cement the lessons of his studies. 
64 War must be the prince’s only thought and only art, but also his only institution and 
discipline. Martial culture, for Machiavelli, requires the full mobilization of knowledge, 
thought, aesthetics, organizing practices, and bodily powers. 
The overlap between political and military organization appears most clearly in 
Machiavelli’s assessment of state foundations in which, “the principal foundations of all 
states … are good laws and good armies. Since good laws cannot exist where there are no 
good armies, and where good armies exist there must be good laws, I shall leave side the 
arguments about laws and shall discuss the armed forces.”65 Machiavelli sees the army as 
an integral political institution, with its practices contributing to the formation of civic 
life. Accordingly, his meditations on military organization serve also as political 
statements for organizing a polity of citizen-soldiers committed to the maintenance of 
freedom in a state that may endure.  
Machiavelli’s condemnation of mercenaries follows from this vision of good laws 
and good armies. Mercenaries prove costly and unwilling to fight in dire circumstances, 
“[t]hey love being your soldiers when you are not waging war, but when war comes, they 
either flee or desert.”66 Likewise, mercenary captains prove equally untrustworthy. They 
“are either excellent men or they are not. If they are, you cannot trust them, since they 
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will always aspire to their own greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their masters, 
or by oppressing others against your intent; but if the captain is without ability, he usually 
ruins you.”67 For Machiavelli, the prevalence of mercenary armies threatens the integrity 
of the entire region and undermines the establishment of a unified Italy. He says of their 
captains, “these condottieri have conducted Italy into slavery and disgrace.”68 
A prince or polity should instead rely on their own arms; “the weapons of others 
slide off your back, weigh you down, or tie you up.”69 By weapons, Machiavelli means 
not only weapons carried by infantry, cavalry, and artillery, but also the political weapon 
of embodied virtù brought about through the “hardships of military service.”70 A prince 
with his own arms wields an army of disciplined citizen soldiers that contribute to the 
strength and depth of military and civic life. They form a thriving city-state composed of 
regiments of bodies organized for war, accustomed to bodily hardship, well studied in the 
art, and organized for the protection of the common good.  
Machiavelli’s Art of War conveys the importance of a city-state fortified by the 
bodily capacities of its citizens. Art of War tends to be overlooked in considerations of 
Machiavelli’s politics. While Machiavelli expresses clear interest in the conduct of 
violence, I also see Art of War as an extended meditation on the creation of effective 
political weapons committed to the defense of a free city. I find in the text, particularly 
those passages voiced by Fabrizio, valuable elaborations on the conditions of 
embodiment, urban politics, and public life.  
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The body of the soldier, and its disciplining, drilling, and training plays a 
prominent role in Machiavelli’s guide to warfare. Speaking through the voice of his 
narrator and veteran soldier Fabrizio, Machiavelli marvels, “See with what virtù our men 
charge. The expertness they have acquired by long drilling and discipline inspires them 
with confidence.”71 Likewise, Fabrizio praises the carefully constructed formations of the 
ancient Romans and the phalanx of the ancient Greeks. He recounts with admiration the 
way that these formations positioned the bodies of their soldiers, recommending that 
armies carefully manage the space between every body. Fabrizio specifies the spacing of 
velites, pikemen, men-at-arms, cavalry, and artillery down to the foot.72 While this rigid 
control of space seemingly seeks to produce an army of perfectly obedient subjects, 
Machiavelli turns this aim on its head with the concluding remark by Fabrizio to “always 
suit my order of battle to the nature of my ground and the quality and number of the 
enemy.”73 Although specific in his initial diagramming of formations, Machiavelli 
provides this diagram as one possible example of the kind of army that must ultimately 
prove flexible should unforeseen events arise. He explains further, “I recommended this 
order not only as the best, which it certainly is, but as a rule to direct and assist you in 
forming others – every art has its general rules and principles upon which it is 
founded.”74 The careful spacing suggested by Fabrizio represents but one way to incline 
the bodies of the army toward the expert skill of virtù brought to battle. Drilling and 
training are not simply enforced to produce obedient subjects. Instead, the drilling of 
soldiers aims to coordinate individual bodies into the larger composition of a virtù-ous 
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army with the collective ability to maneuver and battle with the same virtù as an 
individual soldier.  
Machiavelli sees the practice of constituting and training an army as both a 
military and political endeavor. The politics of raising an army appears clearly in 
Machiavelli’s critique of mercenary troops first undertaken in The Prince. Through the 
voice of Fabrizio, Machiavelli continues and expands his argument against those who 
would make war their profession. Fabrizio warns:  
War will not maintain them in time of peace, and thus they are under a necessity 
either of endeavoring to prevent a peace or of taking all means to make such 
provisions for themselves in time of war so that they may not lack sustenance 
when it is over. But neither of these courses is consistent with the common good; 
whoever resolves to amass enough in time of war to support him forever must be 
guilty of robbery, murder, and many other acts of violence toward his friends as 
well as his enemies; and in endeavoring to prevent a peace, commanders must 
have recourse to many mean tricks and artifices to deceive those who employ 
them. But if these commanders fail in their designs, and find they cannot prevent 
a peace, it often happens that, once their pay is stopped and they can no longer 
make a living they illegally set themselves up as soldiers of fortune and have no 
scruples about plundering a whole province unmercifully.75  
 
Mercenaries will either pursue profit by continually instigating war or commit acts of 
extreme violence during war in order to secure riches for peacetime. Such predations 
undermine the common good through the continuous threat of violence between 
mercenaries and citizens of the polity. Furthermore, mercenaries unable to constantly 
acquire wealth may plunder the polity of their employer. Fabrizio’s commentary 
expresses two objects of concern; first, the acts of cruelty and violence conducted by 
mercenaries and, secondly, the threat that mercenaries pose to the common good in 
public life. With regard to the first, mercenaries threaten to extend the conduct of war and 
to commit extreme violence both inside and outside of warfare. Fabrizio suggests that 
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mercenary warfare inclines toward cruelty: “Such evils are caused by men who make 
mercenary warfare their sole occupation.”76 With regard to the second concern, the threat 
posed by mercenaries to the common good undermines the establishment of a public. 
Mercenaries embody private interest par excellence. They rapaciously fight for their own 
gain, holding only loyalties that further their accumulation of wealth. As Fabrizio 
suggests they “do not themselves have sufficient virtù to suffer honorably in poverty and 
obscurity.”77 They are not citizens engaged in civic life, but private citizens, “ministers of 
tyranny” threatening violence that would unravel the fortifications of the public and 
“bridle the people.”78 
 Through the voice of Fabrizio, Machiavelli recommends establishing a militia 
formed from the citizens of a city wherein they will return to peacetime occupations at 
the conclusion of war. Here, Machiavelli invokes the ancient practice of delectus – the 
choosing of soldiers – as an important military and political task. Delectus refers to the 
practice of conscription, but Machiavelli emphasizes the practice of choosing and the 
founding decision made in that choice as important acts for the vitality of a republic. He 
advises in Fabrizio’s voice “A prince should choose his army from his own subjects, and 
exert his authority in such a choice.”79 Here, the exertion of authority does not simply 
signify the sovereignty of the prince; it regularly reenacts the founding of the city-state. 
This decision or choice is one of unifying private interests into a public with a citizen 
militia embodying the common good. The delectus brings citizens into close proximity to 
the violence that founds and sustains their polity. The practice of raising armies becomes 
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an exercise in civic life rather than an institution of private violence at odds with the 
formation of a public. The delectus is the act of composing public institutions inclined 
toward virtù out of a mass of disorganized bodies moved by innumerable private passions 
and interests. 
 In Machiavelli’s critique of mercenary warfare, I find resonances with 
contemporary debates about warfare and citizenship. His concept of mercenary warfare 
entails more than just violence waged by soldiers of fortune; it refers to the anti-social 
organization of violence within a polity. It entails private interest expressed through 
violence and directed against the fabric of civic life. His emphasis on citizen-soldiers who 
will return to peacetime occupations also poses the question of demobilization. Public 
engagement and reflection on the distribution of violence motivates his discussions of 
war. It is precisely such engagements and reflections that have been neglected in the 
contemporary study of citizenship and military service and to which Machiavelli can 
contribute. 
The clearest embodiment of contemporary mercenary warfare appears in the form 
of private military contractors, privatized armies that resemble the condottieri of 
Machiavelli’s time.80 However, these corporately organized soldiers do not exhaust the 
meaning of “mercenary warfare” for Machiavelli. Privatized military forces exist on a 
longer historical trajectory in which the citizen-soldier was replaced with permanent 
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armies and an “All-Volunteer Force” at the end of conscription in the United States.81 
The more extensive understanding of mercenary warfare advanced by Machiavelli also 
describes these standing armies, particularly those formed on a volunteer basis. Deborah 
Cowen’s genealogy of neoliberal citizenship and military service traces the ways in 
which the elimination of conscription, while a significant achievement of the anti-war 
movement, also served as an incipient moment in the formation of neoliberal policy and 
governmentality. As Cowen observes:  
The anti-authoritarianism of [Vietnam War] protesters found curious common 
ground with the anti-statism of the neoliberals … Conscription was … one of the 
earliest and most important problems through which the economists of the 
Chicago school and more populist libertarians practiced and defined neoliberal 
notions of freedom and models of political belonging.82 
 
The voluntarist logic advanced by neoliberal critics of the draft did not seek to reign in 
the reach of the military apparatus. Instead, it aimed primarily at protecting the private 
interests of an economic subject. Against this image of volunteer soldiers, and the racial 
and economic disparities in military service that it has created, the figure of the citizens-
soldier serves as symbol of “a more serious and thoughtful mass engagement with the 
politics and sacrifices of war.”83 Machiavelli was aware of this need for thoughtful mass 
engagement with the politics of war and sought to build it directly into the organization 
of the city-state. 
In Machiavelli’s terms, the raising of an army signifies the virtù of a republic that 
helps one to ward off the harm of fortuna: “without having one’s own soldiers no 
                                                 
81 Taussig-Rubbo, 106. 
82 Deborah E, Cowen, “Fighting for ‘Freedom’: the End of Conscription in the United States and 
the Neoliberal Project of Citizenship,” Citizenship Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2006): 169. 
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principality is safe … it is completely subject to Fortune, not having the virtue that 
defends it faithfully in adverse times.”84 The floodwaters of fortuna turn elsewhere when 
they see a polity that has prepared itself through the raising of its own troops. In this 
instance, fortuna might be seen as the consolidation of a military-industrial complex and 
its seemingly inescapable influence on the politics of war. Organizing bodies within city-
state for more direct and thoughtful mass engagement with their relation to violence 
resists forces inclined toward perpetual war and makes demobilization a possibility.  
In addition to opposing the private exercise of violence in his outline of political-
military relations, Machiavelli also seeks to guarantee that a city-state may endure. By 
raising an army a prince or governor aims to “use every means to put himself in a 
position of facing his enemy in the field and, beating him there if possible.”85 Machiavelli 
echoes this sentiment in The Prince where he argues that political strength should be 
measured by the ability to raise, organize, and bring an army to battle one’s enemies: 
I judge those princes self-sufficient who, either through abundance of troops or 
of money, are capable of gathering together a suitable army and of fighting a 
battle against whoever might attack them. I consider men who always need the 
protection of others to be those who cannot meet their enemy in the field, but 
must seek refuge behind their city walls and defend them.86 
 
A strong prince may not win every battle, but he is capable of meeting enemies in the 
field rather than at the city walls where siege and urban war may irreparably harm a 
polity. Machiavelli’s effective prince or governor establishes military practices in which 
martial culture contributes to the civic life of the city while creating a military capable of 
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keeping the destructive capacities of battle outside of the city walls. The occurrence of 
urban warfare represents a failure of government.  
Should a prince or governor fail to meet the enemy in the field, he will be 
confronted with the task of turning away a siege, the subject of the seventh and final book 
of Machiavelli’s The Art of War. Seemingly at odds with Machiavelli’s harsh criticism of 
fortresses, Fabrizio outlines plans for a defensible fortress. The mere act of confronting a 
siege signals a failure of leadership in Machiavelli’s judgment. In the Discourses he 
indicates that “by withdrawing with your army into a city, you necessarily come under 
siege, and very soon suffer hunger and eventually surrender.”87 While he remains dubious 
of the success of confronting a siege, he nonetheless offers guidelines should a governor 
or prince face such a contingency.  
Through Fabrizio, Machiavelli provides a set of spatial practices for imparting 
virtù to the defenders of a town. As with his discussion of regiment formation and the 
organization of bodies, Fabrizio provides highly specific advice on the spatial 
construction of towns and fortifications. The architecture of Fabrizio’s fortified town 
would include a high wall with a ditch inside it. The construction of houses should be “so 
low that the governor, in the middle, seeing every part of the walls at one glance, might 
know where to send relief immediately when necessary, and the garrison might be 
convinced that when the walls and ditch were lost, they had no other refuge left.”88 
Similarly, the city’s fortifications should be designed with limited places for retreat. 
Fabrizio says, “I would advise those building fortresses not to make any place of retreat 
in them where the besieged may retire when the walls are either beaten down or 
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possessed by the enemy.”89 The layout of the city cultivates virtù. The militia must hold 
the walls, for they can readily see that they are left with nowhere to retreat.  
Unlike the fortresses of cruel princes, Fabrizio’s blueprint of fortification does not 
attempt to suspend the motion of political life entirely. Rather, it limits the motions of 
some citizens in order to evoke vitality from urban spaces and to aid in the mobility of 
the city’s defenses. The spaces of a carefully built city come alive in times of emergency 
to aid in repelling those who would lay siege to it. Through Fabrizio, Machiavelli 
diagrams urban spaces that work upon the citizenry, enabling the mobility of the city’s 
defenses and inclining them toward virtù. I see such designs not as authoritarian attempts 
to maintain power relations and stop the flow of time. Instead, they affirm the political 
capacities that remain available to the body politic. They are defenses of public space that 
differ in kind from the feudal castle ramparts of private rulers. These walls and trenches 
are fortifications of the urban public against the virtù of its enemies and the currents of 
fortuna. While I have explored the conditions through which virtù comes into being, 
fortuna and Machiavelli’s other cosmological concepts require further elaboration in 
order to discern the connections between bodies, cities, and nonhuman forces. 
 
A Turbulent Cosmos 
 
Machiavelli’s cosmology inflects his understanding of urban life and of the 
relations between the scales of politics. This is a dynamic cosmos in which multiple 
forces that exceed human mastery produce the turbulent conditions of daily political life. 
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Machiavelli’s depiction of fortuna as a raging river captures this turbulent motion. 
Fortuna resembles: 
one of those destructive rivers that, when they become enraged, flood the plains, 
ruin the trees and buildings, raising the earth from one spot and dropping it into 
another. Everyone flees before it; everyone yields to its impetus, unable to 
oppose it in any way. But although rivers are like this, it does not mean that we 
cannot take precautions with dikes and dams when the weather is calm, so that 
when they rise up again either the waters will be channeled off or their force will 
be neither so damaging nor so out of control. The same things occur where 
Fortune is concerned. She shows her power where there is no well-ordered virtue 
to resist her, and therefore turns her impetus toward where she knows no dikes 
and dams have been constructed to hold her in.90  
 
Fortuna possesses the power of “destructive rivers” moving along paths of least 
resistance and overpowering even the greatest of human attempts to confront it directly.91  
Although fortuna is an “uncertain and unstable” force, its effects are not chaotic 
and entirely random.92 Preparations may be made to redirect it or even to move with its 
current. The flows of fortuna may at times be harnessed through careful intervention and 
astute timing. Its turbulence grants ways of passage, often propelling the capacities of 
those who coordinate with it effectively. City-states, religions, and empires rise and fall 
according to their organization, skillfulness, and discipline; i.e. their virtù, in relation to 
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Machiavelli’s misogyny while also acknowledging Machiavelli’s thought as a valuable medium 
through which to consider questions of autonomy and human liberation (Pitkin, 5). 
92 Machiavelli, The Prince, 24.  
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fortuna. Likewise, individuals attain power and fall into disrepute by the tests of fortuna. 
Consequently, fortuna exhibits unique scalar relations. It does not manifest spatially as 
the largest sphere in which individuals, cities, and empires are contained. Instead, its 
powers appear through localized relations working at each of these scales simultaneously.  
Fortuna does not proscribe a single end, definite outcome, a single formulation of 
the good, or correct course of action with transcendental authorization. The ends it 
encourages are provisional and constantly shifting. Accordingly, law-like moral codes of 
proper action face extensive challenges navigating the complexity of fortuna. Machiavelli 
observes: 
men proceed in different ways: one with caution, another with impetuousness; 
one with violence, another with astuteness; one with patience, another with its 
opposite … two men prosper equally employing two different means … This 
occurs from nothing other than from the quality of the times, that either match or 
do not match their procedures.93 
 
Navigating fortuna requires the skill and savvy of virtù-staged encounters with it. Good 
encounters between virtù and fortuna facilitate harmonization: “since Fortune varies and 
men remain obstinate in their ways, men prosper when the two are in harmony and fail to 
prosper when they are not in accord.”94 Harmonizing encounters produce events and 
orders that exceed the capacities of virtù or fortuna alone. In dissonance these encounters 
amplify the destructive capacities of fortuna’s current, turning princes and citizens into 
unwitting agents in the annihilation of their polities. 
Machiavelli’s formulation of fortuna constrains human freedom without 
eliminating it entirely. It exercises control over half of human life, leaving just less than 
the other half to human action: “in order not to wipe out our free will, I consider it to be 
                                                 
93 Machiavelli, The Prince, 85. Gendered language in original. 
94 Machiavelli, The Prince, 86. Gendered language in original. 
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true that Fortune is the arbiter of one half of our actions, but that she still leaves the 
control of the other half, or almost that, to us.”95 Accordingly, human political life 
exceeds its formulation under strong concepts of human autonomy. As Anthony Parel 
suggests, “The empires of heaven and Fortune set a limit to what human autonomy can 
accomplish.”96 Human reason alone proves insufficient to the task of attaining political 
aspirations. Political life becomes a matter of adaptation, adjustment, and navigation: “the 
prince who relies completely upon Fortune will come to ruin as soon as she changes … 
the man who adapts his method of procedure to the nature of the times will prosper, and 
likewise, … the man who establishes his procedures out of tune with the times will come 
to grief.”97 Thriving comes about by adapting “methods and procedures,” practices, to the 
nature of the times. The nature of the times shifts thereby confounding rigid or law-like 
formulations of political action. Politics requires maneuverability and dynamism to adjust 
to the powers that exceed individual or collective existence. 
Working in concert with fortuna, the heavens exert power over political beings. 
The heavens in Machiavelli’s cosmos differ from the Christian understanding of an 
afterlife that transcends human experience. The concept refers instead to a series of forces 
with diffuse causal properties that enter into daily human life. In astrological terms, 
“[t]echnically, ‘heavens’ were the seven ‘spheres’ in which the seven planets moved. But 
in the common usage of the times, ‘heavens’ meant either one planet or all the planets 
taken as a whole.”98 The concept of the heavens, drawn from astrology, marks those 
forces of causation emanating from the planets and their relative positions. Similarly, 
                                                 
95 Machiavelli, The Prince, 84. 
96 Parel, 63. 
97 Machiavelli, The Prince, 85 
98 Parel, 41. 
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“according to pre-modern physics, heaven is an eternal principle of motion.”99 These 
forces affect the motion of mixed bodies. Heaven guarantees the perpetuity of motion in 
the cosmos and interacts with specific motions at the scale of human bodies and political 
institutions. 
For Machiavelli, the heavens possess both constructive and destructive capacities. 
While all composite bodies eventually disintegrate, favor of the heavens may extend the 
duration that certain compositions hold together. The heavens may suspend the 
cosmological principle of dissolving motion in which, “all the things of this world have a 
limited existence, but those which go through the entire cycle of life ordained for them by 
heaven are generally those which do not allow their bodies to fall into disorder but 
maintain them in an orderly way.”100 The heavens, as a regularizing force, set out the 
order of things that may be interrupted by fortuna. Parel suggests that in the 
Machiavellian cosmos, “Heaven[s] give it its order, power, and motion, and the basis for 
regularity and predictability. Fortune accounts for the occurrence of chance events within 
it.”101  
Although the heavens represent a power of regularity, their effects are not 
providential. They work without regard for human well-being. Catastrophic events 
emanate from the heavens: “As for the causes that originate in [the] heaven[s], those are 
the ones which destroy the human race and reduce the inhabitants in one region to a bare 
                                                 
99 Parel, 28. 
100 Machiavelli, Discourses, 246. 
101 Parel, 43. Parel resists the distinction between “heaven” and “the heavens”:  
“in our view, he uses the two forms interchangeably to convey the same philosophical or 
astrological meaning” (Parel, 41). In the passages from which I draw, Parel emphasizes the 
powers of nonhuman forces in the world within Machiavelli’s cosmology. My aim is to 
understand these forces through Machiavelli rather than discern the differences between 
astrological and Christian historical trajectories in his thought. 
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few, and this occurs either because of pestilence, famine, or flood.”102 The heavens have 
the power to uproot entire peoples and erase cities from the map thereby redefining the 
political landscape.  
Machiavelli escapes from the usual theodicy in explaining these events. He 
neither tries to reclaim them as the designs of a providential God nor to reduce them to 
mere chance resulting from fortuna. Instead, he posits a balance of humours within the 
collective body of humanity: 
just as in a simple body, when too much superfluous material accumulates, nature 
herself moves it on many occasions and effects a purgation which restores it to 
health, so this also occurs in the mixed body of the human race, for when all the 
provinces are full of inhabitants … and when human cunning and wickedness 
have increased as much as they can, the world of necessity must purge itself in 
one of three ways, so that men, having been reduced in number and vanquished, 
will live more comfortably and become better.103 
 
In this cosmos the heavens call in flood, famine, and pestilence to restore the health of the 
composite or “mixed body” of the human species. This process of expelling “superfluous 
material” parallels the theory of balancing the body’s humours popular in medieval 
medicine. Just as the humours of the body were thought to balance through the 
elimination of bile, so too did Machiavelli suggest that the heavens would periodically 
purge the bile of human wickedness. Accordingly, argues Parel, “heaven contributes its 
share to the successes and/or failures of human achievements.”104 Intermittently erupting 
into political life, the floods, famines, and other catastrophic events of the heavens leave 
an indelible mark on history. However, the heavens are not without capacities for 
ordering and regularity that may prove conducive to human flourishing. The heavens 
                                                 
102 Machiavelli, Discourses, 168 – 169.  
103 Machiavelli, Discourses, 169. 
104 Parel, 40. 
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represent a different order of power, neither intrinsically beneficent nor hostile to 
humanity. As Parel suggests, “history is a product of the joint activity of heaven and 
humans.”105  
While the cosmos periodically threatens human well-being, not all of 
Machiavelli’s non-human forces endanger human life. Machiavelli suggests, with more 
than a hint of mysticism, “that the air is filled with intelligences, who by means of natural 
abilities foresee future events and, having compassion for men, warn them with similar 
signs so that they can prepare their defences.”106 These “intelligences” whisper to those 
who cultivate sensitivities to subtle processes outside the human domain. They resemble 
vague sensations emanating from the heavens and fortuna and providing a brief glimpse 
into grand natural processes. These intelligences embody the incipient tendencies of 
politics. Their localization defies concentric nesting, as these seemingly small traces 
grant insight into the manifestation of massive systems in politics.  
The relation between these intelligences and the workings of the heavens and 
fortuna is one of entanglement. Separated by great distance, they nonetheless exhibit 
correlated changes in properties. Shifts in the vast workings of the heavens or fortuna 
signal certain shifts in the intelligences in the air. Actions based on these intelligences 
may subsequently alter the influence of the heavens and fortuna on politics. Subjects who 
have trained to hear these intelligences and incipient tendencies in politics will be ready 
for coming transformations at larger scales. Attunement to these small shifts signifying 
                                                 
105 Parel 42. 
106 Machiavelli, Discourses, 139. My emphasis. 
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systemic change allows individuals and collectives to prepare for the heavens and 
fortuna, even finding ways to productively embrace these cosmological forces.107 
Machiavelli thus inserts familiar astrological terms into his open political system 
in ways that modify these concepts while resisting the emerging concepts of a unified, 
transcendental God or Mind.108 While limiting the efficacy of human reason and action, 
he nonetheless leaves nearly half of human life ungoverned. Providence does not 
determine the fate of cities or the outcome of human action. The other half (or slightly 
more than half) of human life is shaped by nonhuman forces and systemic conditions, 
represented by the heavens and fortuna. These concepts extend the domain of political 
life to include unforeseen events, either as the result of the unintended consequences of 
collective human action or as natural processes emerging at the periphery of perception. 
Flood, famine, plague, climatic, geological, and evolutionary shifts enter the social and 
political fabric of urban life. Urban politics involves multiple tiers of causation and scales 
of motion. 
Within this cosmology, the cosmos does not appear as the largest sphere of being 
in which other scales are concentrically nested. Instead, cosmological forces – fortuna, 
the heavens, intelligences in the air – refer to forces that intervene in the power relations 
of everyday life. They manifest as what we would call climatic, geological, and 
biological systems, operating on spatial scales that overlap but do not coincide with 
politics. Such forces are entangled with the politics of bodies and cities, yet irreducible to 
these scales. Machiavelli’s cosmology makes a place for such nonhuman forces in the 
study of politics without marking them forces to be mastered and dominated. 
                                                 
107 I return to the discussion of entanglement as a scalar relation in chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
108 Parel, 37. 




Machiavelli’s Political Topography 
Through his writings on cities, bodies, and the cosmos, Machiavelli provides a non-
concentric image of politics. This image appears explicitly in his depiction of political 
life as a landscape with topographic features that represent the workings of power. In the 
dedicatory letter from The Prince, Machiavelli drafts a multi-tiered and perspectival map 
of the relation between prince and people. He describes the dual nature his work as a 
reference for both prince and people in which different facets of politics appear from the 
position of each:  
For just as those who paint landscapes place themselves in a low position on the 
plain in order to consider the nature of the mountains and the heights, and place 
themselves high on top of mountains in order to study the plain, in like manner to 
know the nature of the people well one must be a prince, and to know the nature 
of princes well one must be of the people.109 
 
For Machiavelli, the vision of the polity captured from the summit of sovereignty differs 
greatly from the plains in which the lived experience of the citizenry unfolds. The view 
from the royal court provides a collective understanding of the life of the people while 
remaining oblivious to political practices within the city. Conversely, the people may 
have a better sense of the affective milieu in which love, respect, fear, resentment, and 
hatred point toward the prince. However, their milieu renders them largely unaware of 
possible political alliances that could contest princely power. Atop the mountain of 
sovereignty, a prince might suddenly be struck with vertigo, unable to distinguish 
direction or track movements occurring below. Furthermore, from the “summit” a prince 
                                                 
109 Machiavelli, The Prince, 6. While I examine this position for the purpose of outlining 
Machiavelli’s ‘topography,’ it is worth noting that this passage captures the importance of the 
people for Machiavelli reaffirming his claim that “the best fortress that exists is not to be hated by 
the people” (Machiavelli, The Prince, 75). The polity of a Prince despised by the people will 
come to know only civil war. 
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periodically encounters orographic obstructions (of sovereignty), the clouds that gather 
around a peak and obscure the vision of what lies below. A prince may not see the cliff 
edge over which he is about to plunge. Machiavelli provides an analysis of sovereignty in 
terms of the relations between governors and governed, that is, how a series of forces 
secure the power of the prince. This relational understanding of power leads Michel 
Foucault to describe Machiavelli as “among the few …who conceived the power of the 
Prince in terms of force relationships.”110  
The metaphor of government as landscape painting outlines a political topography 
from which power relations emerge. Space, elevation, distance and perspective bring 
previously obscured relations of power into focus. Certain features of a political 
landscape only come into view from particular positions and at specific distances. 
Effective political practice requires the mobility to move between diverse scales so that 
one may comprehend the disposition of bodies, natural processes that can wipe away 
polities, and scalar-specific political formations.  
Machiavelli’s meditations on terrain can be read in light of his political 
topography. The discussion of terrain paints a textured political landscape in which one’s 
position may fluctuate suddenly and rapidly. A prince “must also learn the nature of the 
terrains and how mountains rise, how valleys open, how plains lie, and understand the 
nature of rivers and swamps; and he should devote a great deal of attention to such 
activities.”111 On its face, the practice of coming to know terrain seems to be practical 
military advice. A prince must know the physical contours of the earth to successfully 
                                                 
110 Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New 
York: Vintage, 1990), 97. 
111 Machiavelli, The Prince, 51. 
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conduct war in defense of his principality. However, the navigation of political life also 
requires continuous study of the contours and features of power, that is to say, the terrain 
of the political landscape. Politics includes interactions with terrain as non-human nature; 
it also resembles traversing terrain, the strata of forces that constitute the domain of the 
political. Bodies, cities, regions, and planetary processes layer upon one another 
producing a political topography with numerous sites and crossings.   
Machiavelli provides us with an appreciation for the complexities and possibilities 
that result from multiple scales of politics. Adopting a multiscalar approach brings 
previously obscure aspects of politics into focus. Citizen and governor alike acquire 
political knowledge through the general viewing of a wider scene and through a focus on 
locality: “Among the other things necessary to a commander of armies is the knowledge 
of localities and countries, because without such general and particular knowledge, a 
commander of armies cannot undertake any action.”112 Familiarization with the multiple 
scales of political life renders one far more prepared to adapt to circumstances or 
overcome them, as the case may warrant: “anyone who has this experience knows, in the 
blink of an eye, how that plain lies, how that mountain rises, where that valley goes, and 
all other similar things, of which in the past he has gained a solid understanding.”113  
Sheldon Wolin evokes this topography admirably in his account of the “levels” of 
motion in Machiavelli’s turbulent cosmos: 
[W]hile the sources of the endless movements of events lay partly in man’s own 
deficiencies, some of which might be remedied by knowledge, there were other 
causes which could not be eradicated but only eased. First, capricious Fortuna 
constantly threatened the best laid calculations of art. Secondly, there was the 
instability which flowed from the intersection of human ambitions. At the level 
of the city the struggle for competitive advantage took the form of factional 
                                                 
112 Machiavelli, Discourses, 346. Emphasis Mine 
113 Machiavelli, Discourses, 347. 
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strife; throughout the peninsula it was the contest for mastery between princes, 
popes, and foreign rulers; on the international plane rival rulers ceaselessly 
probed each other’s strengths and sought to exploit every show of weakness.114 
 
By Wolin’s estimate, Machiavelli sees a world of abundant complexity that proceeds 
along multiple scales. The urban scale gives life to factions that enter into the regional 
rivalries between princes. Meanwhile, an international scale begins to have effects on 
political life while simultaneously being shaped by turmoil internal to Italy. Finally, the 
caprice of fortuna intervenes at a planetary scale in which accident and chance affect the 
city-states of Italy and the international scale.  
I have argued that Machiavelli helps to map political life constituted on multiple 
scales: the somatic, urban, and planetary. The cosmic forces of fortuna and the heavens 
provide opportunity for human political endeavors while periodically threatening human 
well-being. On the urban scale publics assemble through open built environments, the 
particularities of the founding site, and the collective political philosophy that inflects and 
is inflected by the site and environs of the city. The built environment of the city further 
provides a physical medium for the confrontations between fortresses of domination and 
collective resistance. It organizes bodies and cultivates dispositions that incline toward 
freedom. It provides a space through which to pursue the fortification of publics that will 
endure the predatory practices of political opponents and the chance events of non-human 
nature. 
In contrast to state-centric approaches to politics, which often characterize 
Machiavelli as a thinker of national unity, I see Machiavelli envisioning mobile spaces 
that affirm the intersecting forces of political life. In this spatiality the city is not a 
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territorial unit that fits neatly within a container state. Instead, the city plays an active role 
in geopolitics. It is capable of influencing regional and international power relations. 
Among its transnational political potentials, the city is a site at which geological, 
biological, and climatic forces manifest in political life, thereby enabling new forms of 
ecological reflection and action. Encounters within and between cities facilitate lines of 






 2 | Scale, Power, and Neoliberal Urbanism 
 
In the previous chapter I surveyed Machiavelli’s political geography and the 
numerous scales of political life ranging from the composition of forces within human 
bodies to the turbulent movements of Fortuna. It is a geography of politics and power 
distinct from feudalism and monarchy yet also resisting incipient capitalist and liberal 
political formations. Machiavelli’s political thought is not just a playbook for a Prince to 
secure his claim to territory through force and fraud, but also a world of layered 
complexity constituted by forces that intersect and interact in the spaces of the city-state. 
Michel Foucault’s mapping of political life captures a similar complexity of space 
produced by the relations between micro and macro processes. This chapter’s meditation 
on Foucault’s understanding of spatiality is intended to deepen and extend the relational 
understandings of scale that the previous chapter finds in Machiavelli’s political work. As 
Foucault notes in the first volume of the History of Sexuality, while “Machiavelli was 
among the few who conceived the power of the Prince in terms of force relationships, 
perhaps we need to go one step further, do without the persona of the Prince, and 
decipher power mechanisms on the basis of a strategy that is immanent in force 
relationships.”1 Whereas Machiavelli, at least by Foucault’s account, saw the power of 
the Prince as the spatial relations between numerous forces, a mode of analysis that I 
refer to as Machiavelli’s political geography, Foucault proposes a cartographic practice 
                                                 
1 Foucault, History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, 97. Much of the conversation regarding the convergence 
between Machiavelli and Foucault has focused on their thinking on temporality. As Robyn 
Marasco observes, many contemporary Focuault-inspired theorists have followed “in a tradition 
of reading Machiavelli, from Gramsci and Althusser through Merleau-Ponty, Lefort and Negri, 
which turns on the primacy of the event” (Marasco, 358). While my reading of both thinkers is 
influenced by the tradition of reading Machiavelli and Foucault as thinkers of the event, my focus 
in this project seeks to put the two into conversation on issues of spatiality rather than 
temporality.  
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that extends beyond the authority of the Prince and to the diffuse operations of power 
broadly conceived.2 
The concept of scale has been a point of significant controversy in examinations 
of Foucault’s spatial thought. Some theorists interested in scale seem to have overlooked 
the presence of the concept in Foucault’s thought.3 In other cases, Foucault’s work on 
governmentality and biopolitics has been thought to convey a spatiality that moves 
beyond a concept of scale and into the mapping of topologies. According to these 
readings, topology names an understanding of space in which distinct political 
phenomena connect through networks that operate without regard to proximity and 
distance. 4 In this approach governmentality refers to “networks of spatial connectivity 
governing ‘action at a distance.’”5 This line of thought sees spatial understandings 
drawing on scale as conceptually at odds with mapping network topologies.  For 
example, Ash Amin sees spatialities that emphasize scale closing off relational 
                                                 
2 Robyn Marasco argues that the anti-Machiavellian discourse identified by Foucault serves as a 
“negative touchstone for the construction of a nascent discourse of the art of government” 
(Marasco, 3). Foucault “would like to consider this anti-Machiavelli literature as a positive genre, 
with its specific object, concepts, and strategy” (Marasco, 341).  Foucault refuses to dismiss the 
anti-Machiavellians simply as errant readers of Machiavelli to be placed on the side of falsity by 
the judgment of History and dismissed from an account of the formation of governing. Instead, 
the anti-Machiavellians constitute, through their (often misled) negation/critique of Machiavelli, a 
new articulation of politics as government. 
3 Nancy Fraser contends that Foucault lacks an explicit reference to scale and implicitly 
emphasizes the national frame. For instance, she says “[a]lthough Foucault did not explicitly 
thematize the question of scale, his account assumed that disciplinary ordering was nationally 
bounded” (Fraser, 121). My project will not only identify points at which Foucault explicitly 
invokes the term “scale,” but it will also seek to show how Foucault constantly complicates and 
contests state-centric geographies.  
4 In his book on Foucault, Gilles Deleuze sees Foucault as a thinker of topologies. See Gilles 
Deleuze, Foucault, trans. Seán Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988). I do 
not wish to entirely deny this claim, but show that Foucault also relies heavily on the concept of 
scale in his understanding of space. I treat the text at length later in the chapter.  
5 Keil and Mahon, “Introduction,” 17. 
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understandings of space. Amin sees the concept of scale as too rigid to describe the 
numerous forms of interconnection brought about in a globalizing world: 
My worry … has to do with the possibility that the very ontology of place and 
territoriality itself is becoming altered by the rise of world-scale processes and 
transnational connectivity. The language of spatial change remains that of 
assuming organization along scalar and territorial lines: reterritorialisation 
follows deterritorialisation, and spatial scales are relativized under globalization. 
Sites such as cities and nations continue to exist as territorial units, now with 
different external orientations … and different scalar involvement.6 
 
For Amin, scale refers to an understanding of space inherently tied to antiquated 
forms of territoriality. He proposes that we instead think of the geography of 
globalization in terms of “a topological sense of space and place … constituted 
through folds, undulations, and overlaps that natural and social practices normally 
assume, without any a priori assumption of geographies of relations nested in 
territorial or geometric space.”7 Amin would do away with scale in a postglobal 
landscape. This is a cartography that discards distinctions between the local, 
urban, national, and global in favor of the relations of specific spaces brought into 
immediate contact through networks. 
This chapter argues that Foucault provides a dynamic, relational conception of 
scale. Rather than dispense with the concept of scale in favor of network topology, he 
demonstrates the ways in which scale plays an important role in understanding spatial 
practices that emphasize proximity, distance, segmentation, separation, and circulation. 
Foucault employs a concept of scale distinct from a concentric set of nested territorial 
bodies. His concept of scale is one in which the organization of bodies and populations 
                                                 
6 Ash Amin, “Spatialities of Globalisation,” Environment and Planning A, 34 (2002): 385 – 399, 
387. 
7 Amin, “Spatialities of Globalisation,” 389. 
  Scale, Power, and Neoliberal Urbanism • II 
75 
 
within a space influence the formation of political subjectivity. I argue that this relational 
understanding of scale better captures the contemporary shifts in spatiality, such as those 
identified by Amin, while acknowledging the real effects of scale at work in operations of 
power and resistance. The resulting cartography is no longer committed to a concentric 
image of territory. It represents a move toward thinking about political space made up of 
non-concentric scales through which political beings move, experience, imagine, think, 
and act. 
In addition to deepening the theorization of a relational conception of scale, this 
chapter draws on Foucault in order to expand the alternative genealogies of the nation-
state and globalization. The chapter’s focus on the city in Foucault’s thought reveals the 
pivotal role of urban life in the formation of modern government. Central roles of the 
state, such as exercising force and regulating commerce, first appear in the practices of 
punishment and management developed for the governance of cities. Furthermore, the 
emerging interconnections between cities point to early globalizing tendencies that 
predate neoliberal globalization. The interaction of multiple scales in urban space 
contests the framing of “the global” and globalization as totalities that overwrite other 
political scales. It reorients our understanding of these concepts to the abundant scales 
that influence the formation of political space. 
A relational understanding of scale does not dismiss the scales of politics 
previously understood as nested territorial spaces. Instead, scales such as locality, city, 
state, and globe come to be understood as milieus in which political beings encounter and 
contest disciplinary and biopolitical practices. This chapter will argue that discipline and 
biopower also exhibit distinct relations between scales. Discipline and biopolitics bring 
  Scale, Power, and Neoliberal Urbanism • II 
76 
 
with them different sets of spatial relations. Discipline emphasizes practices of enclosure, 
separation, and partition. Biopower focuses on facilitating circulation and maintaining 
distributions. The shift in emphasis from discipline and punishment to the management 
and regulation of populations involves a reworking of the connections between the local, 
national, and global scale. These shifting relations appear most sharply in the spaces of 
the city.  
I continue my focus on the space of the city in this chapter in order to unpack this 
multiscalar geography. Throughout Foucault’s work, the city appears as an important 
space for the exercise of spatial practices and the transformation of mechanisms of 
power. The figure of the city resides at the center of his account of disciplinary society 
and early biopolitics.8 The disciplinary city of strictly enforced segmentation and 
enclosure evolves into a biopolitical urban space designed for effective and regular forms 
of circulation. By “evolution” I do not intend to suggest teleological historic processes 
that bring about the complete replacement of disciplinary power with biopolitics. Rather, 
I wish to suggest that disciplinary practices (and the built environment created using 
discipline as a model) facilitate the emergence of biopolitics. While discipline gives 
ground to biopolitics as the most prominent exercise of power, it often reappears in the 
biopolitical city. This resurgence of disciplinary tactics appears all too clearly in the 
policing of protests in urban spaces. For instance, responses to contemporary urban 
protest often employ tactics of enclosure, separation, and partition characteristic of 
disciplinary procedures. These police practices are frequently enabled by the disciplinary 
                                                 
8 See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1995) and Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, henceforth STP. Both will receive 
more extended textual engagement later in the chapter. 
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approaches that informed urban planning and design.9 The disciplining of bodies 
continues to shape the ways in which biopolitics regulates and manages populations. 
I focus on Foucault’s approach to the city for two reasons. First, for reasons 
similar to my examination of urbanism in Machiavelli’s political thought, the city 
provides a point at which processes at multiple scales fold into a single space. I find 
numerous points at which Foucault evokes this quality of multiple overlapping 
spatialities through a focus on the city. Second, I find in Foucault a sustained discussion 
of the city through discipline and early biopolitics that ends abruptly with his move into 
neoliberalism and the contemporary era. The significance of his work on neoliberal 
governmentality for urban thought has remained largely underdeveloped. Through my 
engagement with spatiality and cities in Foucault’s work, I hope to expand on his 
potential contributions to the analysis of urban governance under neoliberalism. In 
particular I want to trace the role that neoliberal urbanism has played in producing power 
relations of the existing global order – that is, how cities infused by neoliberal 
understandings of government have shaped and influenced the contemporary global 
scale. 
 
Scale, Discipline, and Biopower 
 
“Shift the object and change the scale.”10 These are Foucault’s guiding words for 
understanding the emergence of discipline in the eighteenth century. They describe both 
the transformation of power and the method for writing its genealogy. Spatial controls 
                                                 
9 For an extensive account of how disciplinary practices play a continuous role in the governance 
of cities see Joe Soss, Richard C. Fording, and Sanford F. Schram, Disciplining the Poor: 
Neoliberal Paternalism and the Persistent Power of Race (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2011). 
10 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 89.  
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would target a newly defined object of power, the body. As Foucault describes it, this 
was a matter of “[d]efin[ing] new tactics in order to reach a target that is now more subtle 
but also more widely spread in the social body.”11 Here, the paradoxical spatial formation 
of an object more subtle yet more widely spread refers to the interaction and mutual 
constitution of the scales of society and the body. Discipline ties the capacities of bodies 
to the scale of society. The approach to discipline that I provide here evokes the scalar 
dimensions of this productive power focused on the training of bodies. I aim to bring 
scale, lingering in the background of Foucault’s analysis, to the forefront of our 
understanding of discipline. 12 
In the formation of disciplinary power, the change in scale is two-fold. First, 
discipline alters the understanding of the body’s internal composition. In taking the body 
as its object, discipline treats it not as the corporeal power of a feudal peasantry but as a 
machine constructed of optimized parts. Discipline seeks to coordinate the movements of 
the body’s various parts and forces. As Foucault explains in greater detail: 
there was the scale of the control: it was a question not of treating the body, en 
masse, ‘wholesale’, as if it were an indissociable unity, but of working it ‘retail’, 
individually; of exercising upon it a subtle coercion, of obtaining holds upon it at 
the level of the mechanism itself – movements, gestures, attitudes, rapidity: an 
infinitesimal power over the active body.13 
 
Here, the scale of the body takes on new qualities. Bodies were no longer treated in their 
aggregate form, as the mass or the multitude, but taken up as “individuals.” Discipline 
                                                 
11 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 89. 
12 Stuart Elden persuasively suggests that Discipline and Punish is part of a larger project running 
through Foucault’s work that examines the “policing of society.” Stuart Elden, Mapping the 
Present: Heidegger, Foucault and the Project of a Spatial History (London: Continuum, 2001), 
134. Elden argues that the focus on the figures of the prison and the panopticon has led much of 
political theory to overlook the larger sociospatial dimensions of Discipline and Punish. My 
project seeks to add scale to the political vocabulary of spatial relations found in Foucault’s 
thought. 
13 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 137. 
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sought to impose specific qualities and intervals on the parts of bodies in order to shape 
fit these pieces together into an “individual.” 
The redefinition of the body as “individual” brought with it shifts in the operation 
of institutions. In particular, sites of production focused on dividing and managing time 
and space in new ways. The time-table temporally monitored movements of bodies. 
Postures and gestures served as central targets for the assessment and reform of bodily 
activities.14 Tactics of enclosure sought out proper distributions of bodies across space. 
The factory divided multiplicities into neatly partitioned and easily governed individuals. 
the works or factories proper … was a change of scale, but it was also a new type 
of control. The factory was explicitly compared with the monastery, the fortress, 
a walled town …The aim is to derive the maximum advantages and to neutralize 
the inconveniences … as the forces of production become more concentrated.15 
 
The factory provided both an institutional setting and a built environment that minimized 
the cost, so to speak, of exercising power. It differed from the more cumbersome built 
environments characteristic of sovereign power, such as the fortress. As I argue in 
chapter one, the fortress became the object of the people’s hatred and no longer held 
sway as a practice of governing. Where the fortress relied on the creation of a spatial 
barrier between the sovereign and the people, the factory worked by dividing 
multiplicities of bodies into neatly partitioned and easily governed individuals. In place 
of the fortress, the factory offered streamlined exercises of power through which the 
bodies of “individuals” could be inserted into the process of industrialized production 
with a minimum of resistance. 
                                                 
14 See Foucault’s discussion in Discipline and Punish of the “Art of Distributions,” 141 – 149 and 
“Control of Activity,” 149 – 156.  
15 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 142. 
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In addition to the new relation between the body and institutions, a rescaling of 
the body occurs in relation to social and political order. The body is no longer that of the 
subject confronted by the sovereign. Instead, discipline connects the body of the 
individual to the entirety of the social order; political subjectivity comes into relation 
with society as a whole. Monitoring, judgment, and punishment are distributed across the 
entire social milieu. Under this scalar shift, in which power is distributed across society, 
“[t]he right to punish has been shifted from the vengeance of the sovereign to the defence 
of society.”16 Here, new tactics may focus on the operations of the body but always 
extend beyond its domain and into the ordering of society more broadly. These practices 
constitute both “the individual” and “society” by redefining bodies and bringing them 
into relation with the aggregate.  
This double movement occurs in a context in which industrialization, production, 
and capital investment reached unprecedented size and scope while mechanisms of 
control used to preserve their functioning became more specific, local, and intense. 
Foucault finds diffuse sets of controls growing out of this unprecedented economic scale: 
“The way in which wealth tended to be invested, on a much larger scale than ever before, 
in commodities and machines presupposed a systemic, armed intolerance of illegality.”17 
This intolerance of illegality focused on innumerable small acts of training and instilling 
                                                 
16 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 90. My emphasis. Foucault seems to already be formulating 
certain biopolitical tendencies. The impulse that would become the title of his lectures “Society 
Must be Defended” and a key principle of biopower serves as an implicit part of his thinking in 
Discipline and Punish. See Michel Foucault, "Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the 
Collège de France, 1975 – 1976, eds. Mauro Bertani, Alessandro Fontana, and Arnold I. 
Davidson, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003). 
17 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 85. 
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self-discipline that could secure expanded capitalist production. The disciplines attended 
to this need as they:  
seem to extend the general forms defined by law to the infinitesimal level of 
individual lives; or they appear as methods of training that enable individuals to 
become integrated into these general demands. They seem to constitute the same 
type of law on a different scale.18 
 
The “different scale” invoked here denotes both the infinitesimal scale of the body and 
the general scale of society. The management of “society” calls upon a political 
technology functioning in the closest possible proximity to the bodies it regulates.   
Discipline functions by working on the body, but as Foucault observes “these 
relations go right down into the depths of society … they are not localized in the relations 
between the state and its citizens.”19 This criticism of “localization,” and the implicit 
alternative of spatial relationality, is thus at the heart of Foucault’s well-known 
skepticism regarding political analyses that start from the level of the state. Discipline 
works through a "political technology of the body,” one that:  
cannot be localized in a particular type of institution or state apparatus. For they 
have recourse to it; they use, select or impose certain of its methods. But, in its 
mechanisms and its effects, it is situated at a quite different level. What the 
apparatuses and institutions operate is, in a sense, a micro-physics of power, 
whose field of validity is situated in a sense between these great functionings and 
the bodies themselves with their materiality and their forces.20 
 
Discipline works through local practices and operations but cannot be localized in a 
particular institutional entity. The micro-operations of discipline produce political effects 
that we call the state, yet these diffuse practices remain irreducible to a statist political 
vocabulary. Discipline functions both locally and globally – it works at the scales of body 
and society but cannot be localized in either. Discipline must maintain the particular 
                                                 
18 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 222. 
19 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 27. 
20 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 26. My emphasis. 
  Scale, Power, and Neoliberal Urbanism • II 
82 
 
relation between these two scales in order to fuel bodies, conceptualized as machines, and 
drive society, conceptualized in mechanistic terms. 
 The significance of scale for Foucault extends beyond the disciplines to the 
formation of biopower. Biopolitics has been studied as a shift in object, in which the life 
of the “population” is managed and regulated so as to amplify its efficiency and 
productive capacity. The study of this dimension of biopower has produced an ample 
literature on the concept of life and its connection to contemporary politics in which the 
work of Giorgio Agamben, and more recently Roberto Esposito, have been highly 
influential.21 However, the treatment of biopolitics as a change in scale, that is to say, as a 
sociospatial formation, remains underdeveloped. The bounding of a space to be governed 
represents one of the cornerstones of biopolitics. 
Foucault sees the spatial apparatus of biopolitics developing through multiple 
interwoven parts: “Western man was gradually learning what it meant to be a living 
species in a living world, to have a body, conditions of existence, probabilities of life, an 
individual and collective welfare, forces that could be modified, and a space in which 
they could be distributed in an optimal manner.”22 Here, the practices of regulating a 
population and studying its probabilities of risk works through particular spaces in which 
these optimized distributions are realized. Biopower takes on a distinctly scalar form: 
“power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-
scale phenomena of population.”23 Both “life” and “population” take on spatial qualities 
                                                 
21 See Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1998) and Roberto Esposito, Bíos: Biopolitics and Philosophy (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2008). 
22 Foucault, History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, 142. My emphasis. Gendered language in original. 
23 Foucault, History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, 137.  
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as levels and scales. Biopower comes into being and takes hold through the 
crystallization of the population as a key object and scale of politics. 
The geographic dimension central to the workings of biopower becomes even 
more prominent as Foucault connects the formation of this new technique of power to the 
development of capitalism. Capitalism required the concerted efforts of disciplinary 
power and bio-power to maintain “the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery 
of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic 
processes.”24 These “productive” forms of power, focused on securing forms of life and 
optimizing the body, sought out operations that were thought to function more smoothly 
than sovereign power. In place of unwieldy acts of repression, discipline and biopolitics 
created coordinates of power in which the individual worked under the conditions of her 
own self-discipline and for the survival of the population (or even the species). However, 
this conceptual development, like its legitimating force for early capitalism, was closely 
tied to geographic transformations: 
The adjustment of the accumulation of men to that of capital, the joining of the 
growth of human groups to the expansion of productive forces and the 
differential allocation of profit, were made possible in part by the exercise of bio-
power in its many forms and modes of application. The investment of the body, 
its valorization, and the distributive management of its forces were at the time 
indispensable.25 
 
Biopower emerges as a way of tying creative processes to the unprecedented scale of the 
population. “Population” gives a name to this scale and produces the object of a politics 
committed to the impersonal management and regulation of life. Capital begins to move 
across this extended scale and tap into the productive forces mobilized by biopower.  
 
                                                 
24 Foucault, History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, 141. 
25 Foucault, History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, 141. Gendered language in original. 
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The Global Scale and Eurocentric “Globalization” 
The interactions of biopower, capitalism, and scale come into focus in Foucault’s 
lecture from 24 January 1979 published as part of The Birth of Biopolitics. In the lecture 
Foucault sifts through a historical archive on government and political economy to 
uncover a global scale distinct from the scales of “the body,” “society,” and “the 
population.” It is here that a nuanced, layered geography underpinning Foucault’s 
thought comes most clearly comes into focus. With the dissolution of mercantilism in 
Europe and the transition toward liberal governmentality, a geographic scale appears in 
liberal thought that stretches across the surface of the globe and reconfigures the quest for 
infinite economic expansion. Foucault suggests that at this particular moment “we have 
the start of a new type of global calculation in European governmental practice … a new 
form of global rationality, of a new calculation on the scale of the world.”26 The 
introduction of a global scale of liberal governmentality defines a new political space, a 
“worldwide space,” and brings about new forms of political and economic order intended 
to stretch across the entire globe.27 Although the scale of society, expansive as it might 
be, stretches beyond national territorial boundaries (and beyond the conceptual threshold 
of the state), it remains more geographically limited than the global. The global scale, for 
                                                 
26 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978 – 1979, ed. 
Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 56. My 
emphasis. 
27 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 56. Foucault’s point here is not that political and economic 
interactions across the globe are radically new at this moment, but rather that “the global” first 
appears in an understanding and practice of government. The globe becomes an object and scale 
of politics in an explicit way. Tarak Barkawi has undertaken a persuasive study of the numerous 
forms of global exchange and interaction that predate much of what is currently understood as 
globalization. See Tarak Barkawi, Globalization and War (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2006). 
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Foucault, entails uniquely international qualities that would alter the telos of the state and 
redefine the nature of interactions between states. 
The global scale enters liberal governmental rationality through discourses on 
political economy and perpetual peace. Under mercantilism, interstate relations and 
economic pursuits were conceptualized through a geographic imaginary of spatial 
fragmentation and competition. Consequently, states pursued economic expansion in a 
zero sum game. Likewise, projects for peace envisioned a balancing of forces between 
states acting in a global environment of mutual tension. However, liberal governmental 
rationality, expanded across a worldwide space, brought with it an understanding “mutual 
enrichment” in which states could benefit one another through economic expansion.28 
Liberal governmentality viewed the expansion of markets across global space as not only 
economically desirable but natural, and even integral to the amelioration of hostilities 
between states. It provided a conception of nature that “intended the entire world, the 
whole of its surface, to be given over to the economic activity of production and 
exchange.”29  The project of perpetual peace that emerged in this governmental 
rationality, exemplified by Kant, rested on the notion of a universal, unified, and global 
human nature expressed through the aspirations and desires of a liberal political-
economic subject. Within the conception of nature at work in global liberal 
governmentality, “[p]erpetual peace is guaranteed by nature and this guarantee is 
                                                 
28 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 54. 
29 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 57. Under neoliberal governmentality Foucault finds a 
different relationship between market expansion and nature, one in which market conditions have 
to be secured, at least initially, by selective interventions of the state. However, the origins of a 
global scale and unlimited commercial globalization rest on a conception of economic expansion 
as a natural process. While the relationship between economics and nature change in the 
formation of neoliberal government, the significance of a global scale and worldwide space of 
economic production and exchange will prove important to the formation of neoliberalism. 
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manifested in the population of the entire world and in the commercial relationships 
stretching across the whole world. The guarantee of perpetual peace is therefore actually 
commercial globalization.”30 
Foucault’s excavation of a global scale has significant implications for the 
contemporary understanding of globalization. First, he shows how forms of global 
connection substantially predate the proliferation of communications technologies and 
neoliberal markets in the 1990s. Discourses of a global, unified political space emerge at 
least as early as the eighteenth century.31 The geography of globalization involves a 
longer genealogy with extensive connections to empire and colonialism. Our 
understanding of globalizing processes must attend to these continuities with colonial 
expansion and the reorganization of colonizing acts into new pernicious forms. 
Second, Foucault begins to elucidate the Eurocentric biases at the origins of many 
of the institutions of “globalization.” The particular understanding of global space under 
examination by Foucault appears at roughly the same time that a unified “Europe” takes 
hold as a prominent concept and scale of politics. The prospect of “mutual enrichment” 
between European states brought about the idea of collective European progress. 
“Europe” named a collectivity organized around a spatial extension of political life. It 
provided the geographic origin for the program of commercial globalization that would 
be extended across the newly governable worldwide space. The project of “global” 
government brought with it “a juridification of the world,” a process that subjected 
                                                 
30 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 58 
31 Foucault is not suggesting that this is the definitive origin of anything that might be called 
globalization. Without doubt, forms of global connection appear long before this. See for instance 
Tarak Barkawi, Globalization and War, 1 – 26. 
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territories across the globe to European legal concepts and political order.32 Antony 
Anghie persuasively argues that liberal global government was constructed upon, and 
frequently exacerbates, nonegalitarian and asymmetric power relations originating from 
the colonial encounter. As Anghie suggests, the expansion of global trade and extension 
of European law across global space “must contend with … a history in which 
international law continuously disempowers the non-European world, even while 
sanctioning intervention within it.”33 Foucault demonstrates the scalar relations between 
“Europe” and “the globe” in the discourse of liberal government. The contemporaneous 
formations of the two scales facilitated their conflation into a profoundly Eurocentric 
“global” order. 
The consolidation of a global scale in political thought demonstrates how 
relations between scales played an important role in the formation of disciplinary power 
and bio-power. The governmental rationality connected to a global scale fundamentally 
altered the relationship between politics, economics, and nature. However, it did not 
simply overwrite the complex layering of political spaces with “the global.” Foucault 
suggests: 
when I say that a new form of political calculation on an international scale 
emerges in the thought of the physiocrats, Adam Smith, of Kant too, and of the 
eighteenth century jurists, I do not in any way mean that every other form of 
reflection, calculation, and analysis, that every other governmental practice 
disappears.34 
 
He finds instead an elaborate intertwining of scales in which the imperatives of global 
economic exchange form in the midst of disciplinary society. The shift is a matter of 
                                                 
32 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 56. 
33 Anghie, 312. 
34 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 58. 
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emphasis. Spaces of enclosure and the disciplining of bodies do not disappear with the 
rise of liberal government. Questions of governing shift their focus to matters of the 
population and global life, but tactics targeting bodies continue, albeit in less visible 
ways. Foucault’s study of this process continues to “shift the object and change the scale” 
revealing multiple scales at which power is at work. For instance, the global scale of 
commercial expansion produces effects at other scales of politics. It sees states as the 
universal political subunit within the field of the global economy. The formation of 
international law used to secure power relations within the global economic order 
requires the affirmation of the state form to guarantee conditions of reciprocity and 
mutual benefit between populations.35 These numerous levels accumulate into a 
genealogical account in which discipline and biopower interact in a non-teleological, 
mutual evolution. Within liberal governmentality, political life constituted at multiple 
scales – the body, the state, society, Europe, and the globe – begins to come into focus.  
  
Scale and Topology 
Gilles Deleuze says Foucault provides a map of political spaces in which power 
relations work through vast diffusions, interweaving clusters, and subtle connections. 
Deleuze’s account invokes the figures of the body, society, the state, and other spaces but 
proceeds without an invocation of scales or levels. Although Deleuze neglects an explicit 
engagement with the concept of scale in Foucault, he provides a careful consideration of 
Foucault’s spatiality that depicts the relational qualities of space. Deleuze sees Discipline 
and Punish as a practice in cartography in which “[a]nalysis and illustration go hand in 
                                                 
35 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 57 – 58. 
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hand, offering us a microphysics of power and a political investment of the body. These 
illustrations are coloured in on a minutely drawn map.”36 Foucault’s project, for Deleuze, 
starts from the politics of the body and seeks to draw maps that relate space to power. It 
slowly and carefully traces micro-processes moving from the training of “individual” 
bodies to the organization and regimentation of the social body. This is a non-concentric 
spatiality of political relations. Although Deleuze wants to suggest that Foucault is a 
cartographer of networks and topologies, a subtle language of scale works its way back 
into his account of the “diagram” in Foucault’s thought. 
Deleuze sees Foucault’s concept of the diagram as an important device for 
mapping social relations. Foucault describes the Panopticon as a diagram: “the 
Panopticon … is the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form; its 
functioning, abstracted from any obstacle, resistance or friction, must be represented as a 
pure architectural and optical system: it is in fact a figure of political technology that may 
and must be detached from any specific use.”37 Considered as a diagram, the Panopticon 
serves as a flexible, abstract model for the operation of power or, as Deleuze would call 
it, an abstract machine: “The diagram is no longer an auditory or visual archive but a 
map, a cartography that is coextensive with the whole social field. It is an abstract 
machine … a machine that is almost blind and mute, even though it makes others see and 
speak.”38 The Panopticon functions as a map for the workings of power relations beyond 
the confines of the penal system. In its abstract function it extends across a society of 
panopticism into numerous domains including education, industrial production, military 
                                                 
36 Deleuze, Foucault, 22. My emphasis. 
37 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 205. 
38 Deleuze, Foucault, 30.  
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training, urban planning, and social welfare. In his writings with Félix Guattari, Deleuze 
focuses on the “nonformal elements” and “composition” at work in and through abstract 
machines.39 However, in his turn to Foucault, Deleuze extends his spatial idioms and 
begins to formulate an explicitly spatial understanding of power in which a diagram 
charts spatial distributions and divisions that inflect power relations across a number of 
domains.  
Deleuze and Foucault both wish to distinguish a diagram from a set of rigid logics 
or structures that operate uniformly across social domains.40 In contrast to a hermetically 
sealed structure, the diagram forms in and through tensions between its constituent 
elements. When clarifying this point, Deleuze slightly revises the relation between a 
diagram and a map: “a diagram is a map, or rather several superimposed maps. And from 
one diagram to the next new maps are drawn.”41 The formation of the diagram occurs 
through maps drawn at different scales that are then overlaid and interwoven. In 
Deleuze’s qualification of the diagram, here, the concept breaks down into multiple maps 
drafted at different scales. Each scale names a particular spatial field in which the 
diagram operates. Scale no longer refers to an essence captured by “the local” and “the 
global” but to plural and heterogeneous spaces defining and defined by power-relations.  
Deleuze finds in Foucault’s thought a redefinition of “the local”: “‘local’ has two 
very different meanings: power is local because it is never global, but it is not local or 
                                                 
39 See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 255. 
40 Deleuze and Foucault both seem to be seeking out a conception of power distinct from 
orthodox Marxism as it was embodied by the PCF. For an excellent account of Foucault’s 
dissatisfaction with French Marxism see Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault, trans. Betsy Wing 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 50 – 58, 136 – 138.  
41 Deleuze, Foucault, 37.  
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localized because it is diffuse.”42 Deleuze and Foucault endorse the first understanding of 
“the local” but frequently note the tension between this notion of it (that it is not global) 
and the local that is localizable as a specific point at which an essence can be located.43  
The first sense of the local, which Deleuze and Foucault use to describe the functioning 
of power, refers to the numerous specific sites at the most intimate, immediate, and 
micro-scales. These localities never become global in the sense that they never fit 
together into a closed system. Instead, numerous local operations of power function 
through a “microphysics” that dispenses with an essentialist understanding of locality 
premised on a concentric image of “the local” nested within a large territorial nation and 
seated within a larger world order. As Deleuze advises, “we must not take ‘micro’ to 
mean a simple miniaturization of visible and articulable forms; instead it signifies another 
domain, a new type of relations, a dimension of thought that is irreducible to knowledge. 
Micro therefore means mobile and non-localizable connections.”44 The “microphysics of 
power” does not simply refer to a sovereign model of power transposed to smaller, but 
otherwise familiar, units of analysis. It charts new pathways of connection across society 
by tracing the mobile forces and tendencies often existing at the threshold of 
intelligibility. Power is never localized, which is to say that these local spaces never 
                                                 
42 Deleuze, Foucault, 24. Although Deleuze’s use of “global” and “local” often suggests a 
rethinking of the relations between the general and specific, I want to suggest that this 
reconceptualization applies to geographic thought as well. 
43 See for instance the conversation between Foucault and Deleuze entitled “Intellectuals and 
Power” wherein Deleuze suggests “a theory is always local and related to a limited field, and it is 
applied in another sphere, more or less distant from it.” Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, 
“Intellectuals and Power” in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and 
Interviews, Ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 205. Deleuze 
wishes to suggest the specific and non-totalizing nature of theory, that is, its contrast with 
globality, yet the formulation maintains the diffuse quality theory through its attachment to other 
distant spheres. 
44 Deleuze, Foucault, 62. 
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embody the essence of power.45 Instead, they are infused by the abstract machine of the 
diagram.  The local and global remain perpetually in contact with one another through the 
operation of abstract machines, that is, through the multiple diagrams or maps that infuse 
them with particular tendencies. Each scale is never merely set in a concentric circle. It 
possesses sharp edges and rough relays with the scales that exceed it.  
What I call infusion, here, does not determine local operations of power; it folds 
into the specificities and contingencies of a particular milieu. As the diagram of the 
Panopticon moves through different domains, institutions and social collectivities get 
reorganized. Practices of surveillance spread across society and take on different forms as 
they filter into penality, education, industrial production, and military training. However, 
they cumulatively produce what Foucault calls panopticism, a social field infused with 
the tendencies of the Panopticon. As the diagram moves through each domain, it comes 
into contact with other political technologies that carry their own maps for social 
organization. Deleuze observes:  
there are as many diagrams as there are social fields in history … for example, 
the Napoleonic diagram, where the disciplinary function merges with the 
sovereign function ‘at the point of junction of the monarchical, ritual exercise of 
sovereignty and the hierarchical, permanent exercise of indefinite discipline’. 
This is because the diagram is highly unstable or fluid, continually churning up 
matter and functions in a way likely to create change.46  
 
Diagrams are not the simple, geometric forms that the term might seem to connote. 
Rather, they contain loose ends, frictional points of contact, and inchoate qualities. These 
tensions are retained in the spaces and scales connected by diagrams. Localities remain 
                                                 
45 Deleuze explicitly rejects an essentialist understanding of power and sees this as a cornerstone 
of Foucault’s project, particularly in Discipline and Punish: “Power has no essence; it is simply 
operational. It is not an attribute but a relation: the power-relation is the set of possible relations 
between forces, which passes through the dominated forces no less that through the dominating” 
(Deleuze, Foucault, 24). 
46 Deleuze, Foucault, 30. 
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spaces of contest, tension, and struggle between different diagrams and the forms of 
parallax that emerge from multiple overlaid maps. 
As Deleuze formulates scale beyond the local, “there is no immediate global 
integration. There is, rather, a multiplicity of local and partial integrations, each one 
entertaining an affinity with certain relations or particular points.”47 His invocation of 
global and local often refers to what we might otherwise understand as the general and 
the specific. However, his conceptualizations also prove productive when thinking of the 
global scale and world space. Deleuze seeks to resist understandings of power in which a 
global closed system or structure becomes the locus of power. Nevertheless, there may be 
good reasons for retaining and rethinking some concept of “the global” even as we let go 
of the idea of an “immediate global integration.” Although it is possible to speak of a 
global map or diagram that establishes connections between local operations of power, 
this global map operates without imposing a unifying or centralizing totality. “The 
global” emerges out of the broader operations of power relations that remain partial and 
fragmentary. It names the numerous connections and disconnects between spaces that 
frequently overlap but never interlock.48 
An understanding of the global as an accumulation of heterogeneous parts without 
totalization parallels the conception of the State advanced by Deleuze and Foucault. In a 
familiar critique of the State as a universal historical form, Deleuze suggests that an 
analysis of power might be better served by examining the movement of numerous 
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domains into loose alliances and clusters, the effects of which come to be known as the 
State. Foucault likewise suggests: 
the state does not have an essence. The state is not a universal nor in itself an 
autonomous source of power. The state is nothing else but the effect, the profile, 
the mobile shape of perpetual … statifications … in the sense of incessant 
transactions which modify, or move, or drastically change, or insidiously shift 
sources of finance, modes of investment, decision-making centers, forms and 
types of control, relationships between local powers, the central authority, and so 
on. In short, the state has no heart … no interior. That state is nothing else but the 
mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities.49 
 
The state is less a cold monster than an elaborate composition produced through the 
numerous operations of different diagrams. It contains a different set of relations than 
those confined to linear causality. It works through “statifications,” processual 
incorporations into the state that bring together “incessant transactions,” “drastic 
changes,” and “insidious shifts.” These movements may shift the site at which power 
operates but do not consolidate the practices in question within a monolithic entity that 
possesses power. The State serves as an integrating force that brings multiple operations 
of power together. If it is vital to an analysis of power, this is because of its integrating 
function. As Deleuze observes, “[i]f the State-form, in our historical formations, has 
captured so many power relations, this is not because they are derived from it; in the 
contrary, it is because an operation of ‘continual state control’… was produced in the 
pedagogical, juridical, economic, familial and sexual domains which encourage global 
integration.”50 This critique of the State seeks to unseat totalizing, “global” structures and 
make conceptual room for the numerous practices and microprocesses that compose these 
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structures. This approach does not wholly discard the State; it sees the State as contingent 
formation that neither unifies nor determines politics. 
Deleuze’s thought on topology has influenced approaches to urban studies critical 
of the concept of “scale.”51 In particular, a tendency exists within Actor-Network Theory 
to affirm a “flat ontology” in which the distance between spaces can be collapsed through 
their connections in networks. This approach within Actor-Network Theory pursues “a 
relational understanding of spatial formations, which … imagines space (and eventually 
scale) as fields of activity or better as attributes of certain urban assemblages.”52 
However, the study of networks leads this approach to largely abandon the role of scale 
in political life: “[s]calar structuration and clustering are rejected as underlying structural 
processes and consequently as analytical categories for the study of cities.”53 This notion 
of spatial flatness sees any two points as being potentially connected through a network 
that collapses and overcomes distance. At its best, scale is seen as an epiphenomenal 
quality of networks emerging from a particular assemblage of constituent parts. Richard 
Smith goes even further to suggest that “the concept of ‘scale’ is … a redundant 
invention for seeing the spatiality of economic relations.”54 Smith sees “scale” as a term 
too rigid and imposing to describe the complexities of the social and political life; 
“‘scale’ is what … Lyotard terms an exteriority, a concept that is imposed on events 
                                                 
51 See Anna Secor, “Topological City,” Urban Geography 34 (2013): 430 – 444 and Ignacio 
Farías and Thomas Bender, eds., Urban Assemblages: How Actor-Network Theory Changes 
Urban Studies, (London: Routledge, 2010). 
52 Ignacio Farías, “Introduction: Decentering the Object of Urban Studies” in Urban 
Assemblages: How Actor-Network Theory Changes Urban Studies, eds. Ignacio Farías and 
Thomas Bender (London: Routledge, 2010), 17. 
53 Farías, “Introduction,” 17. 
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before any empirical investigation has even started.”55 Rather than describing a 
sociospatial formation, Smith sees scale as imposing a particular geographical bias on the 
study of politics and society. 56 
 The concept of scale in Foucault, as I have developed it so far, in many ways 
resembles the dynamic notion of scale endorsed by a few Actor-Network theorists still 
receptive to the concept. It is a relational concept “multiply enacted and assembled at 
concrete local sites, where concrete actors shape time-space dynamics in various ways, 
producing thereby different geographies of associations.”57 However, the assembled, 
dynamic character of scale leads Foucault to place more, not less, emphasis on the 
concept. He more effectively demonstrates that the concept does have effects by treating 
scales as ontologically real but not transhistorical. If scales such as the body, the nation, 
society, and the globe inform Foucault’s study of power, this is because “empirical 
investigation,” or as Foucault might prefer, genealogical investigation, finds these scales 
at work in the discourses and practices that form particular conceptions of government. 
 
From the Sovereign Capital to the Biopolitical City 
The city provides a site where the interweaving of multiple scales appears most 
visibly; in this section I examine how Foucault’s relational understanding of scale offers 
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56 Not everyone within Actor-Network Theory has been as hostile to the concept of scale as 
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its own transformative suggestions for the study of contemporary cities. Throughout his 
work, but particularly in his writing from the mid- to late-1970s, Foucault frequently 
returns to the figure of the city in order to illustrate the functioning of emergent forms of 
power. He invokes the figure of the city to unpack the evolution of two overlapping but 
distinct political phenomena: punishment (and its connection to discipline) and 
territoriality. In each case the focus on particular dimensions of the city differs but the 
two lines of inquiry connect in the larger genealogy of government.  
The unique multiscalar approach alters key concepts for the analysis of 
contemporary cities. In particular, Foucault approaches urban form as a constellation of 
bodies, spaces, and practices that compose power relations. Architectural design and 
discourses of government blend together as transformations of built environments 
accompany the shift between differing mechanics of power. The city forms a palimpsest 
in which built environments leave behind tangible, material imprints of the operations of 
disciplinary power and biopolitics. The spatializations of disciplinary and bio-power 
organize cities in distinct ways. I examine how the transfiguration of the city through 
shifting regimes of power defines, and is defined by, relations between scales. I then turn 
to Foucault’s account of neoliberal governmentality, where a discussion of the city 
remains absent, in order to sketch the forms of spatiality and urbanism at work in 
neoliberalism today.  
 A number of urban forms mark Foucault’s genealogy of punishment. For 
instance, the often neglected urban form of the plague-stricken town provides a foil for 
Foucault’s elaboration of panopticism. In the plague town strict spatial separations render 
the populace immobile thereby guaranteeing their complete visibility. The plague town 
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was governed by “an omnipresent and omniscient power that subdivides itself in a 
regular, uninterrupted way.”58 The result was an “enclosed, segmented space, observed at 
every point, in which the individuals are inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest 
movements are supervised, in which all events are recorded.”59 The spatiality of the 
plague town organized crowds and masses into atomistic individuals through segmented 
spaces, enclosures, constant surveillance, and overt regulations of minute details. In its 
historical moment, the plague town represented meticulous urban control through design.  
With the realization of absolute control came total immobility: “The plague-stricken 
town, traversed throughout with hierarchy, surveillance, observation, writing; the town 
immobilized by the functioning of an extensive power that bears in a distinct way over all 
individual bodies – this is the utopia of the perfectly governed city.”60 This model grew 
out of an extreme event, a crisis such as a plague, that could allow for the reorganization 
of urban space into gridded, closed off segments. In this early form of discipline, “there is 
an exceptional situation: against an extraordinary evil, power is mobilized … it constructs 
… a counter city.”61 The utopian city, imperfectly enacted at moments of emergency, 
represented the highest urban form and yet, it also embodied its opposite. This “counter 
city” represented the antithesis of the city; it lacked movement, sociality, and the general 
conditions of everyday life.  
 A number of flexible, distributed forms of punishment adapted to everyday life 
and working through spaces of circulation rather than enclosure would come to replace 
the practices and built environments used in the governance of the plague town. These 
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new architectures no longer resembled fortresses and the material constructs of martial 
law but were more attuned to the circulations of bodies and things. 
no more bars, no more chains, no more heavy locks; all that was needed was that 
the separations should be clear and the openings well arranged. The heaviness of 
the old ‘houses of security’, with their fortress-like architecture, could be 
replaced by the simple, economic geometry of a ‘house of certainty.’62 
 
Built environments no longer required the heavy fortifications of the plague town. These 
new dynamic urban forms worked instead through precise interventions that distributed 
punishment across society:  
While, on the one hand, the disciplinary establishments increase, their 
mechanisms have a certain tendency to become ‘de-institutionalized’, to emerge 
from the closed fortresses in which they once functioned and to circulate in a 
‘free’ state; the massive, compact disciplines are broken down into flexible 
methods of control, which may be transferred and adapted.63 
 
The turn away from architectures of enforced enclosure brought about urban spaces 
conducive to flexible regulations with generalized effects across society. Power exceeded 
the walls of the fortress and moved through the numerous institutions and apparatuses at 
work across the city.  
 Two urban forms, the “punitive city” and the “carceral city,” adopted this flexible 
approach to discipline. The punitive city appears as one of Foucault’s first suggestions for 
what follows the architecture of power in which the violence of the scaffold secured the 
power of the sovereign. The practices of public torture had inadvertently brought about a 
widespread fascination with the “great criminal” that animated public consciousness and 
populated literature. New practices were required to presumptively discredit the criminal 
by transforming the relationship between crime and society. Here, “the crime can no 
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longer appear as anything but a misfortune and the criminal as an enemy who must be re-
educated into social life.”64 These tactics came with a spatialization that reconfigured the 
distribution of punishment across society, and brought with them the urban form of the 
punitive city: 
This, then, is how one must imagine the punitive city. At the crossroads, in the 
gardens, at the side of roads being repaired or bridges built, in workshops open to 
all, in the depths of mines that may be visited, will be hundreds of tiny theatres of 
punishment. Each crime will have its law; each criminal his punishment ... 
Scenery, perspectives, optical effects, trompe-l’oeil sometimes magnify the 
scene, making it more fearful than it is, but also clearer … But the essential point, 
in all these real or magnified severities, is that they should all, according to a 
strict economy, teach a lesson: that each punishment should be a fable.65 
 
Operations of punishment proliferated within the punitive city. Punishment occurred 
through any number of small theaters in which operations on the body were designed to 
resonate throughout society and move through the educative apparatus of the family, 
public discourse between citizens, poetry, and literature of the time. The spatialization of 
punishment worked through a number of heterogeneous sites from which it then spreads 
across multiple geographic scales.  
 In Foucault’s account, the punitive city, and its geography for educating against 
crime through theater and spectacle, was one among many political technologies vying 
for prominence during the crisis of governmentality faced by the regime of the scaffold. 
The model of the punitive city had to contend with the distinct spatiality of “coercive 
institutions” that would give birth to the modern prison. Both the punitive city and 
coercive institutions exercised punishment in the name of society as a whole “but they are 
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very different from one another at the level of the mechanisms they envisage.”66 As 
Foucault describes at length: 
the divergence is the following: punitive city or coercive institution? On the one 
hand [we have the model of the punitive city], a functioning of penal power, 
distributed throughout the social space; present everywhere as scene, spectacle, 
sign, discourse; legible like an open book; operating by a permanent 
recodification of the mind of the citizens; … acting invisibly and uselessly on the 
‘soft fibres of the brain’, as Servan put it. A power to punish that ran the whole 
length of the social network would act at each of its points, and in the end would 
no longer be perceived as a power of certain individuals over others, but as an 
immediate reaction of all in relation to the individual.67 
 
The geography of punishment envisioned in a punitive city allowed subjects to witness 
punishment and assist in the circulation of the spectacle throughout the citizenry. By 
contrast, the institution of the prison would function by directly training and regimenting 
bodies. Yet through the figure of the punitive city, Foucault does more than simply 
review an understanding of punishment rapidly eclipsed by the turn toward enclosure and 
confinement; he excavates a key dimension of the flexible and productive dimensions in 
power. Elden sees the figure of the punitive city serving an indispensable role in 
Foucault’s spatial thought. This particular urban form begins the inquiry into discipline 
that takes the entirety of society as its object. Furthermore, as Elden suggests, “[t]he key 
question in Discipline and Punish is not so much why the sovereign and his force was 
replaced, but … [w]hy did the administrative apparatus replace the social body, the 
enclosed place of reform get chosen over the punitive city?”68 For Elden, the turn away 
from the punitive city’s distribution of power across urban space forms the central 
tension animating Foucault’s thought in Discipline and Punish. I would also suggest that 
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the punitive city lays the groundwork for the regulation of the social body, that is to say, 
the coordination of the scales of the body and society. Although the model of the punitive 
city would never fully ascend to primacy as a strategy of administering punishment, it 
nonetheless set down important exemplars for later political technologies that would 
draw on the geography of the city interwoven with other scales of politics.  
 The urban form Foucault names the “carceral city” followed coercive institutions 
and would seek out new diffuse tactics of administering punishment in order to regulate 
the social body. The carceral city modified the socially distributed forms of regulation 
characteristic of the punitive city through the addition of mechanisms salvaged from the 
political laboratory of the modern prison. For Foucault, “the carceral” names a complex, 
even paradoxical, set of spatial and geographic forms connecting confinement, 
punishment, and discipline. Foucault finds important forms of continuity and separation 
in its functioning, describing the carceral as both a “system” and an “archipelago.”69 It 
functions by creating links between the penal system and social, political, economic, and 
religious domains: “The frontiers between confinement, judicial punishment and 
institutions of discipline … tended to disappear and constitute a great carceral continuum 
that diffused penitentiary techniques into the most innocent disciplines.”70 As the political 
technology of the prison inflected social and political institutions more broadly, the 
smallest operations of power served a vital role in defining normality and delinquency. 
The carceral brought about continuity between domains of the social field, but it operated 
through geographic discontinuities. For Foucault, the carceral city exercised punishment 
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in a number of disparate, connected geographic spaces, shuttling bodies from one point to 
the next in its archipelago of disciplinary practices.  
The carceral apparatus inhabits urban space and reconstitutes power relations 
within the city. Foucault provides a sketch of the workings of the carceral city at the close 
of Discipline and Punish: 
The carceral city, with its imaginary ‘geo-politics’, is governed by quite different 
principles … at the center of this city … there is not the ‘centre of power’, not a 
network of forces, but a multiple network of diverse elements – walls, space, 
institution, rules, discourse; that the model of the carceral city is not, therefore, 
the body of the king, with the powers that emanate from it, nor the contractual 
meeting of wills from which a body that was both individual and collective was 
born, but a strategic distribution of elements of different natures and levels.71 
 
Here, Foucault identifies the emergence of political space irreducible to the body of the 
king or the sovereignty of mutually contracting subjects. In the political space of the 
carceral city, power works through interconnected levels or scales that resonate together 
to different degrees. The body, the built environment of the city, penal institutions, and 
society intersect in and constitute the carceral city. This is an urban geopolitics 
constituted from below, above, and within the city. In the final pages of Discipline and 
Punish Foucault’s line of questioning has turned from the distribution of punishment to 
an inquiry into spatial distributions and the scales of politics. 
The figure of the carceral city begins to pose the question of urbanism and its 
relation to government. This question is treated explicitly in the lectures Security, 
Territory, Population wherein Foucault frames his study of governmentality. He provides 
a detailed account of the emergence of towns and cities as political entities. In particular, 
his examination of the evolving relation between city and territory brings into focus the 
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shifting relations between scales that defined, and were redefined by, the city’s role in 
politics. I reconstruct Foucault’s genealogy of the city in order to shed light on the 
evolution of regimes of power and, especially, to highlight the implicit role of scalar 
emphasis in defining distinct modalities of power.  
Early in Foucault’s project on governmentality, he frames the question of 
government as a relation between town and territory. Foucault begins his account of 
urbanism in the seventeenth century when “the town still had a particular legal and 
administrative definition that isolated it and marked it out quite specifically in 
comparison with other areas and spaces of the territory  … the town was typically 
confined within a tight, walled space, which had much more than just a military 
function.”72 The town is characterized by strict spatial divisions and laws to define the 
nature of these spaces. Foucault draws on Alexandre Le Maître’s work, La Métropolitée, 
to further theorize the spaces of the juridical town and its relation to sovereignty: 
On the basis of this architectural metaphor, the territory must also comprise 
foundations, common parts, and noble parts. The foundations will be the countryside, 
and it goes without saying that all the peasants, and only peasants must live in the 
countryside. Second, all the artisans, and only artisans, must live in the small towns. 
Finally, the sovereign, his officers, and those artisans and tradesmen who are 
indispensable to the functioning of the court and the sovereign’s entourage, must live 
in the capital.73  
 
The plan put forth in La Métropolitée strictly divides spaces of peasants, artisans, and the 
sovereign (with his seigniorial court). The territory is composed of spatial divisions that 
mark class hierarchies. Yet even within this model of the city certain circulations exist 
between towns. These are primarily intended to be aesthetic, symbolic, and moral 
circulations moving from the capital to the rest of the territory. As Foucault observes: 
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The capital must be the ornament of the territory … The capital must give the 
example of good morals. The capital must be the place where the holy orators are the 
best and are best heard, and it must also be the site of academies, since they must 
give birth to the sciences and truth that is to be disseminated in the rest of the county. 
Finally, there is an economic role: the capital must be the site of luxury so that it is a 
point of attraction for products coming from other countries, and at the same time, 
through trade, it must be the distribution point of manufactured articles and products, 
etcetera.74 
 
The maintenance of a prominent capital and its position atop the hierarchy of space 
characterize this model of the town focused on the maintenance and preservation of 
sovereignty. The relation between sovereignty and territory animates the political thought 
of this urban order; “the primary relationship is essentially that of sovereignty to the 
territory, and this serves as the schema, the grid, for arriving at an understanding of what 
a capital city should be and how it can and should function.”75 This regime of power and 
its spatial configuration seeks to produce a town as a model for the entire territory. It is a 
capitalizing process designed “to ensure a well ‘capitalized’ state, that is to say, a state 
well organized around a capital as the seat of sovereignty and the central point of political 
and commercial circulation.”76 This capitalizing city embodies the claim of the sovereign 
over the territory. Foucault later refers to this process by which a central city comes to 
define the entirety of a territory as the “urbanization of territory.”77  
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Foucault contrasts the capitalizing city, characteristic of sovereign/juridical 
power, with a number of Northern European towns based on the form of the Roman 
camp. The model of the town as camp was employed to produce entirely new built 
environments and subjectivities adapted to the strict disciplinary norms imposed by and 
through the partitioning of space:  
The famous form of the Roman camp is used, which, along with the military 
institution was being reutilized at this time as a fundamental instrument of discipline. 
The form of the Roman camp was revived at the end of the sixteenth and the 
beginning of the seventeenth century, precisely in protestant countries … along with 
the exercises, the subdivision of troops, and collective and individuals controls in the 
major undertaking of the disciplinarization of the army.78 
 
The shift from the capitalizing project of Le Maître to the adoption of the Roman camp as 
the model of the town marks a reconfiguration of the politics of space. For Le Maître the 
urban form was isomorphic with the state; the two spaces are meant to acquire the same 
political, commercial, moral, and aesthetic qualities. However, in the case of the town 
modeled on the Roman camp, the spatial configuration of the town and its corresponding 
political qualities emanate from a smaller scale. As Foucault explains: 
in the previous case, Le Maître’s La Métropolitée, the layout of the town was 
basically thought of in terms of the most general, overall category of the territory. 
One tried to think about the town through a macrocosm, since the state itself was 
thought of as an edifice. In short, the interplay of macrocosm and microcosm ran 
through the problematic of the relationship between town, sovereignty, and territory. 
In the case of towns constructed in the form of the camp, we can say that the town is 
not thought of on the basis of the larger territory, but on the basis of a smaller, 
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geometrical figure, which is a kind of architectural module, namely the square or 
rectangle, which is in turn subdivided into other squares or rectangles.79 
 
As is now well-known to scholars of Foucault’s thought, the movement from sovereign 
power to disciplinary power turns on the shift from a law-like relation between sovereign 
and subject to a system of normation exercised through models and gridded spaces that 
led subjects increasingly toward self-discipline. Foucault’s discussion, here, reveals the 
neglected scalar quality of this shift. The shift from sovereignty to discipline comes about 
through a reconfiguration of microcosm and macrocosm – from town and territory to 
architecture and town. The politics of space animating urbanism shifts from an 
isomorphism between town and territory to a geometry of urban design. Grids, 
enclosures, and the general military architecture of the encampment inaugurate a scale of 
politics that emphasizes the movements and dispositions of the body. This move ushers in 
“the disciplinary treatment of multiplicities in space, that is to say, [the] constitution of an 
empty, closed space within which artificial multiplicities are to be constructed and 
organized according to the triple principle of hierarchy, precise communication of 
relations of power, and functional effects specific to this distribution, for example, 
ensuring trade, housing, and so on.”80 Disciplinary power establishes not only new spaces 
of regulation but new relations to space. It produces “individuals” by dividing a 
seemingly chaotic multiplicity into neatly ordered and segmented parts; it separates that 
which deviates from the norm into “perverse” aspects of individuality. 
With the advent of biopolitics, Foucault sees the town of the eighteenth century 
beginning to evolve a number of security apparatuses. This new town opens routes 
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designed to facilitate hygiene, internal trade, external trade, and more generalized forms 
of surveillance. Here, the aim “was a matter of organizing circulation, eliminating 
dangerous elements, making a division between good and bad circulation, and 
maximizing the good circulation by diminishing the bad.”81 In the eighteenth century 
town circulation is not limited, constrained, or enclosed, as it was in the capitalizing city 
and camp town. Instead, the urban form of the eighteenth century town seeks to connect, 
amplify, and secure circulation. The emphasis on security is a key part of the formation 
of biopolitics and also a central development in the eighteenth century town. Security 
requires an open-ended city designed to accommodate future development. Foucault 
frames this as “a fairly new and fundamental question of how to integrate possible future 
developments within a present plan … What must be done to meet something that is not 
exactly known in advance.”82 Security apparatuses envision a resilient urban space that 
can flexibly manage crises and emergencies in order to maintain “desirable” forms of 
circulation. This apparatus of biopolitics imagines a different kind of political space than 
the prison-inspired grids of discipline’s coercive institutions. It adopts multiple, flexible 
techniques, not unlike the diffuse practices conducted in the name of “society” by the 
carceral archipelago. The difference though is that the space of security is a continuous 
geographic space, a “milieu” that serves as “the target for the intervention of power.”83  
A milieu is a spatial-geographic frame to conceptualize and manage urban life and 
the forces that traverse it. It serves an indispensable role in Foucault’s mapping of 
biopower. The city exists within a milieu. A milieu draws nearby (and potentially distant) 
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spaces and movements into the designs of urban life. It crosses the divides between 
nature and culture and the natural and the artificial. For Foucault the concept of milieu 
denotes a space defined by the interaction of social practices and natural features: 
The milieu, then, will be that in which circulation is carried out. The milieu is a set of 
natural givens – rivers, marshes, hills – and a set of artificial givens – an 
agglomeration of individuals, of houses, etcetera. The milieu is a certain number of 
combined, overall effects bearing on all who live in it.84 
 
Populations, the “agglomerations of individuals, of houses, etc.,” appear as governable 
objects in relation to the milieu. The milieu is that which connects the city to the forces 
and processes at scales beyond the urban. The city becomes a space for managing 
circulations on a scale that exceeds it. Events beyond the scale of the city – climate, 
floods, earthquakes, and volcanoes – interact with the everyday movements of urban life.  
The milieu reframes politics as the management of natural (including human) forces 
across an expansive geographic space. In this image of politics, as it is reframed through 
the concept of milieu:  
the sovereign is no longer someone who exercises his power over a territory on the 
basis of a geographical localization of his political sovereignty. The sovereign deals 
with a nature, or rather with the perpetual conjunction, the perpetual intrication of a 
geographical, climatic, and physical milieu with the human species insofar as it has a 
body and a soul, a physical and a moral existence; and the sovereign will be someone 
who will have to exercise power at that point of connection where nature, in the 
sense of physical elements, interferes with nature in the sense of the nature of the 
human species, at that point of articulation where the milieu becomes the 
determining factor of nature.85 
 
“Milieu” conveys a move beyond concentric or nested understandings of political 
space. In a milieu individualizing and globalizing technologies of power coexist, 
reinforce one another, and produce feedback. Likewise, the “human species,” as 
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an object to be secured through the management of the milieu, is both a 
globalizing project that rests on the aggregating notion of the population and at 
the same time an individualizing technology that works on a single body and soul.  
Causality within a milieu is a complex looping network distinct from the 
deliberate or “rational action” of agents: “The milieu is a certain number of combined, 
overall effects bearing on all who live in it. It is an element in which a circular link is 
produced between effects and causes, since an effect from one point of view will be a 
cause from another.”86 As it reworks the circuitry of urban spaces and their surroundings, 
the emergent spatial form of the milieu has real effects on the constitution of power 
relations and the operations of government. Security aims to produce and sustain 
desirable forms of circulation warding off anything viewed as potentially dangerous, 
pathological, or revolutionary.  
Foucault’s political history of urban forms unfolds through the reconfiguration of 
scales: between city and territory, city and spaces for training the body, and city and 
milieu. Throughout this genealogy, the urban scale serves as a nexus for the interchange 
of micropolitics and their accumulation into macropolitical structures. The city provides a 
crucial set of relays in Foucault’s relational spatiality that folds multiple scales into one 
another. Narrating this genealogy from the starting point of the city unseats the State 
from its central role in political thought and opens the way for the elaborate spatial 
project: 
to show how starting from the relatively local and microscopic analysis of those 
typical forms of power of the pastorate it was possible, without paradox or 
contradiction, to return to the general problems of the state, on condition 
precisely that we [do not make] the state [into] a transcendent reality whose 
history could be undertaken on the basis of itself. It must be possible to do the 
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history of the state on the basis of men’s actual practice, on the basis of what they 
do and how they think … we can see that there is not a sort of break between the 
level of micro-power and the level of macro-power, and that talking about one 
[does not] exclude talking about the other. In actual fact, an analysis in terms of 
micropowers comes back without any difficulty to the analysis of problems like 
those of government and the state.87 
 
Foucault outlines an approach to political analysis that moves back and forth from micro 
scales to the macro, studying the contours of the local and specific before moving to the 
state, general, and global. In this approach to the evolution of power, the city serves as an 
important intersection in which multiple scales overlap and intersect. Foucault drafts 
multiscalar maps of the city in which power-relations form though the confrontation 
between everyday habits and urban bodies, on the one hand, and the governmentalization 
of the state, the imperatives of society, and the movements of global circulations on the 
other. 
 
Neoliberal Urban Governance 
Although Foucault provides a compelling frame for approaching urban politics, 
he leaves the figure of the city behind when he moves into an analysis of neoliberalism. I 
want to suggest that his portrayal of the city in his earlier works, as a space of intersecting 
scales with uneven edges and loose remainders, complements his discussion of 
neoliberalism. It provides a rich theoretical apparatus for understanding contemporary 
urban governance in which cities undergo restructuring through political-economic forces 
while also serving as sites for the global workings of discipline and biopower.  
For Foucault neoliberalism represents not only a set of policies or an ideology, but 
a governmentality. It connects a discourse on the nature of government to a set of 
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material practices and provides a “whole way of being and thinking … a type of relation 
between the governors and the governed.”88 Foucault sees neoliberalism not as an 
ideology that produces false consciousness and can be resolved through demystifying 
critique. As a governmentality, neoliberalism infiltrates numerous institutions and 
permeates a subject’s understanding of her own political being. Its reach extends into 
practices of subjectivity, freedom, and the relation between body and society.89 This 
political rationality culminates in a public policy that pursues privatization, selective 
regulation favoring corporate interests, and austerity. 
Neoliberal governmentality envisions the subject homo economicus as an 
entrepreneur, an “entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital, being for 
himself his own producer, being for himself the source of [his] earnings.”90 Homo 
economicus, envisioned in liberal economic thought as a self-interested economic actor, 
becomes a being committed, in multiple venues, to mobilizing herself as capital. This 
understanding of subjectivity thus permeates multiple domains of political life. 
Neoliberal homo economicus views economic regulation, foreign policy, and social 
welfare as fields in which the state must intervene solely for the sake of enabling 
entrepreneurial endeavors. The terms of neoliberal “freedom” emerge within these 
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limited terms of entrepreneurial being. The drive of neoliberalism to monopolize the 
discourse of freedom necessitates a reconceptualization of the term: 
we should not think of freedom as a universal which is gradually realized over 
time, or which undergoes quantitative variations, greater or lesser drastic 
reductions, or more or less important periods of eclipse. It is not a universal 
which is particularized in time and geography. Freedom is not a white surface 
with more or less numerous black spaces here and there and from time to time. 
Freedom is never anything other … than an actual relation between governors 
and governed, a relation in which the measure of the “too little” existing freedom 
is given by the “even more” freedom demanded.91  
 
Here, freedom is not simply the “negative liberty” of “freedom from” government 
intervention, the control of others, or, in general, the exercise of power understood in its 
sovereign/juridical sense. Instead, freedom represents a certain set of power relations and 
the conditions of possibility for politics that result from those relations. In the case of 
neoliberalism, freedom takes the form of entrepreneurialism, the idealized relation 
between economic subjects and government. Entrepreneurialism is not without 
regulation, selective/tactical intervention, and power relations. Rather, entrepreneurialism 
refers to the set of power relations that neoliberal governmentality ascribes to the practice 
of “freedom.” 
Cities sit at the intersection of the transformations at work in the consolidation of 
neoliberal government. Numerous cities have adopted neoliberal approaches to 
governance by privatizing public spaces, cutting expenditures for public infrastructure, 
and eliminating positions for public employees. These neoliberal reforms are often 
characterized as part of a process of local “empowerment” in which cities exercise their 
supposed autonomy as collective entrepreneurial subjects and pursue neoliberal 
governance by choice. Closer inspection reveals that this process has been part of a 
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layered geography that Nancy Fraser characterizes as “a new multi-leveled structure of 
governmentality, a complex edifice in which the national state is but one level among 
others.”92 Numerous forces emanating from a multiple geographic scales impinge upon, 
constrain, or assault the supposedly “autonomous” neoliberal city.  
First, changes in national policies toward cities have coincided with the 
emergence of transnational actors and institutions capable of exercising disproportionate 
and anti-democratic influence. As Jason Hackworth observes, “local governance is not an 
entirely local affair. The geoinstitutional context within which local decisions are made is 
complex and multiscalar … the neoliberal turn is … one that is highly engineered by 
external institutions that have no formal governing role in any municipality.”93 In the case 
of American cities, three prominent transformations have defined this multiscalar context. 
First, a shift has occurred in the fundamental aim of the national economy wherein 
Keynesianism, drawing on a relatively egalitarian liberal tradition, has been rapidly 
replaced by a commitment to unlimited private wealth accumulation.94 Second, as federal 
budgets for public investment continued to shrink, federal mandates on cities to expand 
policing and accelerate prison construction placed increased strain on local budgets. 
Third, bond-rating agencies have gained undue influence over city government. Cities 
have been placed at the mercy of bond-rating agencies and often undertake massive cuts 
and restructuring in order to maintain a sound rating.95 Bond rating agencies shape 
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neoliberal urbanism through their ability to regulate access to capital markets. These 
unaccountable institutions exercise tremendous influence over a city’s ability to issue 
debt and shape the course of development pursued by the city. As Hackworth suggests, 
“bond rating firms, such as Moody’s Investors Service and Standard and Poor’s (S&P), 
are perhaps the single most influential institutional force in determining the quantity, 
quality, and geography of local investment in the developed world.”96  
In response to national and transnational pressures, many cities have begun to 
compete with one another for what Richard Florida calls the “creative class,” a new 
social class that includes highly mobile residents and corporations seeking out a 
particular bundle of incentives provided by urban life.97 Florida sees a reorganization of a 
Fordist economy into a “Creative Economy” in which markets require only that the 
creativity of individuals be cultivated in order to resolve socio-economic inequalities and 
reduce environmental destruction.98 The formation of a new “creative society” depends 
on cities reorganizing urban governance in an effort to attract the “creative class.”99 
Florida would have cities focus on producing a general creative milieu that seeks out 
technology industries, mobile “talent” (generally young and middle-class workers), and 
an extensive music and arts scene. Throughout his description one can easily imagine 
Florida stretching an image of Google offices across the urban fabric. While the accuracy 
of Florida’s depiction of the interurban economy remains dubious, his utopian vision has 
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nonetheless influenced urban restructuring. It adds another exemplar to the Foucauldian 
panoply. 
Florida’s vision of urban governance has important affinities with neoliberalism 
that limit its potentials for addressing socio-economic inequalities and exacerbate certain 
unequal power relations. As Jamie Peck observes, “the creative cities thesis has travelled 
so far so fast because it encodes an engaging ‘economic imaginary’ based on a set of 
principles that combines cultural libertarianism and contemporary urban design motifs 
with neoliberal economic imperatives.”100 Florida’s Creative Society embraces a degree 
of cultural creativity as a basis for legitimating neoliberalism. It more strongly resembles 
an offshoot of neoliberal governmentality than a corrective to its shortcomings. For 
instance, the citizen of the creative city closely resembles Foucault’s description of the 
neoliberal homo economicus. Peck describes this form of urban citizenship as: 
Homo creativus [who] trades on an especially atomized form of human 
capital (“talent”), while positively thriving on relentless competition and 
long hours of work; s/he ostensibly favours “plug-and-play communities” 
in which weak social attachments prevail and where social distinction is 
marked out in the sphere of consumption. (Collective commitments, 
together with social and job security are, in this context, seriously 
passé.).101   
 
The economic subject of Creative Society moves seamlessly between communities and 
evades the seeming encumbrances of collective social and political endeavors. Homo 
creativus is an entrepreneurial creature whose environment has been redesigned to grant 
her unfettered access to a city based on her class position. This model of citizenship 
encourages urban governance that focuses on the needs and interests of its creative 
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citizens in order to temporarily secure their residence. This subset of the city’s population 
is favored at the expense of other urban residents. As Peck describes this program of 
reform: “[t]he creative cities thesis represents a ‘soft’ scalar fix for this neoliberal urban 
conjuncture, making the case for modest and discretionary public spending on creative 
assets while raising a favoured bundle of middle-class lifestyles to the status of an urban 
development project.”102 Furthermore, the presumptive dismissal of collective life in the 
Creative Society has the depoliticizing effect of discouraging political organization in 
favor of atomistic, unattached social life. It assumes that responses to social problems 
will emerge from individual minds within the creative class rather than through the 
collaboration of citizens committed to social justice in urban life.  
 The accuracy of the creative cities thesis for describing the conditions of cities in 
a new global economy is still in question. However, many cities have begun to act on this 
model generating a performative pressure for others to follow. The acceptance of this 
creative model has led to a situation in which, as Peck describes it, “cities again find 
themselves induced to do whatever it takes to secure mobile and scarce economic 
resources in a globalizing struggle against peer cities.”103 The creative cities thesis has 
introduced new pressures extending from global and inter-urban scales for cities to adopt 
a particular brand of neoliberal reform. Rather than deepening and extending local 
empowerment, Florida’s vision of a creative society contributes to a race between cities 
to remake themselves as spaces of creativity tethered to a neoliberal impetus. 
 Through the transformations induced by neoliberal urbanism, contemporary cities 
have no only carved out havens for the “creative” (upper-middle) class. They have also 
                                                 
102 Peck, 160. 
103 Peck, 160. 
  Scale, Power, and Neoliberal Urbanism • II 
118 
 
set aside space for warehousing bodies deemed surplus by neoliberalism. Neoliberal 
urbanism has streamlined biopolitical and disciplinary mechanisms used to regulate 
populations and bodies that fall outside its political rationality. The geography of 
deprivation and punishment imposed by neoliberalism closely follows the lines of racial 
segregation in American cities. As Lester Spence argues, “the turn toward neoliberalism 
is not possible without the use of ideas about race – about racialized bodies and racialized 
spaces.”104 Within neoliberal governmentality, racialized bodies and spaces serve as 
figures of exception, embodying the supposed failings of progressive policies and 
remaining in need of extensive disciplinary interventions.105 Practices of regulating the 
lives of poor and nonwhite urban citizens, such as remaking the built environment of the 
city to the designs of a predominantly white upper class and expanding the police powers 
within cities, rely on the depiction of these bodies and populations as “dangerous,” 
“inefficient” or “corrupt.”106  
Within the United States the current trend focuses investment on gentrification 
and large commercial projects while neglecting public housing and more equitable forms 
of urban development. Hackworth sees this fundamentally changing urban space in the 
United States: 
The neoliberal city is increasingly characterized by a curious combination of 
inner city and exurban private investment, disinvestment in the inner suburbs, the 
relaxation of land use controls, and the reduction of public investment that is not 
likely to lead to an immediate profit. If public housing and middle-class suburban 
housing were icons of the Keynsian managerialist city, then gentrified 
neighborhoods and downtown commercial mega-projects are the icons of the 
neoliberal city.107 
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The pursuit of gentrified neighborhoods and commercial mega-projects only exacerbates 
already existing inequalities between these newly developed parts of the city and the 
spaces and residents overlooked by these projects. The aim here seems to be short term 
profit generation, often ending in capital flight, rather than the creation and maintenance 
of a livable city.  
 The construction of a built environment that intensifies surveillance and 
reinforces existing inequalities connects with highly disciplinary welfare programs that 
often have more to do with forcing the poor onto the labor market than removing them 
from conditions of poverty. As Soss et. al. observe: 
Welfare programs today demand “work first,” while giving little serious attention 
to the disabilities, life problems, family needs, and resource deficits found among 
the poor. In the process, they actively diminish opportunities to acquire education 
and other forms of human capital that people need to get better jobs. Under the 
banner of “valuing work,” we have constructed an aggressive work-enforcement 
system that rides roughshod over all countervailing values and willfully ignores 
the conditions of labor markets and poor people’s lives.108  
 
These programs are infused with neoliberal governmentality that emphasizes self-reliance 
and personal responsibility as the solution to social problems. Yet, the actual outcomes of 
such programs prove to be primarily disciplinary. The programs aim to guarantee a 
secure labor market and a compliant workforce. The actual needs of those in poverty are 
a secondary concern and often poorly served by the programs. In the process “the values 
of work and responsibility are being used to justify surveillance practices, authority 
relations, and modes of civic positioning that are deeply anti-democratic.”109 These 
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disciplinary welfare programs insist upon the ability for work to resolve socio-economic 
inequality while expanding the net of surveillance cast over poorer citizens. 
 While the United States has experienced a disciplinary shift in its welfare policy 
under neoliberalism, structural adjustment programs left even fewer social welfare 
programs in many states of the global South. From the mid-1970s to the 1980s the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank conditioned loans on neoliberal 
restructuring of the economy that rapidly eroded the quality of life in cities. As Mike 
Davis chronicles exhaustively, “[e]verywhere the IMF and World Bank … offered poor 
countries the same poisoned chalice of devaluation, privatization, removal of import 
controls and food subsidies, enforced cost-recovery in health and education, and ruthless 
downsizing of the public sector.”110 The urban form of cities in the global South began to 
change rapidly under the weight of international economic pressures. Economic 
restructuring in conjunction with the near disappearance of the public sector brought 
about “storms of poverty and sudden explosions in slum-building.”111 As neoliberal 
globalization offered the unprecedented accumulation of wealth and secured urban access 
for an ever smaller group of privileged citizens, it simultaneously relegated an increasing 
number of the planet’s population to rely upon overcrowded housing with minimal 
infrastructure and limited land tenure in spaces subject to frequent punitive police 
action.112  
The willingness of states and economic institutions to pursue policies that 
generate slums has become a spatial practice of maintaining global inequality. Jeffrey 
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Nealon sees this neoliberal/biopolitical tactic as an intensification of power under 
previous disciplinary regimes: “[i]n terms of the global production of slums and the 
concomitant geographical and physical confinement they enforce … market economies 
have proven to be much more efficient and ruthless than discipline’s company-towns ever 
could have dreamed.”113 Here, there seems to be a radical rescaling of the city in 
neoliberal urbanism. Rather than merely encountering new pressures from national policy 
and the changing nature of the global economy, a significant development in its own 
right, cities now function as a medium for the expansion of global inequality and the 
forms of extreme violence that accompany it. The proliferation of slums works as a form 
of global confinement in which entire populations are excluded from formal economic 
and political networks. This is a world in which relations between the scales of the body 
city, state, and globe are being drastically remade into what Davis calls “a grim human 
world largely cut off from the subsistence solidarities of the countryside as well as 
disconnected from the cultural and political life of the traditional city – [this] is the 
radical new face of inequality.”114  
*   *   * 
In an interview with Foucault entitled “Space, Knowledge, Power,” the topic of the 
conversation turns to liberty. Foucault framed liberty as a practice but made sure to 
qualify this statement:  
If one were to find a place, and perhaps there are some, where liberty is effectively 
exercised, one would find that this is not owing to the order of objects, but, once again, 
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owing to the practice of liberty. Which is not to say that, after all, one may as well leave 
people in slums, thinking that they can simply exercise their rights there.115 
 
Liberty is something to be practiced in any number of places, but slums are indicative of 
power-relations running roughshod over the exercise of liberty. This is not to say that 
there are no resistances emanating from slums; simply that the existence of these 
resistances should not serve as legitimation for the radical forms of inequality that slums 
represent. Foucault seemed to have a strong sense of the form that this impending 
neoliberal order would take. His prescient study of neoliberalism as a form of biopolitics 
begins to outline the spatial organization imposed by neoliberal governmentality while 
not yet connecting it to his earlier study of spatial controls in cities. In his brief mention 
of slums it seems that he might have been attuned to the ways that cities could be remade 
into places of biopolitical production. The relational conceptualization of scale that 
informs his genealogies of discipline and biopolitics helps uncover the sources from 
which this order emanates. By tracing the complex interplay between “the local” and “the 
global,” as well as the dynamics between “the body,” “the state,” “the city,” and 
“society” – Foucault constructs a multiscalar map of political life as it exists under 
neoliberal governmentality. In this map, we might find certain possibilities for new 
practices of liberty.   
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 3 | Global War and Planetary Democracy  
 
Hardt and Negri’s trilogy, Empire, Multitude, and Commonwealth, seeks to 
articulate politics at a new scale and establish coordinates for thinking about sovereignty, 
the social body, and the polity respectively. Hardt and Negri’s work on scale in Empire 
has been characterized as a shift from the primacy of the national scale to the primacy of 
the global scale. Paul Passavant describes the arc of the book succinctly: “sovereignty has 
been rescaled from the level of the nation-state to the level of the global.”1 This 
characterization of their work, emphasizing the erosion of national sovereignty and its 
replacement by a supranational usurper, accurately captures much of Hardt and Negri’s 
thinking in Empire. Its close resemblance to the dubious literature on globalization that 
prophesies the decline and disappearance of the state has been a source of criticism for 
those who, correctly by my assessment, see the state and its “internationalization” as 
deeply embedded in the workings of global order.2 Although the predominant line of 
argument in Empire tends toward the rescaling of politics from state to globe, Hardt and 
Negri’s thinking on scale becomes more complicated as their intellectual and political 
project expands and evolves. The aversion to Hardt and Negri generated in response to 
Empire has led many to neglect the reconsideration of scalar questions in their later work. 
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In the preface to Multitude Hardt and Negri identify a more elaborate problematic 
of politics and scale. They see substantial changes in the scale of war and an urgent need 
for drastic changes in the scale of democracy in order to respond to the geographic 
expansion of conflict.3 War becomes more pervasive as it blurs with politics and spreads 
across the globe as so-called “low-intensity conflicts,” “police actions,” “small wars,” 
and “counterinsurgency campaigns.”  As war has been distributed through these new 
spatial formations, democracy has not always followed suit. Instead, it has remained 
moored to antiquated representative practices designed for a social body fitted to the state 
form. Hardt and Negri see global war changing the terrain of politics. Pervasive war 
reshapes connections between political spaces and requires new strategies and tactics for 
pursuing democratic, equitable life. The future of global war and global democracy is tied 
to matters of scale that alter the ontology of politics. This future is a matter of the wars of 
Empire and the democratic lives of multitudes.4 
This chapter outlines my approach to reading Hardt and Negri on matters of scale. 
The reading attends to the figures and scales within their text that give texture to a 
politics that is at once global, national, local, and individual. To think through these 
spatial formations of global order, I draw on Timothy Morton’s work on hyperobjects, 
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things “massively distributed in time and space relative to humans.”5 Morton helps us see 
new scales – of the globe, planet and cosmos – while reworking but not abandoning the 
established scales – the regional, national, urban, and local. Hyperobjects possess unique 
scalar qualities; they also exhibit “knotty relationships between gigantic and intimate 
scales.”6 Hyperobjects allow us to experience only a part of the object in question, a part 
which does not reveal the whole.  They exhibit a relation to space that exceeds human 
experience to such a degree that they undermine the very idea of human mastery of the 
world. Hyperobjects stretch across great geographic distance and permeate human 
experience; their actuality exceeds, or at the very least, resists, totalization through 
human perception. Human life is immersed in hyperobjects. Perception describes the 
encounters with surfaces of a hyperobject, not the thing in its totality. These viscous 
surfaces are already here, proximate to us, around us, and part of us, but they cannot be 
peeled back to reveal an “outside” or “away from” the hyperobject: “[t]here is no Away 
on this surface, no here and no there.”7   
For Morton, examples of hyperobjects include global warming, the solar system, 
the Florida Everglades, the entirety of uranium and plutonium on Earth, and “the sum of 
all the whirring machinery of capitalism.”8 Drawing inspiration from Morton’s inclusion 
of the last item on this list, I seek to push Morton in the direction of thinking complex 
global formations that more explicitly include humans. Although Morton does not 
                                                 
5 Morton, 1. 
6 Morton, 47. “Nonlocality” is a technical term within quantum theory. While Morton engages 
quantum theory at length, his application of nonlocality to hyperobjects is metaphorical. This 
metaphor is valuable for breaking open the hegemony of Cartesian spatial thought and clarifying 
a relational understanding of scale. 
7 Morton, 31. 
8 Morton, 1. 
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exclude humans from hyperobjects, he deploys the term in the context of ecophilosophy 
that tends to deemphasize human collectivities. By reading Hardt and Negri as co-
creators of a vocabulary of hyperobjects, I extend Morton’s concept of hyperobjects to 
thinking about contemporary global war and planetary democracy. I suggest global war, 
Empire, the multitude, and planetary democracy as hyperobjects that facilitate thinking 
about human collectivities and nonhuman worlds together at a massive scale. Bringing 
Morton into conversation with Hardt and Negri helps to clarify how “the global” and “the 
planetary” can manifest other scales without overwriting the specificities of “the local.” 
By thinking through the spatiality of hyperobjects and the “knotty relationships” between 
scales, I seek to provide a map of power in which the global and planetary do not 
overdetermine national, urban, and local politics.  
The second part of the chapter brings Hardt and Negri’s multiscalar geography to 
the corpus of global war. The geography of war that comes into focus reveals new 
technologies of violence – new practices and subjects of war – in late modern warfare. I 
draw Hardt and Negri’s thought into conversation with thinkers approaching the 
problematic of global war. By focusing on points of contact between Hardt and Negri, 
Carlo Galli, and Grégoire Chamayou, I develop scales of politics shaping and shaped by 
global conflict. 
The third part of the chapter examines the geographic concepts deployed by Hardt 
and Negri in relation to their democracy of the “multitude.” I develop their account of 
political organization in which “the global” loses its monolithic status as a scale that 
overcodes political life. We revisit the concept of global scale and seek to elaborate the 
ways that “the global” has been appropriated by universalizing, Eurocentric, and 
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imperialist discourses. The analysis interrogates the equivalence drawn between of 
“neoliberal capitalism” and “globalization.” This part of the chapter seeks to redefine the 
cartography of globalization and to develop “the planetary” as a layered concept critical 
to realizing more expansive and deeper forms of egalitarian democracy. The chapter 
seeks to contribute to a growing literature on alter-globalization and mondialisation, a 
term that encompasses multiple forms of global connection that are collectively 
producing armed globalization, corporate globalization, and popular democratic forms of 
globalization.9 The aim is to formulate a dynamic understanding of “the planetary” that 
provides a key concept for democratic organization on the Left – one capable of 
understanding the sites and scales at which corporate globalization exerts itself, the 
multiple forms of violence used to secure its interest, and the multi-sited geography of 
democratic resistance to it. The placement of Hardt and Negri within this field of thought 
may add depth to an account of politics that has too often been understood as flattening 
and reductive. 
The section ends with an examination of a commonly neglected political space in 
Hardt and Negri’s thought: the city. Hardt and Negri see the globalized metropolis as the 
site where new networks of transnational control clash with emerging forms of global 
democratic experimentation. In their terms, the contemporary metropolis provides a 
valuable space in which aleatory encounters and experiences of being-in-common 
                                                 
9 Jean-Luc Nancy’s work has been influential in thinking about globalization/mondialisation as a 
collaborative process not limited to its political-economic dimension. See Jean-Luc Nancy, The 
Creation of the World, Or, Globalization, trans. François Raffoul and David Pettigrew (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2007). I do not engage his work explicitly. Rather, I seek to 
think about globalization in the way the alter-globalization movement seeks to affirm visions of 
global coexistence while rejecting neoliberal, corporate globalization. 
  Global War & Planetary Democracy • III 
128 
 
amplify political capacities.10 By examining the politics of the city in their thought, I 
unpack the layering of multiple scales. The affairs of cities have planetary effects both in 
their aggregated “local” matters and through their “global” interconnection with other 
cities. I seek to identify diverse forms of political organization developing within cities 
across the globe that might provide a starting point for deeper and more expansive 
practices of democracy. 
 
Reading Hardt and Negri’s Hyperobjects 
Hardt and Negri’s work pushes the understanding of spatiality within political 
theory on two fronts. First, they contribute to thinking about politics at a massive scale 
that stretches the limits of political concepts such as democracy, sovereignty, and war. 
Second, they weave relations between familiar geographies of politics – the national, 
urban, and local – revealing subtle lines of connection across large distances. In order to 
accentuate both lines of argument, I read Hardt and Negri through Morton’s work on 
“hyperobjects,” those massively distributed objects with distinct spatial and scalar 
relations. The resulting ecological vision provides the basis for Morton’s ethics and 
politics tailored to the scale of the planet. 
A number of conceptual options exist for thinking about politics at a massive 
scale: assemblages, constellations, and systems, to name a few. Each of these terms offers 
valuable insights into politics and spatiality. The capacities of assemblages, as the term is 
used by Deleuze and Guattari, have even been used to develop Hardt and Negri’s 
thought. For instance, William E. Connolly has suggested: 
                                                 
10 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Commonwealth (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2009), 251 – 252. 
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Empire is an ambiguous, porous assemblage containing positive supports and 
possibilities as well as ugly modes of domination. It is potentially susceptible to 
reconfiguration through the cumulative effect of selective state actions, changes 
of policy by international institutions, and militant cross-state citizen action.11 
 
Connolly emphasizes the open-endedness of Empire. He notes the “global dimension” of 
sovereignty, its inclusion of scales beyond “the national” and operations outside of the 
state. Yet he wants to see how this quality connects politics across scales rather than 
simply replacing the national, urban, and local.12 The body of political thought examining 
the qualities of assemblages in the formation of the global scale has uncovered new 
dimensions of political spatiality.13 However, Morton distinguishes hyperobjects from 
assemblages and other terms for rethinking scale: “Hyperobjects are not just collections, 
systems, or assemblages of other objects. They are objects in their own right, objects in a 
special sense.”14 For Morton, “object” does not refer to something subordinated to a 
subject. Instead, he uses “object” to denote anything with real effects. In this sense nearly 
everything, including what philosophy has conventionally treated as “subjects,” falls 
                                                 
11 William E. Connolly, Pluralism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 152.  
12 Connolly, Pluralism, 148. 
13 Nicholas Tampio has also used Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of assemblages to think through 
Hardt and Negri’s global politics. Tampio finds a Leninist line in Hardt and Negri that shuts 
down the possibilities for organizing the Left opened within their more Deleuzian moments. See 
Nicholas Tampio, “Assemblages and the Multitude: Deleuze, Hardt, Negri, and the Postmodern 
Left,” European Journal of Political Theory 8 (2009): 383 – 400. I see more promise for the Left 
in Hardt and Negri’s thought and prefer Connolly’s suggestion, “Two conflicting drives govern 
[Hardt and Negri’s account] … There is one drive to play up (in a Deleuzian manner) the 
uncertainties, porosities, and open future of Empire when it is mapped  as an assemblage. There is 
another, counter drive to treat it (in a classic, Marxist way) as a more closed structure of 
domination when it is appraised as a site of potential transformation” (Connolly, Pluralism, 151). 
Saskia Sassen’s work also uses “assemblage” as a central concept, albeit in a different fashion, 
and has been influential in the understanding of scale. See Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, 
Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).   
14 Morton, 2. I find more suppleness and sophistication in work by assemblage and systems 
theorists than Morton does. Therefore, in my terms, hyperobjects are not radically different from 
systems or assemblages. However, I choose to draw on hyperobjects because of the way that they 
emphasize the massive scale of Empire, multitude, global war, and global democracy. 
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under the category of “object.” This conceptual maneuver refuses anthropocentric 
distinctions between human agency and non-human/ “natural” passivity.15 
Both departing from and drawing inspiration from those who have used 
assemblage theory to read and rethink Hardt and Negri’s work, I find Morton’s work on 
hyperobjects provides a valuable set of concepts and methods for thinking about scale in 
Hardt and Negri. I take up Morton because of his passionate insistence on an ontology 
that attends to objects so diffuse that they linger at or beyond the limits of human 
perception. He provides careful attention to relations between scales within hyperobjects. 
Scale, for Morton, is neither concentric nor determinative. Massive scales do not define, 
overcode, or overdetermine national, urban or local politics. His understanding of scales 
emphasizes entanglement and relationality, and he lays out the conceptual framework for 
a multiscalar geography. The particular scalar relations of hyperobjects come into focus 
through concepts of “viscosity,” “phasing,” and “nonlocality.” I define and examine each 
of these terms, providing brief examples of their relevance for thinking about scale in 
Hardt and Negri’s work before returning to a discussion of Empire and multitude as 
hyperobjects.  
Viscosity 
                                                 
15 This is the part of Morton’s thought that is relevant for my project. However, “object” also 
refers to the fact that Morton subscribes to Object Oriented Ontology (OOO) which insists on the 
primacy of objects outside of or without regard to their relations. OOO argues that we must 
acknowledge and attend to the Kantian “gap between phenomenon and thing” (Morton, 12). 
Consequently, OOO sees objects always withdrawing because of this constitutive gap.  For the 
purposes of this project, I use the term hyperobject because of the particular scalar dimensions 
that Morton associates with it, not as an endorsement of the autonomy of objects sought by OOO. 
OOO might take an interesting turn if, instead of building its ontology of objects on the Kantian 
phenomenal-noumenal gap, it instead drew upon Nietzsche’s critique of this ontology in “How 
the ‘Real World’ at last Became a Myth”  in Twilight of Idols. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, 
Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ, trans. R. J Hollingdale (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 
50 – 51. 
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Like a fly stuck in tree sap, one sticks to the surface of a hyperobject suspended 
by its slow, emulsive flow. Morton calls this viscosity and refers to the viscous surfaces 
of hyperobjects. Viscosity conveys a processual quality of hyperobjects. “Object” does 
not refer to a static essence or rigid formation. Instead, it denotes the connections of 
seemingly disparate phenomena – forces, processes, and things – across space. 
Hyperobjects involve multiple political phenomena accessible through a number of points 
of contact. The human experience of hyperobjects through their viscous surfaces means 
that one only ever encounters a part, region, or partial set of processes composing the 
hyperobject. Hyperobjects, by virtue of their massive scale, resist being seen or known in 
their entirety.16 
 Hardt and Negri hint at something like viscous surfaces at work in their 
geographies of Empire and the multitude. One moves across the surfaces of Empire on a 
daily basis. Empire watches through closed-circuit cameras. It patrols to the tune of 
police sirens heard at regular intervals. It shapes the building and development of cities. It 
appears in fluctuations in the value of a paycheck. It teaches subjects to think of 
themselves as entrepreneurs who mobilize their own being as capital. It imposes 
“structural adjustment” with accumulated debt. Each of these manifestations of Empire 
constitutes a viscous surface, a site through which humans might come into contact with 
a part of the hyperobject Empire yet find it difficult to point out the whole. Confronting 
the forms of power that work through diffuse social relations across great geographic 
distances may at first seem overwhelming. From any isolated surface the hyperobject 
Empire presents a disorienting, seemingly insurmountable obstacle to social justice and 
                                                 
16 Morton observes of a hyperobject, “I only see brief patches of this gigantic object as it 
intersects with my world” (Morton, 71). 
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egalitarian peace. I suspect that this disorientation drives some of the resistance to a Left 
discourse that relies on the figures of Empire and the multitude. An ontology of 
hyperobjects poses a threat to human mastery that could be seen to undermine orthodox 
Marxism and certain contemporary strands of Keynesian social democratic projects.   As 
Morton observes, “The vastness of the hyperobject’s scale makes smaller beings – 
people, countries, even continents – seem like an illusion, or a small colored patch on a 
large dark surface.”17 However, an approach to political geography informed by the 
spatiality of hyperobjects does not seek to disempower peoples, collectives, individuals, 
or states. Perhaps it can provide new avenues for political organizing and action by 
connecting constituencies across scales. A project committed to assembling the 
appearances of these viscous surfaces might help render legible the illegibility of the 




Phasing means “to approach, then diminish, from a certain fullness.”18 It refers to 
the way in which viscous surfaces enter into political life, gesture toward the existence of 
a hyperobject, and then resist disclosure of the hyperobject in its entirety. A hyperobject 
is composed of every possible state of a system, e.g. the totality of all possible states of 
the global climate system. Phasing describes the way in which hyperobjects, as objects 
                                                 
17 Morton, 32. 
18 Morton, 74. “Phasing,” like “nonlocality” is a term with a highly specific meaning in the 
natural sciences. It refers to the characteristics of an object in phase space, the term in 
mathematics and physics used to describe “the set of all possible states of a system” (Morton, 71). 
Morton uses the term metaphorically to describe the spatiality and scalar relations of 
hyperobjects. 
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representable only through reference to higher dimensions, partially come into focus 
before retreating from view. Although Morton prefers to characterize this “retreat” of 
hyperobjects as an ontological “withdrawing” from any relation, they seem better 
characterized by superabundance that exceeds human perception. They exude “invisible 
presence” relative to human-scale space and time.19 The invisibility of their totality by no 
means limits their real effects. A hyperobject is not just an abstract “conceptual beyond in 
our heads or out there;” they are real and have material effects.20 Phasing describes the 
way that hyperobjects envelope us, exerting effects even when imperceptible. Consider 
how human induced climate change proceeds before becoming perceptible. Species and 
habitats disappear gradually, often without being noticed, until certain moments when 
entire ecosystems undergo sudden collapse. 
Empire also phases. Its parts come into view while its totality radically exceeds 
the human scale. The entirety of global power relations are never fully evident to us, yet 
they are at work in the formation of subjectivity, government, power relations that 
surround us locally, and in the ways that states and transnational non-state actors conduct 
their relations. Only a few surfaces visible at any given moment. Hardt and Negri may 
already draw on an ontology similar to that of Morton’s, influenced by complexity theory 
in the natural sciences, when they describe emerging forms of administration in Empire 
as fractal:  
The difference today lies in the fact that, whereas in modern regimes of national 
sovereignty, administration worked toward linear integration of conflicts and 
toward a coherent apparatus that could repress them, that is, toward the rational 
normalization of social life with respect to both the administrative goal of 
                                                 
19 Morton, 76. Emphasis in original. 
20 Morton, 73. Furthermore, hyperobjects are not atomistic entities floating in extended space 
until they ricochet off of another object or hyperobject. Their viscous surfaces have encounters of 
mutual exchange or “interobjectivity” (Morton, 81 – 95). 
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equilibrium and the development of administrative reforms, in the imperial 
framework administration becomes fractal and aims to integrate conflicts not by 
imposing a coherent social apparatus but by controlling differences.21 
 
Here, the shift from a form of sovereignty that only attempts to settle and preserve the 
boundaries of political order to a mode joining sovereignty to diffuse, disseminated 
exercises of power represents what Hardt and Negri refer to as a shift from linear to 
fractal administration. “Fractal” may refer to the fragmented and fractured quality of 
sovereignty under Empire. Fractal sovereignty works through partial, mobile 
interventions rather than enforcing a model of social and political coherency. The result is 
a collection of fragmentary powers.  
There is an additional, possibly unintended meaning involved in calling 
sovereignty fractal. “Fractal” also refers to apparently chaotic, yet surprisingly ordered 
characteristics of certain attractors in phase space. These attractors often encounter 
radical shifts in their condition through highly specific small changes.22 Empire in its 
totality may exist on a scale so massive it tests the limits of human perception. However, 
its scale does not make it an irresistible force. Its fractal qualities mean that changes on 
one scale can reverberate through other scales producing dramatic system-wide effects. 
Thinking of Empire as a hyperobject with viscous surfaces that appear through phasing 
and exhibit nonlocal qualities, begins to provide us with a sense of the scalar 
complexities at work in Hardt and Negri’s series of hyperobjects. 
 
                                                 
21 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2000), 339 – 340. 
22 Fractals exhibit scalability meaning that a similarity of pattern exists between fractals when 
examined on any scale. I do not adopt this quality of fractals for Empire or other hyperobjects as 
my project is premised on scale being not only a matter of space and perception, but also a spatial 
quality with political effects, that is to say, an important part of political ontology. 




Nonlocality refers to a relational, entangled spatiality that conveys unique 
relations between the local and global, specific and general, surface and (hyper)object. It 
means that two quantum photons, once entangled and then separated, will change 
simultaneously at great distances from each other. It seems to be still a mystery as to how 
this works. Nonlocality refashions these oppositions that see the specific, local surfaces 
of a hyperobject as both a part of, but in tension with, the general hyperobject. Morton 
describes this condition through the paradox of “the general itself … compromised by the 
particular.”23 This spatial relation is similar to what Foucault might call, drawing on my 
account in chapter two, the local as nonlocalizable. Nonlocality does not imply that 
hyperobjects are dissolved into the less local, larger, or global, but that events at one scale 
have unforeseeable, non-linear, even disproportionate effects at other scales. These are 
what Morton calls “scalar discrepancies” or “knotty relationships between gigantic and 
intimate scales.”24  
To clarify the relations between scales to which nonlocality speaks, take for 
example the case of radiation in which “[t]he most spectacular scalar discrepancies exist 
between the size of an ionizing particle emitted by an isotope and the long-term effects of 
radiation on lifeforms and other entities.”25 Within such scalar discrepancies, changes at 
one scale radically alter conditions on a vastly different scale. Ionizing particles produce 
                                                 
23 Morton, 54, emphasis mine. “Nonlocality” is a technical term within quantum theory. While 
Morton engages quantum theory at length, his application of nonlocality to hyperobjects is 
metaphorical and not meant in precisely the same way that the term is deployed in quantum 
theory. This metaphor is valuable for breaking open the hegemony of Cartesian spatial thought 
and clarifying a dynamic understanding of scale.  
24 Morton, 34, 47.  
25 Morton, 34, emphasis mine. 
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effects in individuals, society, and global politics. For instance, unwanted exposure to 
radioactive isotopes can drastically alter the life of an individual organism. Isotopes such 
as cobalt-60 have shaped society’s interaction with cancerous cells. Furthermore, the 
looming threat of an atmosphere polluted with the radioactive isotopes resulting from a 
nuclear detonation has shaped global politics since the invention of the atomic bomb.  
Empire and the multitude exhibit nonlocality through the “spectacular scalar 
discrepancies” that exist between micropolitics on the one hand – the production of 
affects and subjectivities – and the formation of global power relations. Affect and 
subjectivity factor prominently into the terrain of politics on which global war and global 
democracy unfold. Affect has played an important role in the emergence of “immaterial 
production” in which value of commodities rests on their “symbolic, aesthetic, and social 
value.”26 The production of subjectivity has been central to the organization of Empire 
and represents an important site of resistance. In Declarations Hardt and Negri trace the 
formation of imperial subjectivity along four axes: media, debt, security, and 
representation: 
The triumph of neoliberalism and its crisis have …operated a social, 
anthropological transformation, fabricating new figures of subjectivity. The 
hegemony of finance and the banks has produced the indebted. Control over 
information and communication networks has created the mediatized. The 
security regime and the generalized state of exception have constructed a figure 
prey to fear and yearning for protection – the securitized. And the corruption of 
democracy has forged a strange, depoliticized figure, the represented. These 
subjective figures constitute the social terrain on which – and against which – 
movements of resistance and rebellion must act.27 
 
                                                 
26 Hardt and Negri, Commonwealth, 132. I concur with Hardt and Negri that an analysis of 
contemporary capitalism necessitates the theorization of contemporary forms of production that 
rely on images, knowledge, and affects. However, calling this contemporary form “immaterial 
labor” seems to ignore the material qualities and effects of this mode of production and the 
commodities it produces.  
27 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Declaration (New York: Argo Navis, 2012), 9. 
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Here, the production of subjectivity and the constitution of global order are entangled. 
Transnational finance capital, global communication networks, and international security 
apparatuses depend upon and help to produce indebted, mediatized, and securitized 
subjects. Mechanisms of representation that come to be equated with political subjectivity 
further contain democratic, constituent powers of the multitude. As the terrain of social 
organization and politics, these subjectivities form sites, or viscous surfaces, for 
producing Empire. The economic subjectivity that envisions the self as entrepreneur and 
permeates other domains of life, as elaborated upon in chapter two, should also appear on 
this list of viscous surfaces of Empire. Debt, mediatization, securitization, and 
entrepreneurialism make up a regime of local practices at work on the individuation of 
bodies. The result is a nonlocal effect, a social body of subjects resonating with the global 
order of Empire. 
*   *   * 
This collection of concepts may provide a corrective to the critiques of Hardt and 
Negri on scale that emerged in response to Empire and has been echoed in later 
discussions. The critique in question centers on a concern with the radically 
deterritorialized vision of politics expressed in Empire and its claim that familiar political 
boundaries and spaces have dissipated. This critique sees Hardt and Negri’s account of 
global rule to overemphasize the ability of the sovereignty of Empire to jettison its 
reliance upon national sovereignty and smaller territorial jurisdictions. This response, 
voiced widely across political theory and international relations theory since the 
publication of Empire, reduces Hardt and Negri’s spatiality to one entirely caught up in 
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“smooth space” or “continuous, uniform space.”28 It takes issue with the notion that 
Empire “is both everywhere and nowhere” and argues against the idea of “a regime that 
effectively encompasses the spatial totality [in which] … [n]o territorial boundaries limit 
its reign.”29 Such critics see Hardt and Negri enunciating a deterritorialized world.30 The 
implication is that Hardt and Negri provide a flat geography of world power in which 
global capitalism now simply overwrites the operations of regional, national, and local 
scales.  
Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes offer a succinct critique of the narrative of state 
decline. Laffey and Weldes see globalization as an “internationalization of the state” 
whereby the state, understood as “a structure of rule,” maintains property rights and 
de/re-regulates segments of the economy thereby securing the accelerated movement of 
global capital.31 The conceptual delinking of the state from the territorial mode of 
sovereignty generally ascribed to it does not uproot power from territoriality but finds 
multiple power relations within and alongside one another. As Laffey and Weldes 
suggest, “[t]his conception of the state, because it does not assume a sovereign, territorial 
actor, allows us to recognize the multiple forms, levels, and scales of governance and rule 
that overlap and are intertwined in a complex and internally contradictory 
internationalizing state.”32 
Rather than envisioning national boundaries as opposed to the processes of 
globalization, Laffey and Weldes suggest that “borders, while being transformed, remain 
                                                 
28 Hardt and Negri, Empire, 190, 190. 
29 Hardt and Negri, Empire, 190, xiv. 
30 See Kevin C. Dunn, “Africa’s Ambiguous Relation to Empire and Empire,” in Empire’s New 
Clothes, eds. Jodi Dean and Paul A. Passavant (New York: Routledge, 2004), 151 – 152. 
31 Laffey and Weldes, 132, 133. 
32 Laffey and Weldes, 133. 
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significant. They are in some instances becoming thinner and in others thicker.”33 They 
note that while borders have disappeared within the Schengen area, the movements of 
certain groups are tracked within the zone and border controls around the Schengen area 
have been expanded. In the US, border practices intensify around geopolitical boundaries 
while also extending into spaces distant from the border. For instance, at the same time 
that militarization accelerates along the border between the US and Mexico, police have 
also started to rely on tracking individuals’ movements both domestically and abroad.  
The continued emphasis on borders includes “borders … being “fattened” or deepened 
into home territory” through the adoption of national identification papers and internal 
surveillance practices that reaffirm territorial boundaries while also expanding the mobile 
practices used to track individuals and populations.34 
By retaining a place for the state and borders in international relations, Laffey and 
Weldes also suggest that imperialism in its old form, with a center of power, has yet to 
disappear: “[i]mperialism today is synonymous with the internationalization of the 
state.”35 To treat Empire as diffuse and deterritorialized neglects the history of US 
imperial policy that has spearheaded economic policies under the name of the 
“Washington Consensus” and waged imperial wars across the globe. The state, itself a set 
of overlapping and entangled forms of authority, represents one among many scales of 
power at work in the formation of Empire. The aim here is not to reify the state and state-
centric imaging of global power, but to retain the state as one element in a larger global 
order.  
                                                 
33 Laffey and Weldes, 129. 
34 Laffey and Weldes, 129. 
35 Laffey and Weldes, 135. 
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In the rich account provided by Laffey and Weldes, one might think of the state as 
what Morton calls a viscous surface. While it possesses its own historical trajectory, it 
also participates in larger processes. Citizens and subjects relate to the state, and through 
it they encounter the process of its internationalization, that is to say, the power relations 
of Empire and the problematic of global war and democracy. These larger processes 
extend beyond the scope of human perception. However, smaller, more familiar territorial 
forms may offer a glimpse into the hyperobjects of global politics.  
Although attentive to the historical (trans)formation of the state, Laffey and 
Weldes may be too quick to dismiss the ambitions of Empire, particularly its efforts to 
identify and to flesh out the shape of global order. Martin Coward has suggested that the 
conceptual innovations of Empire lie not within its commentary on the state but in its 
larger geographic vision, in a different theoretical vocabulary, its initial effort to think of 
the hyperobject Empire. Coward counters the reading of Empire that views it as a 
pronouncement of state decline: 
It is important not to draw from Empire the inference that the state is in decline 
and transversality has become the only political – economic dynamic. Rather it is 
possible to note that the territorial model of inter-state relations is naïve insofar 
as it fails to recognize the important dynamics of de-territorialisation at work in 
the present conjuncture. It is equally naïve, however, to think that the de-
territorialisation effected by transversal, expansive flows, is not countered by 
forces of re-territorialisation. That is to say, it is naïve to think that Empire is not 
a dialectic between expansion on the one hand, and the redrawing of boundaries 
on the other.36 
 
An account of global order and its operative logics will find neither an ossified system of 
sovereign nation states nor unmitigated smooth space, nor a Hegelian order of semi-
sovereign states mastered and ordered by one world historical state. Instead, as Hardt and 
                                                 
36 Martin Coward, “The Globalisation of Enclosure: Interrogating the Geopolitics of Empire,” 
Third World Quarterly 26 (2005): 865. 
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Negri uncover and Coward is right to point out, Empire works through de- and re-
territorialization. Its periodic expansions place existing boundaries in question until they 
are redrawn in new locations and through new practices of bordering. The strength of 
Empire lies in its attempt to think of imperialism on a massive scale. In its attempt to 
connect critical insights from a number of fields into a general account of global order it 
may disappoint those within the disciplines of political theory, philosophy, or sociology. 
Nonetheless, Empire synthesizes critical approaches to political economy and global 
politics, producing a theory that captures the central features of world order: its 
expansiveness, hierarchization, relations between government and modes of production, 
and the “motif of crisis.”37 In another language, Empire provides an initial account of the 
surfaces and phasings of Empire as hyperobject.  
 An examination of the Hardt and Negri’s style of writing proves relevant to 
understanding the ways in which they seek to think through global war and planetary 
democracy, understood as hyperobjects, and devise strategies and tactics for intervening 
in these massive forms. Hardt and Negri embrace a way of writing appropriate to viscous, 
nonlocal, phasing political things. Their eclectic style seems to move in too many 
directions leaving loose ends and numerous tensions; however, the loose style provides a 
valuable method of engaging the entangled hyperobjects in question. When looking at 
Empire or Multitude, Hardt and Negri suggest that we will find a familiar form, that of 
Hobbes’s Leviathan or De Cive respectively.38 In similar fashion Hardt and Negri 
                                                 
37 Coward, “The Globalisation of Enclosure,” 857. 
38 “We conceive the movement from one book to the other, from Empire to Multitude, as the 
reverse of Hobbes’s development from his De Cive (published in 1642) to Leviathan (1651). The 
reverse progression speaks to the profound difference in the two historical moments” (Hardt and 
Negri, Multitude, xvii).  
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initially frame their work in Commonwealth within the familiar aims of political theory. 
They promise to seek out “institutional forms” for a democracy of the multitude relating 
their unconventional project to somewhat conventional procedures. 39 Although the 
thinking in Commonwealth ultimately moves in other directions, Hardt and Negri hint, if 
only for a moment, at a text envisioning a new polity or republic. As one continues to 
read these texts, however, they become uncanny. The object in question; sovereignty, the 
social body, or institutions/the polity appears too massive to come into full focus. We see 
fragments or, better yet, surfaces that never fully cohere.  
The somewhat surreal and often disorienting movements of each text create 
connections between differing modes of thought and seemingly heterogeneous political 
programs. Empire takes us from debates in interwar German legal theory to the alter-
globalization protests in Seattle. We hop from place to place never too certain that we 
will arrive at a definitive answer, uncertain whether X marks the spot. In Multitude the 
leaps come faster moving across both space and time. Stories of the Golem narrate 
contemporary capacities for self-destruction. Sixteenth century Italian condottieri, made 
famous by Machiavelli, provide a new short hand for the mercenary anti-politics of 
contemporary war. Readers are transported to the deliberations preceding the French 
revolution, to the guerilla organizing of anti-colonial and national liberation struggles, 
and to the networked marches against the 2003 American invasion of Iraq. Similarly, 
Commonwealth moves across the face of the globe in order to draw revolutionary 
inspiration from diverse sources including autonomous movements of the Zapatistas in 
Chiapas (and others drawing on the spirit and practice of Zapatismo), industrial workers 
                                                 
39 Hardt and Negri, Commonwealth, viii. 
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movements in 1970s Italy, Black Panthers in the US, and Palestinian refugees.40 This 
collection provides a formation so large that it tests the limits of human perception and 
thinking. The concept Empire aggregates the governing forces on the planet. Likewise, 
the concept "the multitude" gathers multiple democratic practices undertaken in the face 
of global war. Their “common” names democratic energies across the planet with 
“commonwealth” referring to the means by which these energies are translated into social 
and/or political movements and practices. Empire, multitude, and common do not 
presuppose an independent subject. The forces, energies, and agencies in question weave 
together collective bodies, ideologies, governmentalities, subjectivities, ethoi, and 
practices. Cumulatively, they compose a hyperobject. In the next section I examine 
global war under Empire, drawing on peculiar scalar and spatial relations of Empire to 
understand how global war now alters the classical terrain of politics. 
 
Global (Civil) War 
 
Hardt and Negri’s account of contemporary war describes the generalized 
violence at work in the existing global order. They announce, “[t]he world is at war 
again, but things are different this time … War is becoming a general phenomenon, 
global and interminable.”41 Their observation of war at a new scale adds a valuable 
addition to a growing body of literature rethinking the politics of war in a shifting 
geography. Even before the pronouncement of the United States’ “Global War on 
Terror,” reflections on the spatial transformations of war had appeared on the horizon of 
thought for political theorists, international relations scholars, geographers, and 
                                                 
40 Hardt and Negri, Commonwealth, 111, 127, 356. 
41 Hardt and Negri, Multitude, 3. 
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anthropologists.42 Many of these studies identified transformations that have remained at 
the margins of social and political inquiry.  This body of thought finds war spatialized 
through transnational networks and urban and local formations of power that exceed 
state-centric theories of war. While this corpus of theory speaks of global war, it does not 
treat “the global” as a homogeneous political space to which concepts like sovereignty, 
power, and democracy can be transposed from nation-states. Global war brings with it a 
complex geography of securitization, militarization, and resistance that produces new 
distributions of power, violence, and exploitation. The multiple overlapping scales of 
Empire reconfigure global processes, national bodies, urban metabolisms, and 
individualized bodies into assemblages that wage violence unevenly across the face of the 
planet.43  
Borrowing from Carl Schmitt, Hardt and Negri refer to these fragmented 
exercises of violence across the planet as “global civil war.” Hardt and Negri first invoke 
the term to emphasize the interiority of global war to the single sovereign space of 
Empire. Hardt suggests in a brief reflection on sovereignty following the September 11 
attacks and the US and NATO responses:  
[T]here is increasingly little difference between military action (outside the space 
of sovereign authority) and police action (inside) … In order for the 11 
                                                 
42 A variety of approaches exist in the discussion of global war. Some of the more important 
voices include Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999). Derek Gregory, The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, 
Palestine, and Iraq (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2004). Carlo Galli, Political Spaces and 
Global War, trans. Elisabeth Fay (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010). Achille 
Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” Public Culture 15 (2005): 11 – 40. James Der Derian, Virtuous War. 
Galli’s work receives more attention later in this chapter. 
43 Global war is an important part of the functioning of Empire but irreducible to it as war may 
periodically work against the fragmentary, mobile sovereignty of empire. For my purposes here, I 
follow the suggestion of Hardt and Negri to focus on the ways in which Empire and global war 
coincide: “Empire rules over a global order that is not only fractured by internal division and 
hierarchies but also plagued by perpetual war. The state of war is inevitable in Empire, and war 
functions as an instrument of rule” (Hardt and Negri, Multitude, xiii). 
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September attack or the responses to it to be acts of war, there would have to be 
two sovereign powers confronting one another. Since there are not, then these 
can only be considered acts of civil war, that is, conflict within the space of one 
single sovereignty.44 
 
This formulation, which appears between the publication of Empire and Multitude, 
begins their shift to the term global civil war. A civil war at the global scale is contained 
within a single sovereign, as it blurs the lines between military and police action. A fuller 
account of global civil war with a stronger emphasis on spatiality and scale follows at the 
outset of Multitude: 
from this perspective all of the world’s current armed conflict, hot and cold – in 
Colombia, Sierra Leone, and Aceh, as much as in Israel-Palestine, India-
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq – should be considered imperial civil wars, even 
when states are involved. This does not mean that any of these conflicts 
mobilizes all of Empire – indeed each of these conflict is local and specific – but 
rather that they exist within, are conditioned by, and in turn affect the global 
imperial system. Each local war should not be viewed in isolation then, but seen 
as part of a grand constellation, linked in varying degrees both to other war zones 
and to areas not presently at war … A new framework, beyond international law, 
would be necessary to confront this global civil war.45 
 
Hardt and Negri grapple with a conceptual vocabulary that constantly fails to disclose the 
entirety of the massive object in question. Global civil war takes the form of “grand 
constellation,” a hyperobject including the totality of wars within global space. The 
peculiar modes of causal relation between specific wars and global civil war takes a 
number of forms. Local wars “exist within,” are conditioned by,” and “in turn affect” the 
global scale.46 These knotty exchanges across scales transform the spatiality of war. Now 
I return to Schmitt’s invocation of “global civil war” and the body of related literature on 
global war in order to elaborate on the scalar relations of global civil war. Hardt and 
                                                 
44 Michael Hardt, “Sovereignty,” Theory and Event 5.4 (2002). 
45 Hardt and Negri, Multitude, 4. My emphasis. 
46 Hardt and Negri, Multitude, 4. 
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Negri are dismissive of Schmitt’s Theory of the Partisan yet it seems to convey a number 
of the spatial transformations that concern their thought. 
Hardt and Negri suggest, “[i]n our present state of imperial war … [t]here are new 
actors on the field of battle today and identifying them more clearly is one of the central 
tasks in constructing such a genealogy [of global war].”47 For Schmitt, global civil war 
refers to unbounded war with indistinct lines of enmity and new combatants, i.e. “new 
actors on the field of battle.” Consequently, it provides a framework for Hardt and 
Negri’s inquiry into contemporary global war. The term appears at the end of Schmitt’s 
genealogy of the partisan, a concept that at the end of the eighteenth century referred to 
“light troops” involved in “irregular warfare” but by mid-twentieth century names a 
figure of war connected to new tactics, weapons, and politics of war.48 Schmitt focuses 
on the expansion of partisan warfare in armed struggles on the left, but much of his 
description of partisans closely fits “modern” militaries based on volunteer forces that 
focus on the use of “special forces,” small groups of highly mobile soldiers supported by 
technologies such as drones and guided missiles that accelerate the pace of war. For 
instance, Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) seems to have embraced its own 
form of partisan warfare.  
                                                 
47 Hardt and Negri, Multitude, 38.  
48 Reference to “global civil war” appears in a discussion of Lenin and in a comment on the late 
days of World War I: “But Lenin, as a professional revolutionary of global civil war, went still 
further and turned the real enemy into an absolute enemy” (Schmitt, 93). “Real enmity arose only 
out of the [first World] war, when a conventional state war of European international law began, 
and ended with a global civil war of revolutionary class enmity (Schmitt, 95). For an extended 
definition of “the partisan” and debates surrounding definitions of the term see G.L. Ulmen, 
“Translator’s Introduction” in Carl Schmitt, Theory of the Partisan, trans. G.L. Ulmen (New 
York: Telos Press Publishing, 2007), ix. 
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The increasing prevalence of partisan warfare and its culmination in global civil 
war denotes a particular geography for Schmitt that exhibits four key characteristics. 
First, it involves a reorganization of the process of mobilization and changes in the space 
of the battlefield, what he calls “the spatial aspect.”49 Second, it takes on what he calls 
“the global-political context,” the waging of war in a global space where sovereignty is 
irreducible to the state.50 Third, global civil war accelerates the mass production of new 
weapons and expands research into technologies for war, “the technical-industrial 
aspect.”51 Finally, it reconfigures the lines between public and private space, the 
“destruction of social structures.”52 Schmitt sees these four changes as inter-involved in a 
way that points toward, but does not fully capture, a larger condition: “In concrete reality, 
these four aspects obviously cannot be isolated as independent spheres; … only their 
intensive reciprocal actions, their mutually functional dependencies can provide the total 
picture.”53 Schmitt hints that his systematized formulation of political and military 
change may be too clean. The “total picture,” which I want to suggest represents the 
hyperobject global civil war, may require a slightly different form of description and 
engagement. Starting from Schmitt’s sometimes narrow definitions of these 
transformations, I gather a series of overlapping and entangled characteristics of global 
civil war to reveal its scalar and spatial relations. 
                                                 
49 Schmitt, 68-72. 
50 Schmitt, 74-76. 
51 Schmitt, 76-80.  
52 Schmitt, 72-74. The explicit influence of Schmitt’s Theory of the Partisan is evident in the 
reference to Grimmelhausen’s Simplizius Simplizissimus, the figure for whom Hardt and Negri 
name a chapter of Multitude and make reference to in discussions of war. 
53 Schmitt, 68. 
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In his analysis of the “spatial aspect,” Schmitt suggests that the partisan has 
opened new dimensions of the battlefield and altered the relations of space through which 
war can be understood: 
In partisan warfare, a new, complicated, and structured sphere of action is 
created, because the partisan does not fight on an open battlefield, and does not 
fight on the same level of open fronts. He forces his enemy into another space … 
he displaces the space of regular, conventional theaters of war to a different, 
darker dimension – a dimension of the abyss … From an underground lair, the 
partisan disturbs the conventional, regular play of forces on the open stage.54  
 
This “structured sphere of action” constitutes a hyperobject. The partisan upends the 
notion of fronts in war, adding depth and shading to these fronts. Fronts become abyssal, 
sites from which partisans may suddenly emerge and then disappear. Partisan warfare 
takes on a number of gradations moving conflict to a different “level.” By becoming 
“darker,” warfare takes on the dimension of shading. Each gradation suggests a blurring 
of familiar categories - war and peace, military and police, foreign and domestic, 
sovereign and participatory. Existing concepts fail to encompass global civil war.  
Schmitt expresses concerns that seem to go beyond the figure of the partisan and 
to the fundamental relations between war and society. He suggests that the 
transformations of spatial structures will also require new kinds of political doctrines 
pointing for example to the way that new communications technologies require different 
theories of war “from what existed in the age of … the Magna Carta of 1215, when the 
lord of the manor could raise the drawbridge.”55 Schmitt seems driven to capture the 
ways in which the capacities for violence have been differently distributed across society, 
a reorganization that proceeds through the partisan but vastly exceeds it. 
                                                 
54 Schmitt, 69-70. 
55 Schmitt, 68. 
  Global War & Planetary Democracy • III 
149 
 
Carlo Galli provides a sustained reflection on the spatiality of global war (or as he 
prefers “Global War”) that implicitly draws upon and expands Schmitt’s notion of global 
civil war. It represents both war at a new scale and war that shifts the relations between 
the scales of locality, the city, the state, and the region. Galli sees global war waged 
within the interiority of a single sovereign: “Global War is not a clash of clear and 
distinct differences, but a single chaos in which the opposing faces of a single system mix 
together; it is One locked in struggle with itself.”56 Galli’s Global War is waged within a 
single system, it is by definition a global civil war. 
Global civil war comes about through the reorganization of total mobilization of 
society for war that characterized the distribution of war-making capacities in the First 
and Second World War. Galli frames this transformation: “Total Mobilization was the 
immediate militarization of society, while Global War is the global socialization of 
violence.”57 He sees in this transformation a radical reconfiguration of the relation 
between war, the State, and society. Galli describes total mobilization as “the convulsive 
gathering of all social energies under the banner of violence.”58 Total mobilization 
rapidly centralizes war-making capacities through the immediate connection of war and 
society.  
In contrast, global war “is endemic and ubiquitous.”59 Its reach extends across 
society, working subtly and continuously to accumulate a wider, thinner network of war-
making capacities able to spread violence diffusely across the globe. Whereas total 
                                                 
56 Galli, 175. 
57 Galli, 174. 
58 Galli, 174. 
59 Galli, 174. 
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mobilization appeared within and in response to totalitarianism, global war has emerged 
within and in response to the entanglements of global economic logics and militarization:  
The first declared itself under the banner of war, the second under the banner of 
economics. The first manifested the crisis of the State before totalitarianism, the 
second revealed the crisis of the State before globalization. Global War is the fact 
that in any moment, in any society on Earth, an armed conflict can ignite, 
motivated by an economic crisis in some other part of the world.60 
 
Contemporary economic logics infiltrate the process of military mobilization creating an 
image of armed conflict inflected by the social philosophy of neoliberalism.  
Hardt and Negri expand on the connections between dominant modes of 
production and the production of militarized society. Total mobilization of society for 
war was premised on a model of militarism that paralleled the industrial production of the 
factory: 
The “total mobilization” of modern warfare was really the turning of the entire 
society into a kind of war factory in which the project of amassing bodies in the 
battlefields was parallel to that of amassing bodies in the factories, the 
anonymous body of the mass worker corresponding to that of the mass soldier.61  
 
Total mobilization seeks to turn all of society into a factory for disciplining bodies into 
soldiers and amassing weapons and materiel. It centralizes production and relies on 
disciplinary modes of social reproduction for war. In global civil war the factory no 
longer served as the model for mobilization. Whereas total mobilization took the factory 
                                                 
60 Galli, 174. 
61 Hardt and Negri, Multitude, 43. Hardt and Negri take care to acknowledge that world war has 
been the norm rather than the exception. However, they distinguish between epochs of conflict: 
“One might say that the world has not really been at peace since early in the twentieth century. 
The First World War (1914 – 1918), which was centered in Europe, led directly, after a 
tumultuous quasi-peace, to the Second (1939 – 1945). And immediately upon completion of the 
Second World War we entered in the cold war, a new kind of global war, in some sense a Third 
World War, which in turn gave way with its collapse (1989 – 1991) to our present state of 
imperial civil war. Our age might thus be conceived as the Fourth World War” (Hardt and Negri, 
Multitude, 37). The emergence of global civil war, as it is experienced under Empire, begins in 
late cold war proxy wars and “low-intensity” conflicts. 
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as its model for the social organization of the means of violence, global civil war mimics 
the post-industrial mode of production characteristic of its era by exhibiting “many of the 
characteristics of what economists call post-Fordist production: it is based on both 
mobility and flexibility; it integrates intelligence, information, and immaterial labor; it 
raises power up by extending militarization to the limits of outer space, across the surface 
of the earth, and to the depths of the ocean.”62 This flexible, mobile approach to war is 
premised on logics of risk management and securitization that are at once economic and 
political.63 The transition from total mobilization to global civil war parallels Foucault’s 
tracking of the shift in emphasis from disciplinary programs of normalizing bodies to 
biopolitical regulation of populations through calculations of risk and security. Global 
civil war not only determines when and where war is waged but also how warfare 
connects to society. Extensive networks of contractors and sub-contractors enable and 
sustain the global military-security apparatus. From highly specialized research 
development and weapons design to basic service provisions of food and sanitation 
service in warzones, the new warriors in global civil war serve as flexible mobile labor 
for a military apparatus that mirrors the labor practices of post-fordist production.64 
                                                 
62 Hardt and Negri, Multitude, 40. 
63 For a full genealogy of the ways in which financial logic and security came to overlap see 
Randy Martin, An Empire of Indifference: American War and the Financial Logic of Risk 
Management (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 17 – 63. 
64 Global civil war is waged by what Machiavelli would call mercenary armies. Hardt and Negri 
call upon Machiavelli’s critique of mercenary warfare through their invocation of the figure of the 
condottiere, the mercenary captain and harbinger of perpetual civil war. Hardt and Negri observe 
“[t]oday all armies are again tending to become mercenary armies” (Hardt and Negri, Multitude, 
49). They note the explicit ways in which armies have been made up of mercenaries through 
increased outsourcing to private military contractors. Additionally, “mercenary armies” includes 
the professionalization of national militaries made up disproportionately of poor minorities, 
supported by engineers tasked with maintaining complex weapons systems, and aided by the 
“cultural expertise” of anthropologists (such as the US Human Terrain Systems). Whereas 
Machiavelli suggested that a republican army would represent the virtù of its citizenry, that is to 
say the society and structures from which it was created, the mercenary armies of today reflect a 
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 Galli’s geography of political-economic connection extends beyond the 
neoliberal/postfordist reorganization of militarizing processes. Global war includes the 
pervasive, systemic violence wrought by economic policies that produce volatility for 
accumulation and impose “structural adjustment.” As Galli extends the concept, “Global 
War is also the financial speculation that topples national markets, or civil conflicts 
stemming from the impoverishment of large population segments due to the World 
Bank’s monetarist policies.”65 To this list of political-economic violence one might add 
the reduction or dissolution of state welfare programs and the program of mass 
incarceration that takes its most extreme form in the US carceral state. Global civil war 
spreads out and reorganizes the process of military mobilization while also drawing 
social policy into the field of war.  
This new folding of violence into planetary organization comes about through a 
number of shifts in the relations between scales. The globality of global civil war does 
not manifest as a homogeneous space of unimpeded movement. As Galli describes, 
“Global nonspace is not … a flat surface … it is a stormy sea, a jumble from which 
Global War, the conflictual side of globalization – emerges.”66 Global civil war appears 
in a number of manifestations with subtle connections and entanglements across global 
                                                 
society of collapsing public spaces, technological fixes in the place of ethical questioning, and 
vast inequalities at work in society. In their discussion of outsourcing war to proxy armies and 
private military companies, Hardt and Negri observer “[t]his is a far cry from the tradition of 
republican armies that reproduced and represented the social structure of the society as a whole. 
There is no way to conceive of the U.S. military at this point as “the people in arms.” It seems 
rather that in postmodern warfare, as in ancient Roman times, mercenary armies tend to become 
the primary combat forces” (Hardt and Negri, Multitude, 47). Although the suggestion of 
“postmodern war” has been interpreted to mean deterritorialized and disembodied, Hardt and 
Negri want to suggest that it instead displays many continuities, at least in terms of the social 
organization, with an older form of war diagnosed by Machiavelli. 
65 Galli, 174. 
66 Galli, 173. 
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space. So-called “small wars,” “manhunts” and contemporary urban warfare represent 
nonlocal viscous surfaces with massive “scalar discrepancies” between individual, urban, 
and regional scales and global civil war. 
An explicit moment of rescaling war appears in the articulation of the doctrine of 
“small war.” As the term was defined in its early stages, small war referred to: 
operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is 
combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another 
state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the 
preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy 
of our Nation.67 
 
This definition sought to make both the territorial extension and the political dimension 
of war “small.” It aimed to limit the territorial extension of the use of force by directing 
military conflict toward the affairs of a single state deemed unfit by a number of metrics.  
The doctrine of small war also sought to contain the politics of war, vesting authority for 
conflict within the executive branch and mobilizing existing avenues of diplomatic 
pressure in concert with military force.  
The concept “small war” secured its foothold in the theory and practice of foreign 
policy and military strategy. The publication of Small Wars Journal attests to the staying 
power of the concept. Within this journal, brief articles compiled from military officers 
and strategists address geopolitics across the globe with the intent of reframing tactics of 
intervention and rescaling warfare. In addition to the presence of the concept in military 
manuals and journals, wars in Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America, and those pursued 
under the auspices of the “war on terror” in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and 
                                                 
67 Small Wars Manual of the United States Marine Corp (Washington: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1940). Air War College Internet Gateway. 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/swm/index.htm. This definition appears in 1940 and 
provides a genealogical root for the fuller explication of the concept that would follow. 
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elsewhere have been premised on this model.  “Small war” is used interchangeably with 
an extensive list of related and overlapping terms including but not limited to: ““brushfire 
wars,” “dirty wars,” “guerilla warfare,” “insurgency-counterinsurgency,” “internal wars,” 
“interventions,” “expeditions,” “limited war,” “ little wars,” “low intensity 
operations/conflicts,” “ political warfare,” “ revolutionary warfare,” “urban guerilla 
warfare,” “proxy wars,” and “surrogate wars.””68 This anodyne vocabulary implying 
violence limited in scope and effect fails to describe the destruction wrought by such 
conflict. As William Minter observes of conflicts that fall under one of the many headers 
of “small war”: “‘low-intensity’ is a monstrous misnomer for wars such as those in 
Angola and Mozambique … [T]he cumulative toll of violence year-in and year-out, plus 
the fact that the victims were overwhelmingly civilian, imposed a trauma on these 
societies comparable with that of the Second World War on Europe.”69  
Small war envisions territorially limited conflicts but simultaneously allows 
imperial war to proliferate across the globe, often outside contestation by democratic 
publics. Aimed at limiting war to national or regional scales, small war instead ushered in 
pervasive global violence waged below the threshold of total war. Hardt and Negri 
observe this shift from the collective enmity characteristic of total mobilization to the 
proliferation of small wars: “war itself had begun to be transformed – less oriented 
toward defending against a coherent mega-threat and more focused on proliferating mini-
threats; less intent on the general destruction of the enemy and more inclined toward the 
                                                 
68 Roger Beaumont, “Small Wars: Definitions and Dimensions,” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 541 (1995): 22.  
69 William Minter, Apartheid’s Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and 
Mozambique (London: Zed Books, 1994), 2. 
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transformation or even production of the enemy.”70 Small war, a misnomer applied to 
wars with devastating effects on society and prone to becoming much larger than their 
intended scope, biopolitically manages global strategic risk. It embodies the sovereignty 
of Empire by applying force in “small” doses, striking “surgically,” and waging “low-
intensity conflict” but alters the relationship between these “small” scales and global 
formations of power. As Stephen Graham suggests, “the world’s geopolitical struggles 
increasingly articulate around violent conflicts over very local, urban, strategic sites.”71 
Global civil war unfolds through the local but nonlocalizable “small wars.”  
The declarations of contemporary small wars often take the form of “manhunts,” 
the pursuit of a particular set of individuals using means in which military and police 
powers overlap.  Grégoire Chamayou provides an extensive genealogy of manhunts as a 
philosophical concept and a technology of domination. The term finds its origins in 
Greek philosophy but runs through extreme forms of violence within European 
colonialism and the Atlantic slave trade and into the origins (and obfuscated brutalities) 
of modern policing.72 For Chamayou the practice of the manhunt has come into contact 
with contemporary war, what I have called the global wars of Empire, altering its conduct 
and organization. War modeled on the form of a duel and articulated by Clausewitz has 
been replaced with “cynegetic war” wherein “[t]he structure does not involve two fighters 
facing off, but … a hunter who advances and a prey who flees or who hides.”73 This form 
                                                 
70 Hardt and Negri, Multitude, 39. 
71 Stephen Graham, “Introduction: Cities, Warfare, and States of Emergency,” in Cities, War, and 
Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics, Ed. Stephen Graham (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2004), 6.  
72 Grégoire Chamayou, Manhunts: A Philosophical History, trans. Steven Rendell (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2012). 
73 Grégoire Chamayou, “The Manhunt Doctrine” Radical Philosophy 169 (September/October 
2011), 2. 
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of war locates enmity in “dangerous” or “threatening” individuals to be pursued as prey 
in a hunt. It seeks out and identifies individuals not for the confrontation that 
characterizes Clausewitzian war, but for either capture or pure annihiliation: “The ‘war’ 
is more like a vast campaign … of extrajudicial executions: a strategy of targeted 
assassinations, of lethal manhunts, which make up the ‘rogue’ and unilateral counterpart 
to the manhunts carried out under the aegis of international criminal justice.”74  
War premised on hunting particular individuals produces a geography shaped by 
the relation between individual and global scales. By “individual” I mean in Foucault’s 
terms, the process by which a body is extracted from a mass, crowd, people, or multitude. 
It is not a preexisting “natural” being neatly divided from other individuals, as the 
tradition of liberal humanism might have it, but a scale involved in the production of the 
political world.75 Manhunts as techniques of domination, work through the production of 
the individual and the subsequent reintegration of the individual into a larger mass or 
aggregate: “The hunt begins by scattering the group of prey in order to isolate the most 
vulnerable. This is a process of division: separating the individual from the group. But if 
this process first isolates its prey, it is only the better to massify them afterward.”76 In 
manhunts the political technology of the individual and the biopolitical security apparatus 
converge in the capture and/or killing of the dangerous individual. 
Cynegetic war founds the hunter’s claim to exemption from geopolitical 
boundaries through its global pursuit of targeted individuals: 
The hunter’s power has no regard for borders. It allows itself the right of 
universal trespassing, in defiance of territorial integrity of sovereign states. It is 
                                                 
74 Chamayou, “The Manhunt Doctrine,” 3 
75 Chamayou observes, “The prey’s experience is that of becoming an isolated individual, cut off 
from his fellows” (Chamayou, Manhunts, 59). 
76 Chamayou, Manhunts, 17. 
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an invasive power which, unlike the imperial manoeuvres of the past is based less 
on a notion of right of conquest, than of a right of pursuit.77 
 
The right of pursuit represents the most violent and predatory dimension of the 
sovereignty of Empire envisioning a loose territoriality by comparison to the model of 
state-centrism. Contemporary cynegetic war envisions a global space of uninhibited 
movement as the hunting ground of the military-security apparatus. It locates and tracks 
its prey by tracing it through nodes in global social networks: “The art of modern 
tracking proceeds by means of a cartography of the prey’s social networks that the 
‘hunter-analysts’ piece together in order to succeed in tracing him back, through his 
friends or relatives, to his hideout.”78 This is a geography produced through the relation 
between individual and global scales. The smooth network of the globe connects through 
nodes of individuals.  
 My account of Chamayou’s genealogy finds a number of deterritorializing 
tendencies at work in cynegetic war: it envisions a global space crossed by smooth 
networks without boundaries. However, this geography retains a connection to certain 
spaces and territory connected through the relations between the individual and global 
scales: 
In cynegetic war, armed violence seeks to pursue the prey wherever it might be. 
The place of hostilities is no longer defined by the locatable space of an effective 
combat zone, but by the simple presence of the hunted individual who carries 
with him everywhere a kind of little halo denoting a personal hostility zone … 
the very notion of armed conflict occurring in a distinct geographical space tends 
to vanish. Here, on the one hand, the combat zone tends to be reduced to the 
body of the enemy, which must then, according to the principle of distinction, be 
the only space that is targeted; but, on the other hand, it is believed that this 
mobile micro-space can be targeted wherever it happens to be. The paradox is 
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that the principle of targeting is accompanied by a limitless virtual extension of 
the conflict zone: the world becomes the battlefield.79 
 
Global war brings the scales of the individual body and the globe into a new relations in 
which the individual becomes the micro-territory of war and the world becomes a 
battlefield. 80 In this imaginative geography the individual represents a mobile marker of 
danger/insecurity that moves through a mass of undifferentiated space. In cynegetic war 
one finds the apotheosis of small war – the ostensible isolation of war to a set of enemy 
bodies in which the battlespace of these bodies is somehow held apart from the 
geographic location and social milieu of these individuals. Yet, this ultimate realization 
of small war also coincides with the absolute globalization of war. This global rescaling 
comes about through the nonlocal effects of cynegetic war. Entangled acts of war 
conducted against hunted individuals in geographically distant spaces make real the 
possibility of war anywhere and everywhere.  
This imaginative geography encounters resistances. Even as cynegetic war tries to 
remake the world as a smooth space for the military-security operations it finds itself tied 
to particular places and spaces. In the process of laying claim to the world as a battlefield 
it lays siege to whole cities and regions. Derek Gregory clarifies this geography of the 
spatial extension of American war across the globe. He finds in US military planning the 
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80 The idea of the world as a battlefield is not a new one. Marx notes “the commercial war of the 
European nations, which has the globe as its battlefield” Karl Marx, Capital: Volume 1, trans. 
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designs of a “planetary garrison that projects US military power … divided into six 
geographically defined unified combatant commands – like US Central Command, 
CENTCOM – whose Areas of Responsibility cover every region on earth and which 
operate through a global network of bases.”81 This vision is not an abstract 
deterritorialized war without specific sites of death and destruction. Instead, Gregory 
suggests, “the everywhere war is also always somewhere.”82 In particular, Gregory 
observes the ways in which we see the localization of this “multi-scalar, multi-
dimensional ‘battlespace’” in the militarized zone stretching across Afghanistan and 
Pakistan and the United States-Mexico borderlands.83 Along the border between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan heavily armed “special forces” of US Joint Special Operations 
Command and CIA drones wage what Jeremy Scahill calls America’s “dirty wars.”84 The 
individualizing dimension of this campaign appears in the “kill lists” that compile the 
names of the hunted to be captured or, more frequently, assassinated. Acts of war against 
individuals are not without collective effects. For instance, the recurrent buzzing of 
drones hovering overhead terrorizes entire populations forced to live with a sound that 
they associate with imminent death.85 In a fashion that mimics military operations, armed 
patrols roam the US-Mexico border working from “forward operating bases” under the 
panoptic view of surveillance drones. These battlespaces disclose the localization of 
                                                 
81 Derek Gregory, “The Everywhere War,” The Geographical Journal 177 (2011): 238. My 
emphasis. 
82 Gregory, “The Everywhere War,” 239 – 240. 
83 Gregory, “The Everywhere War,” 239. 
84 Jeremy Scahill, Dirty Wars: The World is a Battlefield (Nation Books, 2013).  
85 International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law School and Global 
Justice Clinic at NYU School Of Law, Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to 
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devastation unleashed across the world as a battlefield. Cynegetic wars take the entire 
globe as the virtual space of conflict but always actualizes war in a particular locality. 
The localization of global war also comes about through a military habitation on 
urban spaces. Historically, manhunts often have pursued prey through cityscapes. In the 
earliest forms of modern policing there existed a complete “resemblance of the police 
officer to an urban hunter.”86  However, I wish to examine not only how global civil war 
moves through cities but how it shapes and is shaped in turn by them, that is to say, the 
relation between urban and global scales within global civil war.  
Cities have long organized micro- and macro- processes in empires:  
Cities have always been crucial to imperialism, given their natural ability to 
centralise military, political and economic activities and in so doing draw 
otherwise disparate social formations into hierarchical and exploitative structural 
relations at variously extensive spatial scales.87 
 
However, expanding doctrines, technologies, and military theories focused on the battle 
space of the city have triangulated the relationship between war, sovereignty, and the city 
in new ways. Graham describes this emerging theory and practice as “new military 
urbanism,” in which “militarized techniques of tracking and targeting must permanently 
colonize the city landscape and the spaces of everyday life in both the ‘homelands’ and 
domestic cities of the West as well as the world’s neo-colonial frontiers.”88 This shift 
towards war waged in and against cities unfolds through an Orientalist lens in which 
megacities of the global South are represented as “barbaric” and “exotic” spaces of threat 
and danger. From the standpoint of global order, these cities fail to embrace the promise 
                                                 
86 Chamayou, Manhunts, 89. 
87 Kanishka Goonewardena and Stefan Kipfer “Postcolonial Urbicide: New Imperialism, Global 
Cities and the Damned of the Earth,” New Formations, 59 (2006), 25. 
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of neoliberal globalization or refuse it altogether. The focus on cities as spaces of 
dissonance and danger is not limited to the cities of the global South. Similar colonial 
tropes appear in discourses describing major urban areas, particularly those in 
postindustrial cities, of the global North. Such “‘inner city Orientalism’ … relies on the 
widespread depiction amongst rightist security, military, and political commentators of 
immigrant districts within the West’s cities as ‘backwards’ zones threatening the body 
politic of western cities or nations.”89 The discourse of inner city Orientalism sees urban 
places as perpetual threats to the status quo of social relations and political order. They 
are thus deemed to be in need of extensive surveillance and expansive, militarized 
policing. 
Surveillance and warfare in urban spaces constitute urbicide, a form of political 
violence involving the destruction of the built environment as an assault on the 
heterogeneity of public life.90 The concept of urbicide provides a frame for thinking about 
an array of practices targeting built environments. Eyal Weizman points to the curious 
practices that emerge from the expanding role played by architecture and urban planning 
in war within the Israeli Defense Force Operational Theory Research Institute and their 
practice of “walking through walls,” i.e. blowing holes through the interior spaces of 
buildings to move through a high-theory conceptualization of “smooth space.”91 The 
experimental practice drew upon an imaginative geography in which imperial governance 
                                                 
89 Graham, Cities Under Siege, xix. For the ways in which “inner city Orientalism” draws on 
affective and moral economies to expand a security regime see Sally Howell and Andrew 
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moves across borders and boundaries without resistance. As this imaginary encountered 
the materiality of place, it carved its way through the urban landscape in a campaign 
designed to kill, capture, and terrorize without encountering resistance. Further 
cataloguing of the practices of urbicide should not overlook the role of aerial 
bombardment which exhibits particularly gruesome effects in densely packed urban 
spaces. Finally, more expansive understandings of urbicide extend to methods of policing 
at work in the few public spaces left within an increasingly privatized urban environment. 
Paul Passavant clearly suggests the violence of such policing restrictions when he 
observes “manifestations of democratic strength are zoned away from post-Fordist 
entertainment enclaves … [T]he state frames one’s act of expression with razor wire.”92 
Although urbicide remains difficult to pin down as a particular set of practices, its 
imperial effects become clear. One acquires a sense of urbicide in the images of 
contemporary American imperial conflict – shift from rural spaces of Vietnam to largely 
urbanized visual representations of Iraq.93  Goonewardena and Kipfer sidestep the 
definitional difficulties of urbicide by examining the concept in terms of its effects on 
colonized populations. War directed at cities of the colonized produces, “a mockery of 
their political sovereignty, a brutal destruction of their socio-spatial infrastructures of 
resistance to the latest manifestations of imperialism, and a cruel militarisation of their 
everyday life in the name of human rights, democracy and a few other inviolate ‘western 
values’ including tolerant, multicultural and diverse cities.”94 
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Urbicide arises when global civil war stakes out the city as its terrain. Within this 
transformation of political spatiality, “[t]he focus of this new body of military doctrine 
thus blurs the traditional separation of military and civil spheres, local and global scales, 
and the inside and outside of nations.”95 As new relations form between urban, national, 
and global scales, cities become strategic sites for the reproduction of global order, the 
battlegrounds of Empire in which state, local, and private exercises of violence frequently 
appear.96 The “new military urbanism” envisions a geopolitics distinct from a map of 
states competing in a zero sum system.97 Instead, it traces the networks and circulations 
upon which global capital depends and applies the use of force at key sites within a 
global space:  
Globally, the new military urbanism is being mobilized for the securing of the 
strung-out commodity chains, logistics networks, and corporate enclaves that 
constitute the neoliberal geo-economic architecture of our planet. These key 
nodes, enclaves, circulations and infrastructures that together sustain the 
architectures of transnational urbanism tend to lie, cheek by jowl, with 
populations and urban places deemed likely to be sources of insurgent resistance, 
social mobilization, or infrastructural terrorism.98 
 
Military urbanism appears at the relay points of Empire applying force in new 
modulations. Practices for defining the integrity of nation-states change in conjunction 
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96 “[Richard Norton, writing on “feral cities”] invokes what geographers call a process of 
rescaling – a reorientation from globe-spanning revolution in high-tech warfare, and towards a 
dominant concern with the spaces of streets, favelas, medinas and neighborhoods. This parallels 
the increasing preoccupation of military and security forces with the microgeographies of 
domestic cities” (Graham, Cities Under Siege, 55) 
97 For examples of the writings of military theorists embodying new military urbanism see Peter 
W. Huber and Mark P. Mills, “How Technology Will Defeat Terrorism,” City Journal Winter 
(2002), http://www.city-journal.org/html/12_1_how_tech.html and  
Ralph Peters, “The Human Terrain of Urban Operations,” Parameter Spring (2000): 4 – 12. 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/00spring/peters.htm. 
98 Graham, Cities Under Siege, 77. 
  Global War & Planetary Democracy • III 
164 
 
with this emerging military-security apparatus. National boundaries are maintained 
through mobile processes of delineating political spaces. 
Ultimately, there is a point at which borders cease to be geographical lines and 
filters between states … and emerge instead as increasingly interoperable 
assemblages of control technologies strung out across the world’s infrastructures, 
circulations, cities, and bodies. Rather than being the simple blockading of 
territorial borders, the imperative is the permanent anticipation, channeling and 
monitoring of flows so that proper ones can be distinguished from improper ones 
… Inescapably, the attempt to securitize the sustenance of transnational 
capitalism is simultaneously urban and global.99  
 
Practices of bordering work as mobile forms of surveillance that police political 
belonging and citizenship, relying on the densely packed spaces of cities to track, sort, 
and separate bodies and populations. The border represents a political technology reliant 
upon a geography at odds with the physical space of separation between nation-states. 
Global and urban scales are bound together in new ways through these practices of 
surveillance. The political technology of bordering is both closely tied to the organization 
of bodies in human settlements and to the global movements of capital.  
 Small wars, manhunts, and urbicide represent viscous surfaces of global civil war. 
Each exhibits nonlocality in the contacts it creates between scales. Global civil war 
phases through its small wars, hunts, and sieges revealing a glimpse of the massive object 
that exceeds the bodies, cities, and localities that it targets. The next section turns to the 
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Global civil war traverses local, urban, national, and regional scales into the 
“global” through new emphases and relations. In the process of tying together the 
spatialities of war in new ways, it poses challenges to the survival of democratic political 
life. As Hardt and Negri frame this relation, “Because the current state of war is both 
global in scale and long lasting, with no end in sight, the suspension of democracy too 
becomes indefinite or even permanent. The vastly destructive enterprise of global civil 
war threatens to claim democratic life as one of its many victims.  
Yet, global civil war has not entirely snuffed the life from democracy. It has, 
rather, brought about the urgent need to reconsider the theory and practice of democracy 
under the strains of spatial and scalar transformations. Hardt and Negri call this global or 
planetary democracy and find in it the greatest hopes for a just democratic future. As they 
observe in Multitude, “The global scale seems increasingly like the only imaginable 
horizon for change, and real democracy the only feasible solution.”100 
I adopt the term “planetary” democracy because it avoids the conflation of “the 
global” and neoliberal globalization. Furthermore, “planetary” conveys the extent to 
which democracy at new scales must make room for non-human animals, beings, and 
forces within the category of the demos. Hardt and Negri make way for this expansion of 
politics beyond the human:  
A democracy of the multitude is imaginable and possible only because we all 
share and participate in common … This notion of the common does not position 
humanity separate from nature, as either exploiter or custodian, but focuses rather 
on the practices of interaction, care, and cohabitation in a common world, 
promoting the beneficial and limiting the detrimental forms of the common. In 
the era of globalization … both ecological and socioeconomic frameworks 
become increasingly central.101 
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The multitude, Hardt and Negri’s concept for the social body in pursuit of democracy at 
new, massive scales, will involve human and non-human constituencies that stretch the 
concept of demos beyond that of “the people.” Planetary democracy involves the 
coexistence of multiple sites and visions of politics and ontology. There may even be 
contending or contradictory visions, yet they coexist without reduction to a single 
political program or identity. The aim here is not to pin down an exact and exhaustive 
vision of global political order and accompanying set of specific institutions, as so many 
thinkers of cosmopolitanism have sought to do. Instead, planetary democracy seeks to 
think through the contours of a cosmopolitics without cosmopolitanism. It embraces the 
importance of cosmological thinking and the possibilities it holds for understanding 
political phenomena at massive scales without insisting on a vision of “the planetary” as a 
social whole reducible to a single universal cosmology. Such a process that sees politics 
as fragmentary and plural necessarily involves an experimental approach to political 
practice. Hardt and Negri provide valuable insights into democratic experimentation that 
confronts the multiform hierarchies, inequalities, and forms of violence at work in 
Empire.  We can see Hardt and Negri providing an account of planetary democracy as a 
hyperobject – a political formation on a massive scale constituted by multiple viscous 
surfaces and nonlocal scalar inter-involvements. The spatiality of hyperobjects highlights 
the complexity of power relations involved in the emergence of planetary democracy.  
The array of democratic experiments represent viscous surfaces with nonlocal scalar 
qualities. The fragmentary, plural quality of planetary democracy exceeds human 
perception and resists straight-forward, totalizing description.  
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In their most direct discussion of scale and politics, Hardt and Negri frame the 
crisis of contemporary democracy: “democracy is confronted today by a leap of scale, 
from the nation-state to the entire globe, and thus unmoored from its traditional modern 
meanings and practices … democracy must be conceived and practiced differently in this 
new framework and this new scale.”102 Empire and global civil war, in their expansion of 
politics to a massive scale, necessitate new formulations of the theory and practice of 
democracy. This scalar shift in politics is both spatial and ontological, that is, it changes 
the fundamental conditions of politics through its alteration of political geography. This 
transformation requires more than simply “scaling up” institutions of the nation-state to 
the global level; it extends beyond voting practices and representative institutions. It is 
“the rule of everyone by everyone,” a conception borrowed from Spinoza’s notion of 
absolute democracy.103 Absolute democracy does not require global referenda on every 
political decision. Nor does it rely on the institutionalized “democracy” imposed from 
above. International institutions may serve a valuable alleviating extreme inequalities and 
minimizing the harm of Empire, but they alone cannot constitute democracy adequate to 
the challenges of globalized life.  
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Instead, absolute democracy seeks to proliferate instances of direct democracy in 
order to foster more equitable power relations and enable the political capacities of 
collectivities:  
When Spinoza calls democracy absolute he assumes that democracy is really the 
basis of every society. The vast majority of our political, economic, affective, 
linguistic, and productive interactions are always based on democratic relations. 
At times we call these practices of social life spontaneous and at others think of 
them as fixed by tradition and custom, but really these are the civil processes of 
democratic exchange, communication, and cooperation that we develop and 
transform every day.104 
 
Absolute democracy draws upon the numerous democratic relations that sustain society, 
the elements of “living in common,” and pushes these to new levels of intensity. At the 
planetary scale it involves local, urban, and national political movements having access 
the workings of global order. In their pursuit of absolute democracy, Hardt and Negri call 
for forms of political engagement at a number of scales that amplify the living constituent 
power that flows from singularities-in-common. The greatest promise for democractic 
society resides not in centralized institutional designs, that is to say institutions of 
national and supranational governance, but in numerous social movements around the 
globe that express direct involvement in politics without mediation: 
What the various protests make clear is that democracy cannot be made or 
imposed from above … democracy is neither simply the political face of 
capitalism nor the rule of bureaucratic elites. And democracy does not result 
from either military intervention and regime change or from the various current 
models of “transition to democracy,” which have proved better at creating new 
oligarchies than any democratic systems … Democracy … can only arise from 
below. Perhaps the present crisis of the concept of democracy due to its new 
global scale can provide the occasion to return it to its older meaning as the rule 
of everyone by everyone, a democracy without qualifiers, without ifs or buts.105 
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Global democracy will not be achieved as a unified, centralized project. Nor will it be 
brought about through neoconservative notions of “nation building” that beat the drums 
of war for invading armies to occupy the territories of their enemies and also keep 
defining internal threats to defeat. Democracy at a global scale, and with complexity that 
swarms around representative intermediaries, is already arising from grassroots 
movements confronting racism, sexism, imperialism, and economic exploitation across 
the globe. These numerous experiments from below differ in form and content, ranging 
from social movements aimed at altering local conditions to autonomous movements 
articulating radical forms of self-government.  
The rescaling of politics and democracy is not an issue unique to contemporary 
globalization. Democratic revolutionaries in France, the United States, and Haiti in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries sought ways to translate democratic 
traditions of city-states to the emerging state form: 
Advocates of democracy in early modern Europe and North America were 
confronted by skeptics who told them that democracy may have been possible in 
the confines of the Athenian polis but was unimaginable in the extended 
territories of the modern nation-states … The eighteenth-century democratic 
revolutionaries … did not simply repropose democracy in its ancient form. 
Instead their task, aimed in part at addressing the question of scale, was to 
reinvent the concept and create new institutional forms and practices. … [L]ike 
the revolutionaries of the early modern period, we will once again have to 
reinvent the concept of democracy and create new institutional forms and 
practices appropriate to our global age.106 
 
This series of democratic experiments produced representative mechanisms that were 
integral to the formation of the state. New practices of democracy were constituted from 
heterogeneous geographic origins. In much the same way, contemporary social 
movements express a number of different concerns at local, city, state, and regional 
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levels. They have adopted a number of different “forms and practices” designed to 
contest the sovereignty of Empire. These may take the form of new avenues for 
expressing discontent with global order or go so far as to establish new forms of self-
government as the Zapatistas and the spread of zapatismo have demonstrated. Hardt and 
Negri observe, “[t]he common currency that runs throughout so many struggles and 
movements for liberation across the world today – at local, regional, and global levels – 
is the desire for democracy.”107 Through their multiplicity, or as a result of it, they have 
the collective effect of deepening democratic life. 
Hardt and Negri refer to the sweeping multiplicity of egalitarian social 
movements and democractic political projects as the multitude fueled by the vital 
energies of the common. Before expanding on Hardt and Negri’s theorization of 
democracy, it is necessary to clarify how the concepts multitude and common operate 
within my discussion. Hardt and Negri have received numerous criticisms directed 
toward their concept of the multitude. Although fascinated by their notion of the common 
as it emerges within cities, David Harvey nonetheless sees the relationship between the 
multitude and the state as too ambiguous in Hardt and Negri.108 In Mike Davis’s 
assessment “the multitude” presupposes political resources that must instead be 
mobilized by the poor. Davis claims, “Portentous post-Marxist speculations, like those of 
Negri and Hardt, about a new politics of “multitudes” in the “rhizomatic spaces” of 
globalization remain ungrounded in any real political sociology.”109 Equally dismissive 
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of the complexities of political space, Bruce Robbins sees Hardt and Negri’s vision of the 
multitude as largely unhelpful for thinking on the left, suggesting “the multitude exists 
only on the drawing board, where it shares space with a lot of other unbuilt and perhaps 
unbuildable structures.”110 I argue, to the contrary, that by refusing a single, ideal-type 
revolutionary subject in favor of the multitude, the social body characterized by internal 
multiplicity and driven by a volcanic set of energies, Hardt and Negri contribute to a 
pluralistic arsenal of democratic practices. A closer examination of the ontology of the 
multitude and the democratic experiments that take shape within it mitigates these 
accusations of excessive abstraction and depoliticizing messianism. Furthermore, it 
reveals a sophisticated theorization of the planetary social body as hyperobject existing at 
a scale beyond human perception and with nonlocal sites of encounter. 
Hardt and Negri have emphasized the ways in which the multitude differs from 
the concept of “the people.” In particular, the multitude does not resolve internal 
differences into a settled identity. Nor does it form a social body designed to submit to 
sovereignty. Rather than locatings its power in the transcendence of an originary, chaotic 
state of nature, the multitude draws energy from its multiplicity.111 Although the singular 
“multitude” has become the familiar term in the political vocabulary of Hardt and Negri, 
they have adopted the plural “multitudes” in more recent writing in order to better 
emphasize the numerous movements and efforts of different scope and purpose.112 The 
connections between these movements are periodic, informal, ad hoc, and explicitly 
resistant to resolving differences into unity, as in the case of the World Social Forum. 
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Even without specific points of contact, the diverse multitudes have cumulative effects in 
their opposition to existing global order. 
While the plural term may more effectively convey the internal multiplicity I 
retain the singular in order to emphasize the multitude as hyperobject. The multitude is 
the hyperobject of all bodies in resistance to the axiomatics of Empire. The concept of the 
multitude attempts to envision an egalitarian, democratic movement on a planetary scale 
that thrives on the forms of difference that persist within it. Its massive scale resists 
totalization by human perception. While this kind of hyperobject on the left might 
threaten existing principles of mobilization and organization, such as those upon which 
national social democracy and orthodox Marxism rely, it may identify new reserves of 
democratic energy suited to the terrain of planetary politics. Hardt and Negri do not 
dismiss familiar domains of struggle on the left such as state-regulation, public works, 
international treaties, or unions. Instead, they see vital roles for all of these in the 
negotiations with what they refer to as the “global aristocracy,” reforms that will prove 
necessary in the short and medium term.113 These concepts are not to be jettisoned, but 
they are limited in their ability to speak to global/planetary condition of politics. By 
contrast, the multitude and the common emphasize the planetary dimension of politics in 
which new constituencies working at a massive scale can address the condition of global 
civil war. 
Hardt and Negri’s examples of the multitude in sporadic action are abundant – 
Seattle in 1999, protests against the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, Zapatistas, 
Bolivian autonomist programs opposing the privatization of water, anti-colonial 
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struggles, the Occupy movement, the Arab Spring, Spanish indignados, and projects of 
“co-research” by industrial workers movements in the 1960s.114 These diverse 
constituencies share in common a commitment to radically democratic forms of self-
government and organization. The multitude “is not a spontaneous political subject but a 
project of political organization, thus shifting the discussion from being the multitude to 
making the multitude.”115 Democracy becomes an ongoing process of political struggle 
waged at number of scales. This process is further clarified in Declaration: “The task is 
not to codify new social relations in a fixed order, but instead to create a constituent 
process that organizes those relations and makes them lasting while also fostering future 
innovations and remaining open to the desires of the multitude.”116 This is a constituent 
process not limited to “the people,” but involving the sometimes cacophonous voices of 
the multitude powered by the forces of the common. In these terms “the common” is 
something like diverse energies and materials available for the organization of new social 
bodies of multitudes and the sustenance of collective forms of life. 
Although the most visible and dramatic manifestations of the multitude appear in 
the sporadic forms of direct action named explicitly by Hardt and Negri, the sources of 
the multitude’s power arise from various constituencies and anchorage points within 
global political life. Consumers, workers (formal and informal), technicians, teachers, 
professors, and journalists each wield specific political powers. Individually, their 
abilities to promote awareness, think critically, make alternative choices, and withhold 
labor exercise important, but nonetheless limited, influence. Working collectively 
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through, formal solidarities, ad hoc alliances or simply tacit support, their powers amplify 
and they exercise more intensive and extensive leverage on the power of Empire. 
Collaborative efforts between these overlapping constituencies possess the ability to 
envision alternative political and economic configurations, to pursue efforts through 
pressures at multiple sites of production and consumption, and to critically reflect on their 
efforts in pursuit of these visions. This is a transformative vision for politics working 
through a massive social body but grounded in highly specific sites and forms of 
influence. Such a political body differs greatly from Davis’s and Robbins’s 
characterization of the multitude as portentous speculation existing only on the drawing 
board.  
The global body of the multitude takes shape in one of Hardt and Negri’s more 
cryptic formulations: 
the flesh of the multitude is an elemental power that continuously expands social 
being, producing in excess of every traditional political-economic measure of 
value. You can try to harness the wind, the sea, the earth, but each will always 
exceed your grasp. From the perspective of political order and control, then, the 
elemental flesh of the multitude is maddeningly elusive, since it cannot be 
entirely corralled into the hierarchical organs of a political body.117 
 
Here, multitude resembles a hyperobject. It exceeds our perceptual powers, totalization, 
and the conventional metrics of political economy. As subjects we see and dwell on 
surfaces of the multitude without access to the thing in its entirety. However, this “thing” 
is not static, it takes the shape of dynamic flesh. Just as hyperobjects teeter on the verge 
of the sublime, the body of the multitude risks becoming monstrous: “[t]he new world of 
monsters is where humanity has to grasp its future.”118 Hardt and Negri leverage the sort 
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of ontological maneuver being made by Morton to gesture toward a political hyperobject, 
collectivity thought at new spatial scales set against the forces of economic exploitation 
and warfare that constitute their own hyperobjects. Democracy names one possible 
condition of encounter between the hyperobjects Empire and multitude. 
To better understand the multitude one has to examine the ways that it has been 
carved up by Empire through geographies of exploitation, hierarchy, and war. The global 
body of the multitude finds itself divided along a number of axes through complex spatial 
distributions and controls. In Multitude Hardt and Negri suggest “[o]ne has to be 
geographer today to map the topography of exploitation.”119 They approach this 
geography through a pair of spatial concepts, topology and topography describing the 
relation of these terms as follows: 
We need to investigate furthermore the political and social institutions that 
maintain the global hierarchies and the geography of poverty and subordination. 
Our analysis must move now, in short, from the topology of exploitation to its 
topography. Whereas the topology examined the logic of exploitation in 
production, the topography will map the hierarchies of the system of power and 
is unequal relations in the north and south of the globe. These spatial relations of 
control and subordination are key to understanding how the contradictions of the 
system are transformed into antagonism and conflict.120 
 
Topology describes the logics or practices through which exploitation functions. 
Topography, on the other hand, maps the spatial relations that both enable and result from 
conditions of exploitations. The topography of exploitation is involved in both the causes 
and effects of the practices of exploitation described by topology. Take for instance what 
David Harvey refers to as “accumulation by dispossession.”121 There are several practices 
and operations internal to this process, e.g. structural adjustment, privatization, and 
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deregulation. The topology of exploitation creates a conceptual toolbox for exploring the 
inner workings of these practices. The topography of exploitation accounts for the 
“uneven geography” by which this process of accumulation proceeds. For Hardt and 
Negri these are complementary parts of an effective analysis of power relations in the 
existing global order.122  
Hardt and Negri identify an elaborate geography of inequality irreducible to 
national boundaries or neat delineations between the global North and global South. They 
find an extensive system of power asymmetries in which “[c]apitalist globalization … has 
managed to solve this problem [of inequality] in the worst possible way – not by making 
labor relationships equal in countries throughout the world but rather by generalizing the 
perverse mechanisms of unevenness and inequality everywhere.”123 The unequal relations 
of exchange between places come into view at multiple scales. As Hardt and Negri 
observe, “there is uneven development and unequal exchange between the richest and 
poorest neighborhoods of Los Angeles, between Moscow and Siberia, between the center 
and periphery of every European city, between the northern and southern rims of the 
Mediterranean, between the southern and northern islands of Japan – one could continue 
indefinitely.”124 The topography of exploitation traces the multiple levels of inequality – 
within cities, between cities, across regions, within and between the global North and 
South – documenting the movements across scales as well. As they observe, “[t]he 
topography of global divisions of labor, poverty, and exploitation, in short, is a shifting 
matrix of politically constructed hierarchies.”125 This complex geography contains a 
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number of territorial visions that draw old practices of spatial separation into new 
formations. As Hardt and Negri suggest in Empire: 
The transformation of the modern imperialist geography of the globe and the 
realization of the world market signal a passage within the capitalist mode of 
production. Most significant, the spatial divisions of the three Worlds (First, 
Second, and Third) have been scrambled so that we continually find the First 
World in the Third, the Third in the First, and the Second almost nowhere at all. 
Capital seems to be faced with a smooth world – or really, a world defined by 
new and complex regimes of differentiation and homogenization, 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization.126  
 
Taken together, an analysis of global inequality through the topology and topography of 
exploitation lead Hardt and Negri to declare: “We are living in a system of global 
apartheid.”127 Global apartheid names the process through which the body of the 
multitude is divided along internal lines of antagonism. This process is closely related to 
global civil war. The many viscous surfaces of global civil war; small wars, manhunts, 
urban sieges; reinforce lines of global segregation and inequality. 
Thinking about planetary democracy today requires formulating responses to the 
divisions and hierarchies within the social body of the multitude. Hardt and Negri 
identify a number of democratic experiments already underway in contesting the 
conditions of Empire and global civil war. These come into focus through their open and 
pluralizing definition of globalization: “Globalization, of course, is not one thing, and the 
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multiple processes that we recognize as globalization are not unified or univocal. Our 
political task, we will argue, is not simply to resist these processes but to reorganize them 
and redirect them toward new ends.”128 This formulation clearly draws upon and extends 
the enthusiasm surrounding the alter-globalization movement and its profound statement 
in Seattle only a year before the publication of Empire. Maria Hynes and Scott Sharpe 
characterize the ethos of the alter-globalization movement succinctly, “The movement’s 
stance is popularly captures in the formula ‘One no, many yeses’; a resounding no to 
corporate globalisation is followed up with an energetic proliferation of alternatives.”129 
This understanding of globalization acknowledges multiple contending processes 
traversing global space. These include corporate, military, and juridical projects 
irreducible to a single political program but, taken as a totality, constituting Empire. 
Globalization, by this definition, also includes the numerous popular and democratic 
struggles against Empire. Many of these responses are locally situated – tied to the right 
to housing, a living wage, gender equality opposition to police brutality or a particular 
war – yet they resonate with one another across borders in their call for a world different 
from the one being forced upon them by neoliberalism, fascism, and militarism. 
While recognizing the heterogeneity of objections to conditions within the current 
global order, Hardt and Negri nonetheless suggest that we might consider these 
grievances collectively as resembling the cahiers de doléances, the list of grievances 
compiled against the ancien regime prior to the French revolution. The late modern 
cahiers de doléances compiled by Hardt and Negri contain scalar diversity similar to its 
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historical predecessor including “denunciations and demands that ranged from the most 
local problems to issues that touched on the highest levels of government.”130 In 
particular Hardt and Negri have compared the World Social Forum to the cahier de 
doléances. They suggest: 
One should thus read the papers and conferences presented at Porto Alegre like 
the Cahier de Doléances (statements of grievances) presented to the Estates-
General in France in 1789 … At Porto Alegre … [t]hey reveal the horrible state 
of our present form of globalization, the scandal of neoliberal capitalist power, 
and the misery of the majority of the world’s population … They demonstrate a 
mature and organized desire to go beyond what we have, to construct a new 
world that is possible.131 
 
The World Social Forum adopts a non-deliberative organizational strategy which 
provides an open space for participants to exchange thoughts, tactics, and strategies 
without vying for hegemony. It issues no declarations and explicitly states its opposition 
to pensamientos únicos – unitary forms of thought that close off alternatives. Instead, the 
Forum seeks to foster encounters and internal conversation in order to energize a still-
inchoate global left.132 It provides for a space of convergence in which bodies may gather 
together without collectively falling under the header of a single agenda or set of goals. 
Furthermore, it emphasizes communication allowing for diverse interests and groups to 
speak to one another without resolving into a single political entity, party, or movement. 
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To state the function of the World Social Forum in terms closer to Hardt and Negri’s, the 
“open space” of the Forum creates room for conversations and collaborations of the 
multitude(s) to defy the imperial controls of global civil war. Glimpsing the plurality of 
efforts against neoliberal globalization, it also offers a brief glimpse of the hyperobject 
that is planetary democracy.  
Within the demands made at Porto Alegre, Hardt and Negri note the repeated 
importance placed on confronting the ongoing state of war around the globe and its 
promotion by major military powers: 
[T]he struggle against war is a central element of this program. It is perfectly 
clear to those at Porto Alegre that the neoliberal world order and the interminable 
state of war go hand in hand, that they support and legitimate each other … 
Numerous strategies have been invented by the movements for this struggle 
against war, such as caravans for peace and operations of ‘diplomacy from 
below’, that is, intervening actively in conflicts, outside official state channels … 
The networks that are based on our differences and our commonalities create an 
unbreakable relation not only against war and death, but ultimately for a new 
form of life.133 
 
The list of grievances against neoliberal global order formulated at the World Social 
Forum identifies the limitations of egalitarian social change imposed by a condition of 
generalized planetary violence. The creative acts of democratic experimentation and anti-
war resistance respond to the changing terrain of politics under global civil war. In order 
to ameliorate this condition the Forum creates conversations between practitioners of a 
variety of approaches to conflict resolution and opposition to the conduct of specific 
wars.  
 The politics of scale are central to the World Social Forum. Its origins lie in “the 
local administrators experimenting in new forms of participatory democracy together 
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with the utopian schemers of a global democracy.”134 Furthermore, the question of scale 
has been at the center of debates within the World Social Forum: 
Different ideological positions focus on the primacy of different scales. Some 
activists argue that the primary agent of progress lies in localization … Others 
argue for a new form of state that is run by radical, participatory democratic 
principles that are regulated by criteria established by civil society … A third 
position proposes global forms of regulation. The emphases on different scales 
… constitute potential fault-lines in the movement for global justice and 
solidarity. Whether these differences are fundamentally antagonistic or should be 
read as contradictions in process that can be reconciled into a complementary 
multiplicity, is unclear at this time in history.135 
 
Hardt and Negri provide a number of key insights into this “complementary multiplicity” 
and its geography that is at once local, national, and global. They provide a list of 
democratic experiments aimed at different dimensions of social and political life and 
tailored to a number of scales.  
Hardt and Negri group their responses to the grievances of existing global order 
into four categories: reforms of representation, rights and justice, economic reforms, and 
biopolitical reforms designed to reduce the frequency and devastation of war. They 
engage a number of institutions, treaties, and reforms, offering ways to expand the scope 
and effect of each. For instance, they see the International Criminal Court and truth 
commissions as valuable institutions that might be expanded to address colonialism and 
the Atlantic slave trade.136 They lend support to existing corruption reforms but suggest 
that these institutions might be expanded to “not only to prevent corruption but restitute 
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the common that has been stolen.”137 They advise that economic control might be 
reduced simply by shortening the duration of copyright. Additionally, they suggest that 
initiatives such as Creative Commons provide a model for shared, democratic methods of 
knowledge production. International initiatives to reduce climate change as well as 
treaties that would restrict the production and use of land mines, biological, chemical, and 
nuclear weapons present possibilities for global reform as well. However, Hardt and 
Negri do not limit their list to already-existing initiatives. They also suggest experiments 
in activist politics designed to facilitate more democratic access to media and provide 
space for voices critical of military build-ups, economic inequality, and environmental 
destruction. Ultimately, they suggest “it may be more productive not to generate reform 
proposals but to develop experiments for addressing our global situation.”138  
Through this list of grievances with the global order and the accompanying 
variety of democratic experiments and practices in self-government, Hardt and Negri 
devise a politics of hyperobjects designed to strengthen planetary democracy. Certain 
recommendations, such as those that would radicalize global governance, seek to 
intervene directly at a massive global scale. In addition to each of the global reforms that 
they endorse, sometimes hesitantly, they include “a note of skepticism about the 
gigantism of such proposals. Global commissions, global institutions, and global agencies 
are not necessarily adequate solutions to global problems.”139 The cumbersome and 
potentially monolithic nature of global institutions often produces obstacles to addressing 
urgent social, economic, and political crises as well as potentially subverting ongoing 
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struggles for democracy. Hardt and Negri direct more concern towards fostering local 
projects that open new political horizons at the global scale. The long list of possible 
actions seeks out numerous viscous surfaces upon which individual and collective action 
can sustain local democratic aspirations while amplifying nonlocal entanglements across 
multitudes. They frame their politics of engagement on a number of different scales that 
breaks with “a linear, isomorphic relationship among legal and political forms of the city, 
the nation, the region, and the world.”140 Transversal connections between local and 
global enable a potential democratic organization capable of addressing global challenges 
that extend beyond the reach of any single constituency. The result is a strikingly 
pragmatic, multi-sited, and experimental politics. 
 
The City in Common 
 
The possibilities of democracy on a planetary scale are closely connected to the 
scaling of urban life. The layering of urban space provides one of the microcosms of 
planetary politics, a viscous surface of planetary democracy. Hardt and Negri suggest in 
Empire “[t]he multitude is not formed simply by throwing together and mixing nations 
and peoples indifferently; it is the singular power of a new city.”141 They offer this 
formulation as a way to contrast the immanence of the multitude with the transcendence 
of Augustine’s City of God, yet it also provides insight into the way that figures of urban 
space inform the spatiality of the multitude in its early formulations within their trilogy. 
In the pages of Multitude, Hardt and Negri revisit the importance of urban space for 
social and political organization. Looking at the shifting focus of guerilla movements 
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from rural to urban spaces, they observe that “[t]he focus … was increasingly not on 
attacking the ruling powers but rather on transforming the city itself. In metropolitan 
struggles the close relationship between disobedience and resistance, between sabotage 
and desertion, counterpower and constituent projects became increasingly intense. The 
great struggles of Autonomia in Italy in the 1970s, for example, succeeded temporarily in 
redesigning the landscape of the major cities, liberating entire zones where new cultures 
and new forms of life were created.”142 Here, the ability of resistance movements to 
interrupt the functioning of everyday life intensified in urban space. Lines of mobility 
through the material cityscape, what Lefebvre and others have called the “right to the 
city,” reflected the efforts of democratic transformations and successful campaigns of 
worker self-government. 
Hardt and Negri’s strongest endorsement of the democratic potentialities within 
urban space appears in Commonwealth. They observe, “metropolitan life is becoming a 
general planetary condition.”143 Living in cities has become a part of the common shared 
by an increasing percentage of humanity. The space of the city is not shared equally. It is 
divided, sliced, segregated, policed, and subjected to hierarchies. Military urbanism 
disciplines bodies and populations moving through urban space. Urbicide seeks to reduce 
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built environments, as spaces constituting the possibility of being-in-common, to 
rubble.144 Yet, the element of being together still impinges upon the lives of urban 
citizens.  
The connection between the city and deeper, more expansive forms of democratic 
practice extends beyond the pervasive urbanization rapidly changing the terrain of 
politics. For Hardt and Negri the city provides a valuable resource for democratic 
organization in its creation of the common. As they suggest “[t]he metropolis is … the 
space of the common, of people living together, sharing resources, communicating, 
exchanging goods and ideas.”145 The emphasis on the common, here, differs from 
understandings of the common as a “natural” space or set of resources: “The common … 
is not so much the “natural common” embedded in the material elements of land, 
minerals, water, and gas, but the “artificial common” that resides in languages, images, 
knowledges, affects, codes, habits, and practices. This artificial common runs throughout 
the metropolitan territory and constitutes the metropolis.”146 The common for Hardt and 
Negri represents an active, productive force, not an idyllic past in need of “conservation” 
or “restoration.” Jason Read expands on this unconventional notion of the common: 
“What human individuals have “in common” is not some abstract idea of humanity but 
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their specific relations, which are constituted each moment in multiple forms.”147 The 
common is neither a set of given resources, nor is it the universalist and universalizing 
essence of “humanity.” Rather it is the condition of shared relations, the democratic 
undercurrents constantly fueled by the condition of being-together.148  
The contemporary urban form is that of the “biopolitical city” in which the city 
increasingly corresponds with the space of production:  
With the passage to the hegemony of biopolitical production, the space of 
economic production and the space of the city tend to overlap. There is no longer 
a factory wall that divides the one from the other, and “externalities” are no 
longer external to the site of production that valorizes them. Workers produce 
throughout the metropolis, in its every crack and crevice.149 
 
It is in this sense that “the metropolis is to the multitude what the factory was to the 
industrial working class,” both the space of control and the common condition of being- 
(and working) together. 150 This extended space of production brings with it a flexible 
system of controls that are less easily identifiable than those of the factory floor manager. 
However, it also opens a more extensive set of connections across society. Capitalist 
production both relies upon biopolitical production and faces the challenge of new forms 
of subjectivity enabled by the common. 
While the common can provide a resource for democracy, its contribution to 
egalitarian human flourishing is not guaranteed: “the common can be positive or 
negative: dynamic local cultural circuits in a metropolis are a positive form of the 
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common, whereas pollution, traffic, social conflicts, and the like are negative forms.”151 
Democratic politics in post-Fordist, biopolitical cities, becomes a matter of organizing 
encounters: “The politics of the metropolis is the organization of encounters. Its task is to 
promote joyful encounters, make them repeat, and minimize infelicitous encounter.”152 
This Spinozist-Deleuzian urbanism sees the bumpy, scalar layering of city life as a place 
where local, state, global and planetary processes meet.153 The hope and promise of this 
politics is that, in an era of accelerated urbanization, it can have effects that reverberate 
beyond the city: 
The metropolitanization of the world does not necessarily just mean a 
generalization of structures of hierarchy and exploitation. It can also mean a 
generalization of rebellion and then, possibly, the growth of networks of 
cooperation and communication, the increased intensity of the common and 
encounters among singularities. This is where the multitude finds its home.154 
 
The density of encounters with the common make cities pivotal sites for democratic 
organization. Mega-cities, conurbantions and urban networks extend the common across 
urban fabric that exceeds the territorial boundaries of the city. The urban becomes a 
surface of the hyperobject “multitude” holding within it political capacities enabled by 
well-staged encounters. Cities gather together multitudes and connect them across distant 
geographic space.  The hope of planetary democracy depends on the vital energies within 
and across cities and urban fabric throughout the globe: “A new geography is established 
by the multitude as the productive flows of bodies define new rivers and ports. The cities 
of the earth will become at once great deposits of cooperating humanity and locomotives 
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for circulation, temporary residences and networks of the mass distribution of living 
humanity.”155  
Ash Amin, Doreen Massey, and Nigel Thrift offer a number of insights into the 
practical dimensions of constructing democratic politics within and between cities. While 
not explicitly employing the language of the common and the multitude, their concern 
with egalitarian economic development and flourishing democratic practices aligns their 
project with that of Hardt and Negri. Amin, Massey, and Thrift see cities as intensive 
social networks that bring together a multiplicity of forms of life, the multitude, in a 
single space. Contemporary cities, with their densely-packed encounters, highlight the 
challenges of creating global democracy:  
If we think of cities not in terms of their physicality or built design only, but also 
in terms of constellations of lives, then the intensity with which those lives are 
lived, together with the diversity of lives which are brought together, present both 
special problems and particular opportunities … [I]n a globalised world 
democracy faces challenges everywhere, in cities and outside them, but in cities 
one comes face to face with perhaps the most acute expressions of these 
challenges.156 
 
Cities not only pose new challenges for the constitution of democratic politics, they also 
enable new forms of connection across space. They open up “transversal politics … 
[that] seeks, first, to reconcile universal goals with particular interests by forging 
solidarities across the disparate sites and social demands of the heterogeneous 
contemporary city … Second, it seeks to provide mechanisms for airing differences and, 
as far as possible, a level playing field for contestation.”157 Transversal politics cut across 
scales forming habits, practices, constituencies, and demands that connect groups and 
                                                 
155 Hardt and Negri, Empire, 397. 
156 Ash Amin, Doreen Massey, and Nigel Thrift, Cities for the Many. Not the Few (Bristol: The 
Policy Press, 2000), 31. 
157 Amin, Massey, and Thrift, 39. 
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techniques across geo-space as well as reverberating upward and outward. This is not a 
unitary body of political thought or action. Transversal politics open up “real experiments 
with urban democratisation around the world.”158 Such an approach approximates the 
forms of political engagement that I have offered for dealing with hyperobjects. They 
enter politics through viscous surfaces at a number of sites and move more easily through 
networks of nonlocal entanglement. The transversal politics connecting globalized cities 
offer a starting point for building planetary democracy. It provides a method of 
connection and communication that facilitates egalitarian visions at a massive, 
unprecedented scale, yet it does not seek to produce a global project (in the unified, 
universalist sense). The aim is not a new sovereignty of Empire, but the coexistence of 
multiple forms of life and governance.  
 
*   *   * 
 
Hardt and Negri provide a map of the collisions and encounters between 
hyperobjects in which politics unfolds at unprecedented scales and folds previously 
distant spaces together through scalar discrepancies. Their politics resists the temptation 
to design a program for the left. Instead, it offers a rethinking of scale that echoes 
thinking about the left offered by Gilles Deleuze, one of their interlocutors. Deleuze 
suggests that rather than being contained within a particular preexisting political identity, 
being on the left represents a particular “phenomenon of perception”: 
So how to define being on the left… first, it's a matter of perception, which 
means this: what would *not* being on the left mean? It's a little like an address, 
extending outward from a person: the street where you are, the city, the country, 
other countries farther and farther away … It starts from the self, and to the 
extent that one is privileged, living in a rich country, one might ask, what can we 
                                                 
158 Amin, Massey, and Thrift, 43. 
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do to make this situation last? One senses that dangers exist, that it might not last, 
it's all so crazy, so what might be done so that Europe lasts? Being on the left is 
the opposite: it's perceiving … first the periphery … say the world, the continent 
-- let's say Europe --, France, etc. etc., rue de Bizerte, me.159 
 
Whereas the Right asks about questions of universal morality and self-interest as it moves 
outward into the world from the starting point of the self, the left looks to the horizon. 
The horizon represents the more expansive world but also the periphery, marginalized, 
and excluded. Being on the left involves assessing power relations and looking into the 
complex interconnections that create the world and society. As Deleuze continues:  
First, you see the horizon… And you know these millions of starving people 
can't last… there's no point in kidding about it, it's an absolutely worn-out justice 
system, it's not a matter of morality, but in perception itself. It's not in saying that 
the natality rate has to be reduced, which is just another way of keeping the 
privileges for Europe. <Being on the left> is really finding arrangements, finding 
world-wide assemblages. Being on the left, it is often only [knowing that] Third 
World problems that are closer to us than problems in our neighborhoods. So it's 
really a question of perceptions… more than being a question of "beautiful 
souls.160 
 
The phenomenon of perception that characterizes the left involves rescaling – self, street, 
city, country, and world – and identifying lines of connection between scales. For 
Deleuze, as for Hardt and Negri, the questions of the left turn on understanding the scalar 
relations of globalized life. On the left, one thinks through possibilities of intervention, 
new tactics, strategies, new alliances, and possible resonances.  
 I find in Morton’s theorization of hyperobjects new ways of thinking about spatial 
connections on the left that dislocate concentric circles of belonging. Viscosity, phasing, 
and nonlocality offer not only a way to think through natural phenomena impinging upon 
human life, as pursued by Morton, but also a vocabulary for the nonlinear dynamics that 
                                                 
159 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, “‘G as in “Gauche”’ in L’Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze, 
trans. Charles J. Stivale (2004). http://www.langlab.wayne.edu/CStivale/D-G/ABC2.html. 
160 Deleuze and Parnet, “G as in ‘Gauche.’” 
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characterize collective action on a massive scale. By reading Empire and the multitude as 
hyperobjects, I have emphasized the multiple scales intertwined in each of these global 
systems. This spatiality reveals a dynamic political terrain that defies human control and 
requires periodically rescaling political organization and democratic practices. 
My analysis has focused on the encounter between global civil war and planetary 
democracy in its incipient form. The interaction between these two hyperobjects involves 
more than a dialectic relation between two seemingly totalizing entities. It involves a vast 
web of encounters between diverse processes of militarization and the efforts to cultivate 
forms of life outside the production and reproduction of global violence. The encounters 
of these viscous surfaces take a number of forms. They appear in the confrontations 
between the extension of public surveillance and artists efforts to satirize or subvert these 
programs. They appear between weapons manufacturers and university, city-wide, or 
national divestment campaigns. They appear between the ideology that suggests “the 
world is a battlefield” and the democratic vision of the World Social Forum, seeking to 





 4 | The Urban Question and the Scales of Politics 
 
The previous chapter posed the question of the city’s distinctive relations to political-
economic processes through the work of Hardt and Negri. They see the city as a 
privileged space of production that has eclipsed the factory as a pivotal site for struggles 
over subjectivity and the organization of the social body of the multitude. This approach 
suggests that aleatory encounters within cities contain democratic energies entangled with 
global political forces. The examination of urban space within Hardt and Negri’s thought 
provides an implicit response to what social theorists have conceptualized as the “urban 
question.” The urban question names a problematic of the relations located between 
society and space, on the one hand, and the city and global capitalism, on the other. Hardt 
and Negri cast the question as a matter of responding to imperial power operating on a 
global scale. This same question has, however, been posed, framed, and answered in 
distinct ways by thinkers working in different traditions. 
Manuel Castells’s The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach provides a formative 
account of the relations between cities and capitalist society. Castells poses the urban 
question in a historical and epistemological framework, as a matter of a “scientific 
theory” of the relation between the capitalist mode of production, its corresponding social 
formation, and the city.1 Subsequent debates over the urban question have offered 
                                                 
1 Manuel Castells, The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach, trans. Alan Sheridan (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1979), 64. Castells sought to shift social theory away from the concept of urban 
culture that associates “the urban” with normativities of modernity and development while 
sidelining questions of material conditions at work in the formation of cities. Although Castells’s 
formulation of the urban question emphasized power relations in the study of cities, the influence 
of a strong Althusserian structuralism reduced the study of cities to the epiphenomenal workings 
of a totalizing capitalist structure. Castells’s account and the debates surrounding it would shape 
Marxist urban sociology and geography by focusing urban studies on the power relations between 
labor and capital. For a detailed account of the problems that stem from Castells’s 
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differing approaches to expanding the scope of the question by focusing on the location 
and distribution of agency within and between cities.2 Adopting a historical materialist 
approach, Neil Brenner succinctly frames the urban question as it has been posed by 
Marxist geography as a problematic with deliberate, productive ambiguity. He sees two 
overlapping dimensions of the urban question: “On the one hand, the urban question 
refers to the role of cities as sociospatial arenas in which the contradictions of capitalist 
development are continually produced and fought out. On the other hand, the urban 
question refers to the historically specific epistemic frameworks through which capitalist 
cities are interpreted.”3 That is, the urban question involves both material processes of 
urbanization in the context of contemporary capitalism and the concepts formed in the 
design, planning, and study of cities. By material, here, I mean the narrow terms of 
historical materialism, as the accumulation of capital in and through cities as well as the 
contradictions that result from this accumulation process. Brenner sees cities and global 
capitalism as co-constitutive. He ascribes agency to processes at a number of scales 
examining the supra- and sub- urban processes in the formation of contemporary 
capitalist cities. 4 The urban question proves inextricably tied to multiple scales of politics 
and their intersections. 
                                                 
“epistemological critique” of urban studies see Peter Saunders, Social Theory and the Urban 
Question (London: Unwin Hyman, 1987), 174 – 182. 
2 Castells sought to discredit urban theories (on both the left and right) that relied on the rhythms 
and habits of everyday life in their understanding of the city. Instead, he provided a framing in 
which “[t]he practices of individuals … can be explained only through a scientific theory of 
structure” (Saunders, 170). In contrast to Castells, I wish to suggest that habit, rhythm, and 
everyday life need not be understood in opposition to structures. A notion of structure less rigid 
than Castells’s opens a space for thinking about rhythm and everyday life as both forming and 
formed by structural conditions. 
3 Brenner, 362.   
4 Brenner, 362. 
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Brenner’s work builds on the influential work of David Harvey, and a return to 
Harvey’s thought helps further clarify the trajectory of debates about the urban question.  
Harvey has characterized his approach as “historical-geographical materialism” in which 
space plays an important role in understanding the continued expansion of capital as well 
as the formation of a democratic politics in opposition to capitalism.5 Harvey’s 
formulation expands the scope of the urban question, the framework for understanding 
cities, and their relations to capitalism. In Harvey’s recent work on urban geography, the 
city reflects collective answers to numerous political questions: “the question of what 
kind of city we want cannot be divorced from the question of what kind of people we 
want to be, what kind of social relations we seek, what relations to nature we cherish, 
what style of life we desire, what aesthetic values we hold.”6 The city forms at the 
intersection of social, political-economic, ecological, and aesthetic concerns.  
Pushing back against the structuralism of Castells, Harvey sees potential for class 
struggle in the thought and practice of diverse urban social movements. He stretches the 
boundaries of inquiry within Marxist urban geography, modifying it through 
engagements with everyday, lived space. By folding in new domains for consideration, 
such as aesthetics and ecology, Harvey expands the urban question beyond the immediate 
and conventional concerns of political economy. He pays close attention to the multiple 
scales in which the social, economic, and political life of cities participate. Framing the 
urban question as a matter of organizing anti-capitalist politics through the city and 
democratizing the process of urbanization, his work makes the urban question both 
political and scalar.  
                                                 
5 David Harvey, Spaces of Hope (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 15. 
6 David Harvey, Rebel Cities (New York: Verso, 2012), 4. 
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 Harvey has not been alone in expanding the terms of the urban question. The 
group of writings loosely gathered together under the name New Materialism, 
incorporating work from ontology, philosophy of science, and ecocriticism, have also 
offered a unique framing of the urban question, albeit in less explicit terms. New 
Materialists take notice of the smallest and most subtle forms of agency. The work on 
cities coming from this body of thought carries the urban question through an historical 
and epistemological inquiry, in the line of Castells, to the realm of the ontological. For 
New Materialists, cities embody forms of complexity that bring humans, nonhuman 
animals, and things into political and social assemblages irreducible to familiar categories 
of “nature” and “culture.”7 As a representative of this approach, I focus on the work of 
Manuel De Landa. He expands the terms of the urban question to include the intersection 
of linguistics, biology, and geology, each set on a number of temporal and spatial scales.8   
 Harvey’s “historical-geographical materialism” and De Landa’s “New 
Materialism” share a common problematic: both shift the urban question away from 
historical and epistemological inquiry, in the lines of Castells, and toward an expansion 
of the forces and agencies included in political economy. Both also lean heavily on a 
dynamic understanding of scale in their cartographic approach. The two fields have rarely 
entered into the same theoretical conversations. But in this chapter I draw these two 
approaches to urban geography together to see how they can inform one another. I bring 
Harvey’s politically engaged vision of social justice to New Materialist thinking on the 
                                                 
7 For a full account of New Materialism see Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, eds., New 
Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010). My 
understanding of the approach is influenced by Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter. See also William 
E. Connolly, “The ‘New Materialism’ and the Fragility of Things,” Millenium 41.3 (2013): 399 – 
412.  
8 Manuel De Landa, A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History (New York: Zone Books, 2000).  
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city while simultaneously deepening Harvey’s thought by expanding his understanding of 
social and political life to processes and publics that extend beyond the human.  Through 
this encounter between historical-geographical materialism and New Materialism, the 
thematic of scale comes to refer to the numerous planes of organization including but not 
limited to the spatial extension of capitalist development. Whereas Castells’s framings 
have focused on the historical arc of urbanization and capitalism and the epistemology of 
studying this relation, the encounter staged between Harvey and De Landa’s thought 
explores connections between ontology, political practice, and ethical cultivation. By the 
ontological dimension again I mean the ways the New Materialists challenge 
subject/object, human/nonhuman, and culture/nature binaries by attributing differential 
degrees of agency to both sides of these divisions and by exploring nonhuman processes 
imbricated within human cultures. Reading Harvey and De Landa as complementary 
framings of the urban question provides us with a robust understanding of the relation 
between cities and other scales of democratic, egalitarian political organizing.  
 The first two sections of the chapter work at the level of social ontology. They 
examine how the encounter between historical-geographical materialism and new 
materialism broadens and deepens our understanding of urban political economy. The 
first section examines the concept of historical process in historical-geographical 
materialism, beginning to push this approach beyond the treatment of historical processes 
as synonymous with capitalist accumulation. The section proceeds by differentiating 
urban process from capitalist process and noting the forms of social complexity that 
begin to appear when cities serve both as and more than incubators for capitalist surplus. 
The second section examines historical processes through De Landa’s approach to 
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nonlinear history. It elaborates on historical processes irreducible to capitalist 
accumulation and considers their interaction with the built environments of cities. The 
third section develops a more subtle theorization of the agentic powers of bodies, one that 
is closely attuned to the political potentials within the informal sectors of cities. By 
expanding understandings of historical processes and bodies, I seek not only to add sites 
of agency to a political field, understood as a settled space of preexisting actors and 
mechanisms. The aim, additionally, is to show how closer attention to the workings of 
historical processes and bodies changes our understanding of causal relations. Through a 
consideration of the scalar relations that shape the urban question, nonlinear causal 
dynamics such as feedback loops emergence come into focus.  
The final section draws lessons on the spatialization of society from historical-
geographical and new materialism. It identifies the contributions of this conversation to 
the theory of scale developed throughout this project. In particular, it explores how the 
spatial and scalar sensitivities of alternative approaches to architectural theory might 
inform the practice of political theory. In this conclusion, I suggest ways in which the 
political theorist might periodically think as an architect, offering insights into the 
spatiality of power and resistance in the contemporary political moment. 
 I conclude the project with this chapter because it provides a more dynamic map 
of the multitude – the social body constituted by the heterogeneous movements for self-
government and radical democratic organization. This chapter seeks to consider the urban 
question as it pertains to the multitude, that is to say, the organization of a multitude in 
and through cities. Its inquiry into the relation between cities and global systems involves 
clarifying the forms of urban governmentality within Empire and identifying the spaces 
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of emergence, organization, and vitality through which the multitude is embodied. How 
could a planetary social body constitute itself just as the very substance of its being is 
shifting rapidly – at a moment when human settlements expand in ways that alter 
ecosystems, climate systems, and geopolitical power relations on a planetary scale? What 
are its anchorages and points of leverage on imperial and capitalist institutions? How are 
its diverse constituencies organized? What possibilities of organization become available 
as bodies – human and nonhuman – are redistributed through global urbanization? The 
urban question as I formulate it concerns the spatial distribution of Empire and the 
multitude. It provides a problematic within which to think about politics on a planetary 
scale while maintaining concern for deep democracy. As a problematic it does not solve 
in advance all the issues it poses. Rather, it provides a perspective from which to enact 
possibilities and then to review their effects. 
 
Disaggregating Historical Processes  
 
Harvey and De Landa approach urban geography with the common aim of 
understanding the long durée social transformations shaping and shaped by cities. As a 
result of this historically extended lens both thinkers work not only in spatial terms of the 
city and urban scale but also in temporal terms represented by their notions of urban 
process. While their images diverge in important respects, for both, the urban process 
attests to the constant changes of the city – movements of populations, changes of 
regimes, urban metabolisms of commerce and transit, and the ever-changing face of the 
built environment – and to the significance of the urban scale in modulating global 
processes. For both Harvey and De Landa, the urban process interacts with more general 
historical processes that exceed the urban milieu. Through engagements with these two 
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distinct social ontologies, I pursue an expanded notion of historical process that includes 
the movements of matter and energy broadly conceived. This notion of historical process 
sees history as the movement of diverse intertwined processes. Capitalist processes form 
an important part of this historical account but encounter and interact with biological and 
ecological processes irreducible to capitalism. The complex scalar relations that come 
into focus convey the nonlinear effects of the city in global capitalism. The position of 
the city relative to larger historical processes demonstrates the ways in which small shifts 
in the urban fabric produce dramatic effects at other scales.  
For Harvey historical process acquires its meaning in the tradition of historical 
materialism. Harvey’s thinking about urban space emerges within his return to and 
revitalization of Marx’s Capital. The encounter between geography and Marxist political-
economy staged by Harvey altered the social ontology of Marxism as well as the political 
engagements of geography. To understand the workings of capital requires attention to its 
mobility, to the movement and distribution of labor, to spaces of production, and to the 
land on which labor toils and through which rent is extracted. Geographic accounting of 
the spatial dimensions of capitalism produces “historical-geographical materialism,” a 
method attentive to the spatial distributions of capital and the geographic fragmentation 
of class struggle.9 The importance of a geographic dimension for thinking about capital 
comes through most clearly in Harvey’s notion of a “spatial fix,” a geographic 
                                                 
9 Harvey suggests, “We need far better ways to understand if not resolve politically the 
underlying tension between what often degenerates into either a temporal teleology of class 
triumphalism (now largely represented by the triumphalism of the bourgeoisie declaring the 
victorious end of history) or a seemingly incoherent and uncontrollable geographical 
fragmentation of class and other forms of social struggle in every nook and cranny of the world” 
(Harvey, Spaces of Hope, 55). 
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reorganization of contradictions within capitalism designed to avert or contain crises.10 
Colonization and imperialism embody spatial fixes to which Marx was attuned.11 
Neoliberalism presents its own set of geographic maneuvers designed to suspend 
contradictions within capitalism. This includes the complex geography of inequality 
formed within and between cities. 
 The city appears as a node in Harvey’s analysis of uneven development and in his 
examination of urbanization as a process of capital growth. Harvey portrays the city as a 
dynamic space embedded in the relations of capital through the process of urbanization: 
Cities have arisen through the geographical and social concentration of a surplus 
product. Urbanization has always been, therefore, a class phenomenon of some 
sort, since surpluses have been extracted from somewhere and from somebody, 
while control over the use of the surplus typically lies in the hands of the few … 
This general situation persists under capitalism, of course, but in this case there is 
a rather different dynamic at work. Capitalism rests, as Marx tells us, upon the 
perpetual search for surplus value (profit). But to produce surplus value 
capitalists have to produce a surplus product. This means that capitalism is 
perpetually producing the surplus product that urbanization requires. The reverse 
relation also holds. Capitalism needs urbanization to absorb the surplus products 
it perpetually produces. In this way an inner connection emerges between the 
development of capitalism and urbanization.12 
 
Let’s focus on the ways in which this quotation defines the distinctions and overlaps 
between capitalist process and the process of urbanization. As Harvey formulates this 
relation, cities work as incubators for capital expansion while containing the political and 
revolutionary volatility at work in capitalist, urbanizing processes. Cities have long 
formed from concentrations of surplus products that predate capital, and so capitalist and 
                                                 
10 David Harvey, Limits to Capital (London: Verso, 1999), 415 – 417. See also Harvey, Spaces of 
Hope, 23, 54. 
11 Marx’s work on colonization, particularly through the discussion of “primitive” or “original” 
accumulation has been the subject of interesting recent scholarship on Marx as a thinker of 
political violence. See Jason Read, Micro-Politics of Capital, 19 – 25. See also chapter 3 of this 
dissertation. 
12 Harvey, Rebel Cities, 5. 
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urban processes are intertwined but do not coincide exactly. Nonetheless, Harvey 
emphasizes the contemporary function of urbanization as it pertains to the organization 
and growth of capitalist surplus. Under capitalism the “geographical and social 
concentration” induced by urbanization absorbs surplus products in order to maintain 
seemingly endless growth.  
The urban absorption of surplus capital and containment of political potential in 
surplus labor have focused on a number of different spaces and scales of construction in 
the city. The clearest example of capitalist and urban processes intersecting appears in 
Haussmann’s rebuilding of Paris. Haussmann’s urban planning is best known for the 
open spaces that enabled the suppression of mass dissent and its marginalization of 
workers and the poor.13 Harvey notes that these large construction projects also 
suppressed social unrest in another less direct fashion. The grand boulevards and public 
works designed by Haussmann required massive expenditures of labor and capital. The 
result was the stabilization of a crisis first appearing in Paris, but also unfolding across 
Europe, involving “unemployed surplus capital and surplus labor side-by-side.”14 The 
absorption of surplus labor and capital through urbanization involved imagining the city 
at a different scale: “Haussmann thought of the city on a grander scale, annexed the 
                                                 
13 As Merrifield observes, “Haussmann’s first characteristic was an immense hatred of the 
masses, of the poor, of rootless homeless populations, the wretched and ragged victims of his 
giant wrecker-ball” (Merrifield, The New Urban Question, 36). Although Haussmann’s designs 
for Paris include public works, his notion of the public rests on a privileging of the bourgeoisie 
and contempt for the poor. Hardt and Negri’s call for a politics based on the common as opposed 
to the public might be understood in this context. Whereas the public involves a mobilization of 
state power, potentially to the exclusion of workers and the poor, the common represents an 
expansive democratic energy crossing lines of class, race, gender, and sexuality. See chapter four 
this dissertation. In my discussion of Machiavelli and Bennett, I retain a notion of the public 
closer to Hardt and Negri’s “common” than Haussmann’s “public works.” See chapter one of this 
dissertation. 
14 Harvey, Rebel Cities, 7. 
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suburbs, and redesigned whole neighborhoods … rather than just bits and pieces of the 
urban fabric.”15 The city no longer represented merely the sum of its parts. Instead, 
Haussmann imagined the city as a larger object of government in which the built 
environment could be remade en masse. The result was construction on a new scale that 
could both absorb surplus capital and contain the revolutionary potential of surplus labor. 
Following Haussman’s example, future instances of urbanization would defer social 
crises at national and global scales. Robert Moses would enact similar reforms in the 
New York metropolitan area, linking the suburbs to the urban fabric through a vast 
network of highways and in the process resolving problems of surplus capital and labor.16  
An even more substantial rescaling of the urban process takes place under 
neoliberalism. Contemporary urbanization “has now become genuinely global, in part 
through the astonishing integration of financial markets that use their flexibility to debt-
finance urban projects from Dubai to São Paulo and from Madrid and Mumbai to Hong 
Kong and London.”17 The expansion of this process relies on new financial institutions to 
continue seemingly endless modes of debt-financed construction. Cities become nodes in 
a global network of surplus capital movement. Alongside debt-financed mega-projects, 
fortified enclaves produce new patterns of spatial segregation whereby high walls and 
private security guards inscribe and enforce socio-economic separations. Paradoxically, 
“the physical distances separating rich and poor have decreased at the same time that the 
mechanisms to keep them apart have become more obvious and complex.”18 Neoliberal 
                                                 
15 Harvey, Rebel Cities, 7. 
16 Harvey, Rebel Cities, 9. 
17 Harvey, Rebel Cities, 12. 
18 Teresa P.R. Caldeira, “Fortified Enclaves: The New Urban Segregation,” in Cities and 
Citizenship, ed. James Holston (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 115. Caldeira notes that 
the inward facing design of fortified enclaves contradicts the principles of Haussmann’s urban 
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urbanism both dictates the process of large-scale urbanization and produces more 
complex and diffuse practices of withdrawal from the public sphere. 
For Harvey the real stuff of history emerges from capitalist dimensions of 
urbanization. In his account urban processes largely coincide with capitalist processes 
insofar as the significant dimensions of the urban process involve its encounters with and 
resolution of capitalist contradictions. Here, historical processes primarily entail the 
endless growth of capital. Urbanization, through its absorption of surplus products, 
becomes “historical” insofar as it enters into the process of capital accumulation. 
 
Planetary Dynamics of Historical Processes 
Although Harvey directs his attention to the overlap of urbanization and 
capitalism, he leaves room at the margins for divergence. For instance, by noting that 
urbanization as a concentration of surplus products preceded capitalism, Harvey hints at 
the existence of important dynamisms within urbanization irreducible to capital. He even 
seems to pose the possibility of other historical processes. De Landa’s work accentuates 
aspects of urbanization not wholly subsumed by capitalism. This is an understanding of 
urbanization as a historical process with a partial dynamic of its own, generated by a 
broader set of forces and tied to a more complex web of social relations. He directs 
attention to worlds of production beyond not only capitalist relations but humanism more 
broadly. This involves engaging a wider array of processes – biological, evolutionary, 
climatic, capitalist, and urbanizing – periodically converging and interacting with one 
another. Broadening Harvey’s understanding of historical processes through engagements 
                                                 
design committed to grand, open spaces (Caldeira, 125). However, the spatial separation of 
classes embodied by enclaves carries with it the legacy of Haussmann’s disdain for the urban 
poor. 
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with De Landa’s nonhumanist and nonlinear approach to process may provide a richer 
image of the city and a more dynamic account of forces at work in political economy. 
De Landa expands the notion of historical processes to include “cosmological and 
evolutionary history in addition to human history.”19 Cosmological processes include 
“natural” systems – climate, ocean currents, patterns of drought, and intensified storms. 
However, none of these systems is without cultural, human imbrications. This is a notion 
of historical process that extends to nonhuman bodies and forces playing active roles in 
the constitution of society. This nonhuman nature is not set in opposition to “the human” 
or “culture;” it is often bound to the human as biological process or defined through 
ecosystems involving encounters with humans. However, De Landa moves beyond an 
understanding of cosmological processes limited to familiar designations of “the natural.” 
He sees the vast urbanization of the planet, now visible from space, as a process 
mineralization by which flows of matter and energy moving on a planetary scale have 
formed an “urban exoskeleton” no less significant than the evolutionary development of 
bone.20  
To envision society crossing familiar conceptual thresholds, De Landa’s social 
ontology engages assemblages composed of the human and the nonhuman, nature and 
culture, and “products of historical processes.”21 Within an assemblage, constituent 
components continue to exercise their own capacities while entering into a larger-scale 
                                                 
19 Manuel De Landa, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity 
(New York: Continuum, 2006), 28. 
20 De Landa, Nonlinear History, 27. Mike Davis observes, “Urban inequality in the Third World 
is visible even from space: satellite reconnaissance of Nairobi reveals that more than half of the 
population lives on just 18 percent of the city area” (Davis, 95). 
21 De Landa, New Philosophy, 2. 
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entity with capacities that exceed the sum of its parts.22 It is through the concept of 
assemblage that De Landa “bridge[s] the level of individual persons and that of the 
largest social entities (such as territorial states) through an embedding of assemblages in 
a succession of micro- and macro- scales.”23 Assemblages exhibit the qualities of the 
parts from which they are formed, their relative micro-scale, as well as constituting a new 
macro-scale with its own set of capacities.  
De Landa’s expanded field of historical processing and attendant spatiality 
complicates historical-geographical materialism as a framework of political economic 
analysis. It is an ontological approach, in part because it shows by comparison the 
implicit ontology in other approaches and also because it works to break the 
nature/culture, human/nonhuman, and cause/agent dualities often circulating in historical-
geographical materialism. Through expanded notions of history, process, and society, De 
Landa emphatically resists the reduction of historical process to capitalist process. This 
distinction becomes clear in his insistence on the complexity of economic relations. 
Although sympathetic to the projects of Marxist sociology and geography, he 
disaggregates the processes and institutions gathered together under the heading of 
“capitalism” more radically than Harvey’s approach allows: “The conceptual confusion 
                                                 
22  De Landa uses “larger-scale” to mean something different from extensive space that would 
imply a concentric understanding of scale. By “larger-scale” he denotes a scale containing a large 
quantity of energy and a higher order of complexity, as a result of more numerous components, 
than other scales: “the meaning of the expression ‘larger-scale’. Its usual meaning is geometric, as 
when … one says that a street is the longest one in a city, or that one nation-state occupies a 
larger area than another. But there is also a physical meaning of the expression that goes beyond 
geometry. In physics, for example, length, area and volume are classified as extensive properties, 
a category that also includes amount of energy and number of components. It is in this latter 
extensive sense, not the geometric one, that I use the expression ‘larger-scale’” (De Landa, New 
Philosophy, 6 – 7). 
23 De Landa, New Philosophy, 17. 
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engendered by all the different uses of the word “capitalism” (as “free enterprise” or as 
“industrial mode of production” or, more recently, as “world-economy”) is so entrenched 
that it makes an objective analysis of economic power almost impossible.”24 De Landa 
invokes the notion of antimarkets in order to transcend the conceptual baggage tied to 
“capitalism.” Borrowing this notion from Ferdinand Braudel, antimarkets capture a 
specific dimension of political economy, used “exclusively to refer to a certain segment 
of the population of commercial and industrial institutions.”25 The term antimarket should 
not be confused with the rhetoric of “naturally” equilibrating markets emerging through 
the removal of state intervention, an image invoked in popular neoliberal discourse (but 
actually a discarded fragment of liberalism). Instead, antimarkets refer to the power 
relations necessary for producing and controlling markets. By resisting any formal 
analysis of surplus value, the concept highlights the role of power in political-economic 
structures.  
De Landa complicates the forms of causation at work in the formation of society 
by further dissecting the forces within capitalism: 
Resisting the temptation to reduce complex institutional dynamics to a single 
factor (e.g., antimarket economics) is even more important when considering the 
great circuity of trigger flows that formed the basis for the Industrial Revolution. 
No doubt, antimarkets played a key role in the conjunction of trigger flows (coal, 
steam, cotton, iron, raw labor, skills) that made up the factory towns and the 
industrial conurbations. But here, too, other destratified elements, other particle 
accelerators were necessary.26 
 
His concern with this “single factor” targets a monolithic understanding of capitalism 
governed by efficient, linear causality.  He offers in its place an image of society 
                                                 
24 De Landa, Nonlinear History, 48.  
25 De Landa, Nonlinear History, 48.  
26 De Landa, Nonlinear History, 266.  
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produced at the intersection of multiple processes periodically interrupted by radical 
changes emerging from the confluence of seemingly minor forces. While I follow his 
resistance to a reductive account of political economy, the concept of capitalism might be 
recovered by referring to a historically specific mode of production, social formation, 
forms of subjectivity, commodities, and dispositions to nature. De Landa focuses too 
heavily on disaggregating capitalism and seems periodically to lose sight of the 
assemblage as more than the sum of its parts. Reference to antimarkets fails to convey the 
expansiveness of this elaborate system of interconnections and its hegemony as an 
aggregate of economic and political relations. The term capitalism names this larger 
entity. One can follow De Landa’s methodological suggestion by treating capitalism as 
an open system which interacts with other processes and systems at its porous borders. 
Here the methodological move is, as Connolly suggests, to “treat economic markets as 
merely one type of imperfect self-regulating system in a cosmos composed of 
innumerable, interacting open systems.”27 
In this focus on multiple interacting open systems, including capitalism, cities 
serve not only as sites for the deposit of surplus products, as Harvey would see it, but also 
as “veritable transformers of matter and energy.”28 Technologies of urban construction 
exert influence on socio-spatial organization. For instance, the design of miniaturized 
motors for use in elevators in conjunction with the availability of mass produced iron 
enabled the construction of skyscrapers. These intertwined processes of electrification 
and metallization exerted a centripetal effect in which growing city centers attracted 
                                                 
27 Connolly, The Fragility of Things, 25. 
28 De Landa, Nonlinear History, 76. 
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unprecedented concentrations of population, industry, and commerce.29 The availability 
of combustion engines in personal automobiles had the opposite effect, granting urban 
residents who could afford cars access to suburbs.30 Considered within their effects on 
capitalism, these technological developments produce distinct effects in cities that 
interact with the organization of production and the distribution of wealth. When 
approached from the broader perspective of movements of matter and energy, the 
dramatic changes in the built environment brought about through electrification and 
metallization represents a geological shift. The mineralization of the city – its 
appropriation of matter and energy to produce a built environment – changes 
fundamentally.  This materialist approach, a critical approach inflected by the ontological 
attunements of new materialism, captures the intersection of historical processes of 
urbanization with the development of capitalism. However, it also maintains the 
irreducibility of historical processes to the framework of political economy.  
A growing body of thought in urban sociology and geography adopts an approach 
to the crossings of nature and culture that shape cityscapes. Eric Klinenberg’s “social 
autopsy” of the 1995 Chicago heatwave “treat[s] the city as a complex social system of 
integrated institutions that touch and interpenetrate in a variety of ways.”31 The climatic 
                                                 
29 De Landa, Nonlinear History, 92. 
30 De Landa, Nonlinear History, 92. In the US the centrifugal effects of widespread automobility 
would have been more limited had it not been for two intervening factors: national nuclear 
defense strategy and racism in the form of “white flight.” Suburbs grew in size as a result of 
white populations moving out of urban centers to produce de facto segregation, the construction 
of an Interstate highway system that was heavily subsidized by the federal government, and a 
decentralization of the population supported by the military as a move toward nuclear resiliency. 
See Stephen Graham, “Cities as Strategic Sites: Place Annihilation and Urban Geopolitics,” in 
Cities, War, and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics, ed. Stephen Graham (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 2004), 42. 
31 Eric Klinenberg, Heat Wave: A Social Autopsy of Disaster in Chicago (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2002), 22. Emphasis in original. 
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event of the heatwave cannot be understood solely in its metereological dimensions, that 
is, as a purely natural event. Instead, the heatwave refers to weather phenomena. They 
impinge upon and amplify urban inequalities. This approach attends to the ways in which 
“the nature, culture, and politics of the city crystallized in Chicago in the summer of 
1995.”32 The extreme event of the heatwave brings processes of urban inequality into 
stark contrast; it “integrates and activates a broad set of social institutions and generates a 
series of social processes that expose the inner workings of the city.”33 The isolation of 
urban poor citizens, the degradation of urban hotel residences, the privatization of social 
services, and the social abandonment of neighborhoods, already deadly on a level below 
the spectrum of social visibility, acquire new degrees and scales of lethality.34 
Drawing on a similar approach, Matthew Gandy traces water flows as they move 
between the operations of capital and the material dynamism characterizing larger 
planetary processes. Water crosses domains of life moving from visible spaces of the 
landscape to invisible spaces of infrastructure. Both landscape and infrastructure find 
their conceptual origins in the “rationalizing impulse of modernity,” landscape from the 
Dutch term referencing the “drainage and regularization of land” and infrastructure as an 
emerging project of the modern state.35 For Gandy, human relations to water reflect the 
multiple understandings of modernity: 
Water, in its different relationships with urban space, touches on … the 
“modernization” of water supply, especially from the middles decades of the 
nineteenth century, to the “modern” experience of bathing, hygiene, and public 
                                                 
32 Klinenberg, 13. 
33 Klinenberg, 32. 
34 Klinenberg, 24. 
35 Matthew Gandy, The Fabric of Space: Water, Modernity, and the Urban Imagination 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014), 3. 
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health, and finally to the advent of “modernist” approaches to design, which still 
persist in aesthetic if not ideological terms.36 
 
These partially overlapping notions of the “modern,” from the technoscientific and 
biopolitical to the architectural and aesthetic, shape human interactions with water. The 
process of “modernization” allows technocratic practices of water distribution to override 
democratic decision making. It is through this “hydro-social cycle” that the materiality of 
water is folded into social life.37 
The interaction between evolutionary and planetary processes and urbanization 
appears clearly in the example of Lagos. Gandy considers the interactions between water, 
the spread of malaria, and colonialism unfolding at the urban scale. The materiality of 
water constantly enters political life in Lagos: “its presence and the disruptive effects of 
flooding; its absence and the dangers and indignities experienced in the “infrastructure-
free” parts of the city; and its role in the transmission of disease.”38 The lack of water 
infrastructure, leaving only one home in twenty connected to the municipal water supply, 
reflects an assault on urban investment imposed by structural adjustment.39 However, the 
most extensive remaking of the cityscape in relation to water came about in the 1940s 
with the draining of more than 6 square miles of swamps in an effort to contain the 
spread of malaria.40 The project, conducted by British colonial administrators, impinged 
upon several scales beyond the city. It represented an exercise in the centralization of 
colonial power: “the swamp drainage scheme systematically extended control over land 
                                                 
36 Gandy, Fabric of Space, 4. 
37 Gandy, Fabric of Space, 5. 
38 Gandy, Fabric of Space, 83 – 84.  
39 Matthew Gandy, “Learning from Lagos,” New Left Review 33 (2005): 46, 50. See also Mike 
Davis 152. 
40 Gandy, Fabric of Space, 91. 
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by the colonial state.”41 Furthermore, it began to consolidate a global network of 
scientific expertise on malariology, a technocratic response met with ambivalence by 
those concerned with complex social dynamics occluded by the vast colonial project.42 
The case of Lagos demonstrates the importance of expanding the analytical frame of 
historical processes beyond its capitalist horizon. As Gandy suggests: 
The independent agency of nature – in this case represented by the spread of 
malaria-carrying mosquitoes in response to irrigation policy – should be woven 
into the analytical frame. This is not to argue that mosquitoes are “actors” in the 
sense of an undifferentiated causal network that downplays human sentience, but 
to highlight the active role of biophysical factors in historical processes.43 
 
The interactions between water, malaria, and colonial urban planning, that is, of nature 
and culture entangled and intertwined, constitute the complex field of historical 
processes. 
Water continues to remake the urban space of Lagos with the image of rising tides 
contributing to new forms of spatial segregation built into the metropolitan region. The 
design for Eko Atlantic, a privatized city built in response to climate change, has rescaled 
the process through which inequality manifests spatially. The city will be built on an 
island of sand dredged from the Atlantic and envisioned by developers as a reclamation 
of the land lost to the last 100 years of climate change and rising sea levels. The project 
also involves the construction of a “Great Wall of Lagos,” which developers claim will 
control flooding and further erosion of the coastline. Private administration and security 
will govern and police the city. Following on the legacy of Haussmann, design concepts 
                                                 
41 Gandy, Fabric of Space, 94. “The drainage of the Lagos swamps reveals a far more tightly 
centralized and state-directed mode of government control than the forms of “indirect rule” that 
had hitherto characterized the colonial project in Nigeria” (96). 
42 Gandy, Fabric of Space, 95 – 96. 
43 Gandy, Fabric of Space, 102. My emphasis. 
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of the city display grand boulevards lined with high rises and skyscrapers, dotted with 
yacht basins and green space.44  
The fortified enclave takes on a new scale in Eko Atlantic. The walls that once 
embodied fears of social heterogeneity (often coded as concerns about crime) now return 
as barriers between different ecological worlds. The walls of the city are meant to 
encircle a space safe from flooding and chaotic climate, yet they serve as an even more 
extreme form of spatial segregation, a fortification set against the perceived disorder of 
slum construction, urban poverty, and informal urban life. The environmental journalist 
Martin Lukacs sees Eko Atlantic as a prototype for new models and practices of 
socioeconomic segregation through urban design:  
Eko Atlantic is where you can begin to see a possible future – a vision of 
privatized green enclaves for the ultra rich ringed by slums lacking water or 
electricity, in which a surplus population scramble for depleting resources and 
shelter to fend off the coming floods and storms. Protected by guards, guns, and 
an insurmountable gully – real estate prices – the rich will shield themselves 
from the rising tides of poverty and a sea that is literally rising. A world in which 
the rich and powerful exploit the global ecological crisis to widen and entrench 
already extreme inequalities and seal themselves off from its impacts – this is 
climate apartheid.45 
 
With the construction of Eko Atlantic, crisis capitalism has seized on the threat of climate 
change in order to further extend already stark inequalities and build fortresses of private 
wealth on a new scale. The plan for the privatized city threatens future urban bulldozing, 
forced evictions, and slum clearance, practices feared by nearby residents of the island 
city. Social abandonment and environmental injustice can already be felt. Rising sea 
levels have been reported by nearby communities, causing their own form of 
                                                 
44 Eko Atlantic, “Image Gallery,” http://www.ekoatlantic.com/media/image-gallery.  
45 Martin Lukacs, The Guardian, “New, Privatized African City Heralds Climate Apartheid,” 
January 21, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/true-north/2014/jan/21/new-
privatized-african-city-heralds-climate-apartheid. 
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environmentally induced displacement.46 Furthermore, Eko Atlantic has displaced more 
equitable alternatives that embody what Rob Nixon calls an “environmentalism of the 
poor.” 47 For instance, low-cost floating structures adaptable to rising sea levels have 
proven effective in the nearby Makoko slum.48 This alternative remains free of the anti-
social dimensions of private enclosure and, as a result, more amendable to democratic, 
egalitarian organizations of space. 
Inequalities built directly into cityscapes are not limited to Eko Atlantic. Climate 
change adaptation serves as a new terrain for confrontations between mobilization for 
economic justice and exercises of power through economic segregation.49 Eko Atlantic 
and the debate over climate adaptation demonstrate the convergence of planetary 
processes and capitalist spatial segregation. As these two processes intersect, the notion 
of historical processes should be expanded to include what Gandy refers to as the 
“explicit recognition of the mix of biophysical and cultural influences that shape urban 
space.”50 With this recognition will come a new politics of environmental justice in 
which democratic action at a number of scales partially shapes, but never fully masters, 
                                                 
46 The discussion of Eko Atlantic remains limited primarily to journalistic sources. For the issues 
referenced here see Stan Okenwa, Daily Champion, “Nigeria: Fear Grips Eko City as Lekki 
Residents Experience Sea Rise,” http://allafrica.com/stories/201202100540.html. Jude Njoku, 
Vanguard, “Nigeria: Raging Controversy Over City in Atlantic Ocean,” 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201201250520.html.  
47 Nixon sees the “environmentalism of the poor” as a response to “conjoined ecological and 
human disposability” (Nixon, 4). By blending together ecological and postcolonial critique, the 
writing of Ken Saro-Wiwa serves an important, if not formative, role in Nixon’s thinking about 
the environmentalism of the poor. Eko Atlantic demonstrates the resurgence of powerful financial 
forces and elites behind Saro-Wiwa’s execution. Funding for Eko Atlantic comes from a 
subsidiary of the Chagoury Group. Gilbert Chagoury, one of the two men behind the Chagoury 
group, was also an advisor to the military dictator Sani Abacha who executed Saro-Wiwa. On the 
Chagoury connections to Eko Atlantic see Lukacs.  
48 Lukacs. 
49 Margaux J. Hall and David C. Weiss, “Avoiding Adaptation Apartheid: Climate Change 
Adaptation and Human Rights Law,” The Yale Journal of International Law Vol. 37 (2012): 314. 
50 Gandy, Fabric of Space, 208. 
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the complexity of historical processes. Rather than the technocratic management of 
climate change, this involves envisioning new social relations – just ways of planning, 
building, and dwelling in cities – that consider adaptations and responses to climate 
change as an integral part of that social vision. The question of scale will prove 
indispensable: 
The shift away from technocratic politics is also reflected in attempts to rethink 
the flow of water though urban space at different spatial scales, ranging from 
individual households, with the differentiation and reuse of water, to more 
complex community negotiations over wastewater treatment technologies, 
floodplain restoration, and even urban agriculture.51  
 
Considering the ways in which the materiality of water enters political life at several 
scales exerts a democratizing effect on the hegemonic, technocratic forms of 
management. A multiscalar social ontology facilitates democratic decision making at 
each scale of society: the household, community, and region. Scalar entanglements allow 
grassroots democratic actions to enter into and reshape larger social assemblages. 
 
Bodies in the Informal City 
 
Historical processes involve organizations of the bodies of humans, nonhumans, and 
things. Capitalism and urbanization, understood as distinct but overlapping historical 
processes, exert forces on bodies that reinforce, amplify, contest, or each process. 
Understanding the contours of these processes requires a closer examination of the 
agentic powers of the bodies upon which they work. Harvey’s ontology of bodies sets out 
from an engagement with Marx. Marx’s approach to embodiment provides for Harvey 
“something to build upon rather than to negate … The human body is a battleground 
                                                 
51 Gandy, Fabric of Space, 16 – 17. 
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within which and around which conflicting socio-ecological forces of valuation and 
representation are perpetually at play.”52 Harvey turns to Marx for a dynamics of 
embodiment that brings into focus both the extraction of value from laboring bodies and 
the transformative power of workers bodies to resist. I trace the way that this 
understanding of the body as labor power enables important lines of critique while 
nonetheless requiring modification and expansion to elucidate urban geopolitics. 
By building on the work of Marx, Harvey offers a materialist understanding of 
bodies: “The particularity of the body cannot be understood independently of its 
embeddedness in socio-ecological processes … [T]he body … cannot be understood 
outside of the forces that swirl around it and construct it.”53 The notion of a body defined 
in relation to material social forces draws lessons from the social constructionist or 
cultural turn influenced by deconstruction and poststructuralism. But it also pushes back 
against the perceived limits of this moment in political and social theory. Harvey finds 
important emancipatory potential in work on gender, sexuality, and race within social 
constructionist thought. By locating these axes of power in material social processes, he 
directly connects questions of gender, sexuality, and race to the functioning of 
capitalism.54 This approach begins to move in the direction of what Diana Coole and 
Samantha Frost refer to as “critical materialism,” which “after the cultural turn 
                                                 
52 Harvey, Spaces of Hope, 116. 
53 Harvey, Spaces of Hope, 16. 
54 “Class, racial, gender, and all manner of other distinctions are marked upon the human body by 
virtue of the different socio-ecological processes that do their work upon that body” (Harvey, 
Spaces of Hope, 99). For Harvey, attending to the intersection of material forces working on the 
body provides critical leverage for thinking about organizing bodies in resistance.  I am not as 
convinced that social constructionist thought bracketed questions of collective resistance, but I 
see Harvey engaged in a politically energizing mode of theorization that makes practices of 
political intervention more explicit. 
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foregrounds an appreciation for just what it means to exist as a material individual with 
biological needs for survival yet inhabiting a world of natural and artificial objects, well-
honed micropowers of governmentality, and the more anonymous but no less compelling 
effects of international economic structures.”55 Harvey’s work sets us on our way to 
thinking about conditions of embodiment formed within but not entirely determined by 
economic structures. 
The task of tracing the body in relation to larger social structures, be they 
capitalist, colonial, imperial, patriarchal, or heteronormative, leads Harvey to reconsider 
the concept of globalization. The term has taken on a number of different usages of which 
he remains wary. Neoliberal vocabularies equate it with the deregulation of capital flows, 
disciplining of labor, and selective fiscal austerity.56 More recently “globalization” has 
served as a term that many on the left allowed “to displace the far more politically 
charged concepts of imperialism and neocolonialism.”57 In these instances, the study of 
globalization described the diffuse economic, social, political, and cultural relations at 
work in the production and reproduction of an uneven, unequal world. At times, however, 
this work falls short of describing how these diffuse processes form larger assemblages of 
power and how these assemblages foster longer historical legacies of exploitation and 
domination. 
These cautionary notes lead Harvey to consider globalization as a diverse set of 
processes working at a macro scale and changing in relation to bodies: “boiled down to 
its simplest determinations, globalization is about the socio-spatial relations between 
                                                 
55 Diana Coole and Samantha Frost “Introducing the New Materialism” in New Materialisms: 
Ontology, Agency, and Politics, ed. Coole and Frost (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 28. 
56 Harvey, Spaces of Hope, 13. 
57 Harvey, Spaces of Hope, 13. 
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billions of individuals.”58 The politics of contemporary globalization involves identifying 
and transforming the effects of historical processes that organize bodies at the scale of the 
entire planet. His aim is to connect the scalar vocabularies of the body and globalization 
to notions that have otherwise worked in different corners of social thought separated by 
disciplinary boundaries and geographic imaginaries. The task is to think through the 
relations between scales: “These two discursive regimes – globalization and the body – 
operate at opposite ends of the spectrum in the scalar we might use to understand social 
and political life. But little or no systematic attempt has been made to integrate ‘body 
talk’ with ‘globalization talk.’”59 Tracking the relays between body and globe, Harvey 
acknowledges multiple dimensions through which bodies are differentiated under 
globalization, but he chooses to focus on political-economic order.60 The primacy of the 
economic domain in his approach to globalization might seem to reduce globalization to 
its economic dimensions. However, I read Harvey’s selective emphasis as a strategic 
move in that, rather than naturalizing the global economic order, highlights its unequal 
power relations and potential sites of transformation.  
Examining the somatic dimensions of economic globalization leads Harvey to 
focus on the body as it enters the labor process and is translated to the global scale.61 In 
                                                 
58 Harvey, Spaces of Hope, 16 
59 Harvey, Spaces of Hope, 15. 
60 Evidence of Harvey’s willingness to acknowledge globalization beyond the economic sphere 
dots his work. For example, “the globe never has been a level playing field upon which capital 
accumulation could play out its destiny. It was and continues to be an intensely variegated 
surface, ecologically, politically, socially, and culturally differentiated” (Spaces of Hope 33). 
Also, “Class, racial, gender, and all manner of other distinctions are marked upon the human 
body by virtue of the different socio-ecological processes that do their work upon that body” 
(Harvey, Spaces of Hope, 99). 
61 Harvey, Spaces of Hope, 16. 
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his account, the body is primarily that of “the worker” and its capacities are those of labor 
power:  
the worker exchanges the use value of labor for the use value of the commodities 
that can be bought for the money wage. Exchanges of this sort are usually highly 
localized and place-specific. The worker must take his or her body to work each 
day … But labor power is inserted as a commodity into a Money-Commodity-
Money circulation process which easily escapes the spatiotemporal restraints of 
local labor markets and which makes for capital accumulation on a world stage.62  
 
Capital accumulation relies on the labor power of bodies transfigured into commodities in 
order to move beyond the domain of local labor markets. This connection between the 
local, place-specific effects of bodies and global processes of accumulation serves as the 
starting point for Harvey’s vision of labor organized at multiple geographic scales to 
regulate capital at each scalar domain.  
Although focused on the body as it enters the labor process, Harvey also 
pluralizes the identity of the anti-capitalist left. One must commend his willingness to 
offer an expanded notion of class beyond the subjectivity of the factory worker.63 In 
particular, Harvey resists the opposition between class struggle and rights-based politics. 
This division, and its privileging of a vanguard of industrial workers, leads to the 
presumptive dismissal of urban movements: 
If urban social movements are considered at all, they are typically construed as 
either mere offshoots or displacements of these more fundamental struggles. 
Within the Marxist tradition … urban struggles tend to be either ignored or 
dismissed as devoid of revolutionary potential or significance. Such struggles are 
construed as being about issues of reproduction rather than production, or about 
rights, sovereignty, and citizenship, and therefore not about class.64 
 
                                                 
62 Harvey, Spaces of Hope, 109. 
63 Harvey, Rebel Cities, 128. 
64 Harvey, Rebel Cities, 120. 
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Harvey sees no reason to draw such strong lines between movements. To do so would 
neglect the long history of “urban-based class struggles” and the strength of their 
connection to place.65 Furthermore, the denigration of urban movements ignores the 
forms of exploitation occurring through the urban fabric, those “economies of 
dispossession and of predatory practices … with respect to housing markets.”66 The more 
important question for Harvey is how to relay social movements beyond the territorial 
limits of the city and into other scales of political action and mobilization. The nature of 
contemporary urban political economy weakens distinctions between class struggle and 
rights claims; it reveals overlaps and relays between political actions separated into these 
categories.67 
 Processes other than capital accumulation, that is to say “metabolic, ecological, 
political, social, and psychological – that play key roles in relation to bodily practices and 
possibilities,” call for philosophical resources beyond the scope of historical-geographical 
materialism.68 In particular, biopolitical regimes for regulating laboring bodies also 
involve the meticulous study of biological processes, interfaces between bodies and 
technology, and the position of the body in planetary, that is to say ecological and 
climatic, systems. De Landa, while never quite characterizing his work as a study of 
                                                 
65 Harvey, Rebel Cities, 115 – 116. Urban-based class struggles include, but are not limited to 
“Paris from 1789 through 1830 and 1848 to the Commune of 1871, … the Petrograd Soviet, the 
Shanghai Communes of 1927 and 1967, the Seattle General Strike of 1919 , the role of Barcelona 
in the Spanish Civil War, the uprising in Córdoba in 1969, and the more general urban uprisings 
in the United States in the 1960s, the urban-based movements of 1968 (Paris, Chicago, Mexico 
City, Bangkok, and others including the so-called “Prague Spring,” and the rise of neighborhood 
associations in Madrid that fronted the anti-Franco movement in Spain around the same time” 
(Harvey, Rebel Cities, 115). 
66 Harvey, Rebel Cities, 129. 
67 Harvey, Rebel Cities, 128 – 129. 
68 Harvey, Spaces of Hope, 116. 
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biopolitics, locates bodies within the matrix of forces coming from historical processes 
beyond the workings of capitalism. 
By examining bodies in relation to flows of matter and energy De Landa evokes 
biological and ecological processes which intersect, make possible, and periodically 
disrupt the workings of political economy. De Landa’s study of bodies traces the history 
of biological processes intersecting with urban life. For De Landa, “[o]ur organic bodies 
are, in this sense, nothing but temporary coagulations in these flows: we capture in our 
bodies a certain portion of the flow at birth, then release it again when we die and micro-
organisms transform us into a new batch of raw materials.”69 This approach might be 
called biopolitics, albeit in a different sense of the term than deployed by Foucault. 
Whereas Foucault writes a genealogy of how life comes to be defined through its 
treatment as an object of government, De Landa provides a historical sociology of how 
biological processes, already understood as life, infuse, trouble, and impinge upon 
politics. De Landa’s conception of causality and political agency, focused on bodies as 
flows and coagulations differs greatly from Harvey’s at times mechanistic scale jumping 
between the body and the globe. By following the neglected political effects of biological 
systems, De Landa provides an account of urban governmentality formed through the 
scalar relations of bodies and planetary systems. I seek to infuse this account with 
Harvey’s conviction and sense of urgency, thereby bringing De Landa’s sociological 
vision into a politically engaged register. 
 While early urban sociology considers the ecology of the city in metaphorical 
terms, De Landa finds an actual ecosystem in the transformations of matter and energy in 
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cities. For instance, he construes the food chain, the movement of biomass by which 
energy transfers from plants to herbivores and then onto carnivores, as a process altered 
by the agricultural practice focused on feeding urban centers.70 At the same time 
medieval towns and cities consumed forests turning land and resources into urban space.  
An ecological approach to urban political economy involves, in part, exploring its 
dependence upon and interaction with other ecosystems. Noteworthy influences come in 
the form of microscopic and massive ecosystems that play an extensive role in 
organization of urban life and commerce: “Both infectious diseases and changing weather 
patterns played a great role in urban history, making epidemics and famines part of the 
“biological regime” that dominated urban and rural life until the eighteenth century.”71 
Evidence of the importance of interactions between micro-organisms and human bodies 
can be found in Foucault’s genealogy of urban form that traces shifts from the spatial 
relations of the plague stricken town to the punitive and carceral city plans.72 Climate 
plays an equally important role in the late middle ages and early modern period by 
influencing the amount and type of agricultural outputs. The “biological regime” formed 
through human experiences of climate and encounters with micro-organisms is not a 
nested scalar hierarchy in which political subjects move through influences emanating 
from concentric scales. Instead, it exhibits what Morton calls “scalar discrepancies” in 
which pressures emanating from different scales of being, in this case microorganisms 
and planetary climate systems, help to shape human life and the urban dimensions of life 
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72 For a comparison of the punitive city and the carceral city see Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 
129 – 130. See also chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
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in particular.73 For instance, cities act as “‘heat islands,’ separated from their countrysides 
by a sharp difference in temperature.”74  
Such scalar discrepancies come into focus through the nonlinear dynamics of 
contagious disease. In particular, De Landa identifies the intersection of microorganisms, 
rat populations, and urban centralization that brought about the Black Death in Europe. 
The expansive spread of the plague in the fourteenth century depended upon three 
intersecting factors: the presence of rats with fleas likely to carry the microorganism, the 
presence of the plague in underground rodent colonies, and the connection of shipping 
routes between European cities.75 Each of these factors provided a necessary condition 
for the epidemic that would emerge. However, no single factor served as the sufficient 
condition. The virulence of the plague meant that without a large population of 
microorganisms, a large population of rats capable of carrying the disease, and 
consolidated pathways of urban interconnection, any outbreak would be brief. The Black 
Death emerged from a series of amplifications between bodies and biological processes – 
of Pasteurella pestis, a particular species of rats, and well-traveled shipping lanes – 
across different scales. The spatial practices of strict separation and partition, 
characterizing the plague-stricken town identified by Foucault in Discipline and Punish, 
embody a scalar discrepancy of microorganisms reflected in urban form.76 Human 
                                                 
73 Morton, Hyperobjects, 34. See also chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
74 De Landa, Nonlinear History, 107. 
75 De Landa, Nonlinear History, 124. Much of De Landa’s account of the Black Death comes 
from William H. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples (Garden City, NJ: Anchor/Double Day, 1976), 
146. 
76 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 197. See also chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
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encounters with rats and microorganisms ushered in the diagram of the plague town, a 
new sociospatial formation.77 
While the diagram of the plague town represents one set of spatial practices 
connected to the control of disease, contemporary pest control campaigns operate on 
different understandings of spatiality in urban life. The movements of rats and other 
pests, says Dawn Biehler, defy modernist visions of space reliant upon clear 
public/private, nature/culture, and human/animal distinctions. For Biehler, pest control 
campaigns either target individual households, “making pest control a private 
responsibility despite broad-scale factors that sustained infestation” or they “launched 
top-down projects … ignoring the small-scale dynamics.”78 This insistence upon a 
simplified image of urban space downplays the complexity of urban ecology and its 
scalar relations. But as pest control campaigns attempted to maintain these divisions, 
“rats [nonetheless] scurried across property lines and breached crumbling foundations.”79 
Pests disclose the permeabilities, proximities, and encounters that define urban life. The 
movements of rats required an ecological approach in which controlling pests would also 
confront racial injustice reflected in residential segregation, poverty, urban politics, and 
federal housing policy.80 
Insisting upon strict public/private divisions, pest control campaigns sought to 
define the presence of rats, flies, bedbugs, and cockroaches as a natural phenomenon 
                                                 
77 In a fashion similar to architecture, political theory engages in the construction of what Deleuze 
would call maps and diagrams. For Deleuze, this term refers to a blueprint never directly or 
exactly transposed onto society. See Deleuze Foucault 22. I focus on his example of panopticism 
as a map/diagram in chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
78 Dawn Day Biehler, Pests in the City: Flies, Bedbugs, Cockroaches, and Rats (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2013), 7. 
79 Biehler, 7. 
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devoid of political significance: “By narrowing their conception of infestation to either a 
public or private issue, reformers depoliticized urban ecology and sometimes even tried 
to isolate it from its community context.”81 In place of this depoliticized view of pests, 
Biehler writes a history of the city in which pests provide a cipher for examining the 
geography of urban inequality. She reveals patterns of environmental injustice by 
tracking ways in which landlords neglect properties based on lines of residential 
segregation: “Insiders in infested communities saw rats as fleshy manifestations of the 
ecology of injustice.”82  Furthermore, Biehler sees how an urban history of pests reveals 
insight into “the position of homes in public life.”83 First, the gendering of domestic 
space often defined pest control as the work of wives and mothers thus adding to the 
unacknowledged labor of women.  Secondly, households negotiated their relationships to 
the public sphere in different ways. Some sought to hide potentially stigmatizing pest 
infestations from the eyes of the state while others sought public protection from 
neglectful landlords.84 In either case “the biological ecology of rats could not be 
separated from the political ecology of the city.”85 
In each instance, rats and other pests enter into the formation of political life in 
ways not yet fully appreciated by De Landa. Whereas De Landa notes the importance of 
                                                 
81 Biehler, 8. I am wary of the language “pests” and “infestation,” but Biehler mobilizes these 
terms in direct opposition to their stigmatizing and racialized invocations. Her project questions 
the techno-scientific approach to pest extermination pointing to the modernist vision 
underpinning this approach (and its failures). She seems particularly skeptical of what she calls 
“the exertion of human agency to manage urban nature and domestic space” (127). Furthermore, 
she sees pests as part of an ecology that defines urban life. While this ecology is the web through 
which environmental injustice and threats to health come into being, it also seems to embody 
democratic and egalitarian qualities of interconnection.   
82 Biehler, 150. 
83 Biehler, 8. 
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biological processes and planetary processes in the history of urban transformation, I 
wish to suggest that these processes intersect with, impinge upon, and inflect social 
inequality, citizen activism, state action, and global political economy. The “biological 
regime” of which De Landa speaks, helps to structure the organization of bodies. As the 
relationship with micro-organisms, pests, and climate changed over time, the political 
organization of cities transformed from rigid, sovereign forms to more flexibly organized 
political-economic spaces. The scalar discrepancies between humans, micro-organisms, 
and climate have become even more radical and asymmetric as more extreme forms of 
precarity emerge through late capitalism.  
De Landa’s political attunement seems more refined in his discussion of 
colonialism. In his biopolitical frame, European colonialism represents not only pervasive 
brutality and exploitation but attempts to reorganize life across the face of the planet. De 
Landa describes this as a twofold process in which, from the standpoint of biological 
history, Europe was “digesting the world, transforming it into a supply zone for the 
provision of energy and raw materials, a process that … involved a great ecological and 
cultural homogenization. On the other hand, European nation-states began digesting their 
minorities, in the sense that the new disciplinary institutions embodied homogenizing 
criteria of normality to which everyone was now made to conform.”86 Viewed from the 
global scale through a lens focused on the movements of matter and energy, one sees 
twin processes of European colonization abroad and imperial centralization within 
Europe. Europe rescaled internal territorial governance through disciplinary institutions 
and practices that gathered together human and nonhuman bodies under new spatial 
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arrangements. But at the same time, these colonizing and absorption processes promoted 
a precarity of capitalist civilization in general hardly noticed by most participants. 
The process of European colonialism included the absorption and digestion of 
colonized languages. In particular, English-speaking colonizers “entered into a number of 
different contact situations through which linguistic items from foreign tongues 
penetrated English.”87 Although contact situations altered English, these modifications 
tended to be temporary. The linguistic items of colonized peoples adopted by English-
speakers rarely became permanent parts of the language; only a handful would make their 
way into regular use.88 This process of linguistic subjugation (backed by colonial 
violence) played a role in the rise to prominence of English in global commerce, a field 
shaped in many ways by colonialism.89 
The regulation of bodies under discipline contributed to a process of “digestion” 
at work over a long time scale in Europe. De Landa draws upon Foucault’s study of 
discipline to explicate the regime of surveillance and spatial partitioning that migrates 
from towns to institutions in the eighteenth century. His materialist approach expands 
upon Foucault’s account in important ways, however. First, by treating discipline as a 
historical process, De Landa views it as “a mixture of materials that had been 
accumulating for centuries.”90 Understanding discipline as a set of material practices 
                                                 
87 De Landa, Nonlinear History, 241. 
88 De Landa, Nonlinear History, 241. 
89 De Landa, Nonlinear History, 242. The acceleration of communications through the telegraph 
and steam powered transportation and the large-circulation newspaper play important roles in 
English consolidating into a single language, or as De Landa prefers, a single “norm pool” (De 
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refutes the common reception among Marxists in which discipline is treated as a 
“discursive regime” closely akin to ideology.91 Discipline has material effects that shape 
the contemporary form of capitalism and the world beyond political economy. In addition 
to focusing a reading of Foucault on the materiality of discipline, De Landa notes how 
discipline reaches beyond the regulation of human life. Disciplinary measures cataloged 
and organized both human and nonhuman bodies: “the new disciplinary institutions 
processed more than human bodies: animals and plants, too, fell under a net of writing 
and observation.”92 Institutions for regulating the lives of nonhuman animals and plants 
included standardizing breed pedigrees for animals and agricultural practices that would 
only later come to be understood as controls over plant genetics. 
In his analysis of the expansion of disciplinary power, De Landa attends to 
“microfeatures of bodily actions.”93 Discipline seeks outcomes at the level of the body, 
understood as the individual, but it intervenes through tactics that target dispositions and 
parts of the body: “The new goal was to study bodies and break down their actions into 
basic traits, and then to empty them of their know-how and reprogram them with fixed 
routines.”94 Elsewhere, De Landa refers to this scale of political intervention as 
“subpersonal components,” which function at a scale distinct from the individual body or 
person: “persons are not the smallest analytical unit that social science can study … 
persons emerge from the interaction of subpersonal components, and … some of these 
components may justifiably be called the smallest social entities.”95 Contrary to Harvey’s 
                                                 
91 Harvey is a noteworthy example of those who see discipline as a “discursive regime” (Harvey, 
Spaces of Hope, 15). 
92 De Landa, Nonlinear History, 162. 
93 De Landa, Nonlinear History, 161. 
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suggestion that “‘the body’ is surely the most micro from the standpoint of understanding 
the workings of society,” 96 De Landa finds a whole world of power and social relations 
that work in and on bodies as “microfeatures” and “subpersonal components.”  
It is in the informal dimensions of urban life where microfeatures, those processes 
and relations below the level of the body-as-organic-whole, take on their greatest 
significance. These microfeatures and subpersonal components filter into formal urban 
decision-making apparatuses and compose much of the informal city. The informal refers 
to a number of different conditions of urban life, naming markets existing outside of 
municipal and/or state authorization, residency with precarious tenureship, and civil 
society broadly conceived. AbdouMaliq Simone explores the dimensions of the informal 
as it extends beyond the economic interactions of formally recognized markets. The 
informal involves a “heterogeneity of social collaborations.”97 These social relations are 
diverse and amorphous yet they still have real effects on the urban fabric. Simone 
characterizes their form in a variety of ways: They are “affective bonds,” “diffuse forms 
of social mobilization and coordination,” a “hodgepodge,” “faint signals,” “flashes of 
important creativity,” “small eruptions in the social fabric,” and “micropolitics of 
alignment, interdependency, and exuberance.”98 They exhibit a “throbbing” vibrant 
energy while remaining “highly tenuous and frequently clandestine.”99 Their seemingly 
abstract qualities nonetheless produce substantial political effects, which are “diffuse but 
no less concrete” marking “small but important platforms from which to access new 
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views.”100 Informality represents a field of relations difficult to isolate and identify as 
discrete units. These relations are not a defining or determinative part of political life on 
their own but exert undeniable, even profound, cumulative effects. 
This vast field of relations contains political possibilities not immediately evident 
within extant political vocabularies and approaches. The informal sector has produced 
substantial changes in its formal counterpart. It has absorbed over half the workforce in 
many African cities.101 In Latin America “a third of all city dwellers live in informal 
conditions.”102 This transformation becomes even more significant when considering 
construction of the urban fabric: “squatters and favelados build more square miles of city 
than governments, developers, architects, or anyone else.”103   
These shifts necessitate reframing the spatial concepts of historical-geographical 
materialism. The factory, as a privileged space of collective organizing and action, proves 
inadequate to describe networks of subcontracted labor engaged in factory production but 
tied together outside regulatory frameworks.104 “Macrolevel” governance and 
development projects succeed or fail insofar as they consider the milieu of informal 
relations in which they intervene: “Macrolevel interventions … interact with these local 
dynamics to set up a shifting and often precarious terrain of constraints and possibilities 
that local actors must carefully navigate.”105 Territorial governance of urban districts 
interacts with, complicates, and in some ways subverts informal relations. One should 
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take caution before proscribing or insisting upon centralization or action at a “larger” 
scale without assessing the implications for the vast field of informal relations.  
The importance of informality largely eludes the current reach of historical-
geographical materialism. While Harvey acknowledges the significance of the global 
expansion of slums, his thinking on embodiment makes little room for subtle shifts in 
power that emanate from the informal sector. In his consideration of the body as a site of 
politics, he focuses on struggles for a living wage.106 Harvey’s accounts of living wage 
campaigns demonstrate one important dimension of bodily capacities – the laboring body 
as it enters into economic accords and acquires the power of negotiation in its ability to 
withhold work. This political capacity represents one among many, some of which do not 
depend on the body’s position within formal economic structures. Undoubtedly a 
commendable cause, the emphasis on urban struggles around a living wage nonetheless 
treats those already within wage labor as the prime locus of social and political change.  
Other allies of the urban poor within historical-geographical materialism have 
similarly downplayed political possibilities within the informal sector. In particular, Mike 
Davis, while providing an extensive chronicle of the social abandonment and state 
repression that rapidly expands urban informality, views the political position of the 
informal sector within the terms of its class location, that is, as “semi-proletarianization” 
or “passive proletarianization.”107 For Davis, exclusion from the formal sector entails 
near total depoliticization. As he envisions informality, the position outside the economy 
                                                 
106 Harvey, Spaces of Hope, 117 – 130. Harvey’s emphasis comes through in declarations such as 
the following: “From the standpoint of the laborer, embedded as a political person within the 
circulation of capital, politics is rooted in the positionalities that he or she assumes and the 
potentialities that attach thereto” (Harvey, Spaces of Hope, 120). Here, the horizon of political 
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of wage labor strips one of all political leverage. The rapid expansion of the informal 
sector carries with it forms of violence and exploitation, but it also continues to carry its 
own subtle set of political possibilities. Focusing on the body as it labors within formal 
economies, and to thereby treat the informal sector as the repository for wholly 
depoliticized non-subjects, neglects what Simone refers to as the “enormous creative 
energies” within the informal arena.108  
To state the theoretical issue explicitly, historical-geographical materialism 
neglects the microfeatures of the body and the subpersonal components in circulation 
through informalities. Infusing historical-geographical materialism with De Landa’s 
attention to the agentic power of seemingly minute processes would sharpen its 
understanding of politics at the scale of the body. Work on informal urbanism has drawn 
on De Landa’s social ontology to theorize the interactions of the formal and informal 
sector as a “complex adaptive assemblage” with nonlinear and multiscalar relations.109 
Rather than viewing the formal and informal as opposed domains separated by the line of 
the law, formal and informal practices constitute the urban fabric so seamlessly that they 
might never be fully disentangled. Informal settlements, while seemingly small-scale, 
exert scalar discrepancies at work in shaping the contours of global society.  
In this reframing of global urban life, De Landa provides a social ontology with 
more conceptual space for thinking through the politics of informality in the city, yet he 
includes almost no mention of the informal sector as it forms through socio-economic 
exclusions. Harvey, on the other hand, offers an ontology of bodies that deemphasizes the 
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political energies contained within informal life in the city. However, he foregrounds the 
urban poor in his ethical and political concerns, even if they remain for him only a 
nascent political force.  
 
Scale and Politics 
So far I have focused primarily on the complementary dimensions of social 
ontologies advanced by new materialism and historical-geographical materialism. I wish 
to turn more explicitly to the political and ethical prescriptions of each approach to the 
urban question, the strategies for mobilizing urban citizens in relation to politics at other 
scales. The city holds a privileged space in imagining alternative political orders. Such 
efforts to reimagine political life often rely on an idealized small-scale city resembling 
the ancient Greek polis and limited in population, geography, and territory. The spatial 
restrictions imposed on this urban body allow utopian visions of political life to bracket 
the complex sociospatial scales within and across cities.110 
My project has also advanced the importance of the city for political theory, but it 
does so in order to emphasize social complexity. Rather than conceal the constantly 
changing, sometimes turbulent conditions of politics in an imagined space of territorial 
boundaries, a neatly ordered citizenry, and clean divisions between public and private, I 
take the city, shaped by global forces and periodically remade through new interactions 
between formal and informal, to be instructive about political life in general. The aim 
here is to cast off the pathologizing treatment of actually existing urban life and 
acknowledge the political possibilities existing within the contemporary urban form. 
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The urban question proves indispensable in theorizing the political geography of 
globalization. The challenge of mobilizing political action calls for new modes of 
perception and sensation attuned to connections across global space. Jerry Brotton 
identifies the need for new modes of perception to emerge from gaps between the 
geographic representation of the terrestrial globe and the power dynamics of 
globalization.111 The terrestrial globe, now an iconic image of an overarching late modern 
globalization, traces its origins to late fifteenth century Europe where it rose to 
prominence through its use as a geographic device in territorial disputes between the 
Portuguese and Castilian empires.112 This geographic device has become outdated by 
changes in the structures of political spatiality. For Brotton “the terrestrial globe can no 
longer represent the invisible flow of information technology across its surface.”113 
Information now moves invisibly across the surface of the globe through pathways that 
depend little on terrestrial space. The political world unfolding in and through 
information flows and telecommunications exists as a world apart from the globe; as 
Brotton suggests it “becomes extra-terrestrial.”114  
In addition to the effects of telecommunications technology, one must consider 
the ways in which climate systems, ocean currents, intensified storms, and the threat of 
droughts render the terrestrial globe inadequate. That is to say, planetary processes 
formative of political life fall outside the perceptive habits of the terrestrial globe. 
Furthermore, urban interconnections across the planet in the form of political solidarities, 
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financial flows, infrastructure networks, flight paths, shipping routes, and migration 
patterns produce experiences of globalization not captured by the cold, abstract image of 
a terrestrial globe. New methods of geographic perception attuned to the intensive and 
extensive qualities of power and resistance require new ways of seeing and new material 
and spatial sensitivities. 
Cultivating attunements to the material and spatial dimensions of politics as they 
emerge at multiple scales requires the political theorist to work as a sort of architect. 115 
By suggesting the political theorist think and work as an architect, my aim is not to 
develop an approach to political theory built from the ground up on unshakeable 
foundations. Furthermore, I do not wish to invoke the notion of a grand architect wielding 
control over every outcome. Nor do I wish the political theorist to work as a foot-soldier 
of privatization pursuing a vision of political life that advances hyper-individualistic 
gated communities and neoliberal gentrification and development. Instead, I seek to 
inflect political theory with the material and spatial sensibilities of politicized approaches 
to architecture, specifically Harvey’s insurgent architecture and Eyal Weizman’s forensic 
architecture. The aim is to pursue theory as a practice that works in the middle of 
entangled spaces that both enable and constrain new possibilities. Political theory, in 
ways similar to architecture, engages in construction as it expands upon old concepts, 
practices, and modes of organization or periodically creates them anew. The confluence 
of forces and processes at multiple scales determines the viability of these constructs.  
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Harvey suggests we approach egalitarian politics through the eyes of an 
“insurgent architect” committed to disrupting social relations and rebuilding more 
equitable configurations: “As crafty architects bent on insurgency we have to think 
strategically and tactically about what to change and where, about how to change what 
and with what tools.”116 Insurgent architects consider how their constructs responds to 
surroundings. They never work on a blank slate but, instead, intervene in a preexisting 
social field of elaborate interconnection. This should put them on guard against 
displacements and dispossessions that might result from their work. Ideally, they design 
against displacement. The political theorist as insurgent architect envisions political 
organization and mobilization occurring within a particular spatiotemporal domain. They 
map possibilities of connection between existing political energies and suggest practices 
for activating latent potentials. 
The figure of the insurgent architect is particularly instructive to political theory 
in its attention to spatial scale. As Harvey observes, “real political change arises out of 
simultaneous and loosely coordinated shifts in both thinking and action across several 
political scales.”117 For Harvey, this involves thinking, movements, and actions at the 
scale of the body, the city, and the (global) social order with an eye to the ways in which 
these scales prove mutually interdependent. Productive efforts at collective politics 
involve tactical interventions at one or more of these scales. The urban question for 
Harvey involves understanding relationships between the city and other scales of politics 
in order to help harness the unique political energies of the urban scale. 
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Harvey frames the question animating his inquiry as one concerning the 
possibilities of the city as a space for political organizing: “To what degree should anti-
capitalist struggles explicitly focus and organize on the broad terrain of the city and the 
urban?”118 A rich history of urban struggle figures prominently within the larger history 
of anti-capitalist and revolutionary action.119 Harvey’s attention never strays far from the 
urban question, and yet, his concern might better be described as attached to scalar 
hierarchies, the privileging of certain scales over others in political analysis and action. 
His focus on the city as a scale of territorial governance comes from a dissatisfaction with 
the history of state action.120  
In addition to a skepticism directed at state-centric approaches, Harvey is equally 
dissatisfied with scalar reorganization on the left in the wake of national revolutions and 
reforms. The tepid results of social-democratic reforms and the dismal conditions 
resulting from communism and socialism at the national level has produced a widespread 
aversion to involvement with the state. The result has been a rescaling of political 
organization in which “[t]he burden of politics thus shifts back to some form of worker, 
community, or localized control.”121 As criticism of the state grows, the local scale 
becomes primary.122 For Harvey the emphasis on the local prioritizes the practices of 
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organization over the specific concerns with social change. He sees this as a pervasive 
problem: 
The left as a whole is bedeviled by an all-consuming “fetishism of organizational 
form.” … [P]rinciples are frequently advanced – such as “horizontality” and 
“non-hierarchy” – or visions of radical democracy and the governance of the 
commons, that can work for small groups, but are impossible to operationalize at 
the scale of a metropolitan region, let alone for the 7 billion people who now 
inhabit planet earth. Programmatic priorities are dogmatically articulated, such as 
the abolition of the state, as if no alternative form of territorial governance would 
ever be necessary or valuable.123  
 
Harvey’s critique of horizontality stems less from objections to the principle itself – one 
he later endorses as “an excellent objective” – than from a lack of attention to the 
operations of power at multiple scales that can undermine movements espousing strong 
commitments to horizontality.124 Harvey attributes the “fetishism” of horizontality, and 
the resulting over-emphasis on the local, to political movements broadly, but particularly 
to thinkers and movements who, “focus their efforts on the recuperation of ancient and 
indigenous notions of the rights of nature, or insist that issues of gender, racism, anti-
colonialism, or indigeneity must be prioritized above, if not preclude, the pursuit of an 
anti-capitalist politics.”125 Indeed, his claim of fetishizing horizontality may apply at 
certain moments and to certain voices within social justice, feminist, and anti-colonial 
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movements. He nonetheless seems to invoke a tired distinction between anti-capitalist 
politics and “identity politics.” Rather than see anti-racist, feminist, anti-colonial and 
indigenous movements to be at odds with anti-capitalist politics, as Harvey does, one 
might draw sustenance from their critiques of territorial governance – be they directed at 
the public/private divide, the constitutively racist dimensions of the contemporary 
national state, territorial occupation and collective punishment, or the ongoing history of 
settler colonialism – when envisioning a map of the global left. Harvey offers a 
compelling vision of equitable and complex forms of territorial governance. However, 
these need to be infused with an ethos of radical democracy, self-government, and 
autonomy advanced in different ways by anti-racist, anti-colonial, indigenous, and 
feminist movements. 
De Landa’s attunement to a wider field of materiality and an extensive notion of 
agency can help us to navigate the challenges of horizontality and centralization. He 
approaches this organizational question through the relations between hierarchies and 
meshworks as they emerge from processes of destratification and restratification.126 
Stratification refers to the structuring of material flows, not to any strong normative 
proscription. As De Landa observes, “the mere presence of an emergent meshwork does 
not in itself mean that we have given a segment of society a less oppressive structure.”127 
Instead, he calls for an experimental politics attentive to numerous combinations of 
meshworks and hierarchies. Curiously, De Landa’s notion of social movements remains 
limited to the logic of recognition. Although social justice movements may employ a 
variety of “expressive displays,” ranging from sabotaging machines to statements in mass 
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media, he suggests that their common goal “is to achieve recognition as a valid 
interlocutor on the part of the governmental organization.”128 Such criteria of what 
constitutes a social justice movement arbitrarily restricts the political aims of a group. 
The relationship of the left to the state proves more complex as movements navigate 
complex overlapping governmentalities in which the state may periodically provide 
resources for resistance while at other times constituting a central part of the assemblage 
of domination. Autonomous movements, affirmations of indigenous sovereignty, and 
anti-statist movements are presumptively dismissed from possible coalitions. 
Moving through the connecting links between different scales involves a way of 
navigating a field of hierarchies and meshworks that privileges each of these tendencies 
at different moments. Anti-colonial politics, opposition to state violence, and the 
abolition of mass incarceration embody strong destratifying tendencies with periodic 
modes of restratification at work to maintain their political energy. Collective action to 
slow climate change, halt environmental destruction, and protect workers may 
periodically involve certain degrees of stratification in organization. Destratifying 
elements will nonetheless prove important to maintain their tactical and strategic 
viability. The climate movement in its current form has offered an extensively connected 
network of dispersed movements with interspersed moments of hierarchy. Indigenous 
and environmental justice movements, which now constitute an indispensable part of the 
climate movement, contest both the sovereignty of settler colonial states and fluid, 
destratified forms of corporate power moving across national boundaries.129  
                                                 
128 De Landa, New Philosophy, 59. 
129 The Idle No More movement finds the Canadian state and mining, logging, oil and fishing 
companies intertwined in contemporary settler colonialism. See “The Manifesto,” Idle No More, 
http://www.idlenomore.ca/manifesto.  
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Rob Nixon’s work on an environmentalism of the poor identifies the importance 
of stratification and destratification in mobilizing democratic, ecological action. He seeks 
to navigate tensions between placed-based environmentalism that tends toward social and 
cultural homogeneity and postcolonial thought that emphasizes hybridity, dispossession, 
and movement.130 In place of either approach, the environmentalism of the poor works 
through a “transnational ethics of place,” a sense of ecologies defined by nature-culture 
crossings and the power relations within which they function. Here anti-colonial struggles 
and opposition to poverty are inseparable from environmental justice. Voices of such an 
approach include Ken Saro-Wiwa, whose poetry opposed a military regime and the 
interest of transnational oil, Arundhati Roy, who writes against dams as manifestations of 
class power and ecological destruction, Rachel Carson, who refused corporately branded 
toxicity, and Naomi Klein who joins cross-regional climate movements to egalitarian 
pursuits. Nixon’s invocations pursue overlapping modes of political experimentation and 
action. He sees this environmentalism working not only on our political orientations but 
also on our collective spatial imaginary in order to think about ecological processes at 
multiple scales. Developing an appreciation for these spatial and political complexities 
requires the destratification of political thought. A multiscalar approach to politics 
provides rich maps of political intervention. It breaks open old assumptions about the 
organization of political space and finds overlapping scales with rough edges constituting 
the terms of political subjectivity and collectivity. 
                                                 
130 Nixon, 233 – 262. Nixon observes, “The environmentalist advocacy of an ethics of place has 
all too often morphed into hostility toward displaced people” (Nixon, 239). Within this place 
based environmentalist approach, “the concentric rings of the bioregionalist more often open out 
into transcendentalism than into transnationalism” (Nixon, 238). Nixon’s critique of 
postcolonialism, on the other hand, focuses on cosmopolitan dimensions in tension with 
ecological efforts (Nixon, 236). 
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The intersection of temporal process and spatial scale requires the political 
theorist to work not only as an insurgent architect but also as a forensic architect, one 
who investigates the nonlinear dynamics of historical processes and their imprint on built 
environments at multiple scales. Forensic architecture emerged from the collective 
thought of architects, artists, and activists concerned with the material, aesthetic, and 
spatial sensitivities formed from the state practice of forensics.  In contrast to the state 
deployment of forensics as a practice of determining criminality and assigning 
punishment, forensic architecture expresses what Eyal Weizman calls a “critical practice 
… committed to investigating the actions of states and corporations and also to critical 
reflection on the terms by which contemporary forensic investigations – on the scales of 
bodies, buildings, territories, and their digital representations – are currently 
undertaken.”131 Forensic architecture draws upon the material sensitivities contained 
within forensics – the practice of interpreting traces left by processes and things – while 
mobilizing this interpretive-sensorial practice in service of critique and political action 
directed at state and corporate power.  
To forensic architects spaces reveal imprints of power and violence. The task of 
the political theorist as forensic architect involves uncovering these markings, mapping 
the ways in which power shapes and inhabits space, and asking how this space-power 
relation requires us to reconsider political concepts and practices. Foucault’s genealogy 
of the city examined in chapter 3 provides a precursor to contemporary practices of 
forensic architecture. Today this practice entails confronting the neoliberal urban 
government of housing bodies seen as surplus, subjecting them to diffuse processes of 
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surveillance and systemic violence as well as acute acts of state, private, and privatized 
violence. This relation between spatiality and power moves through non-concentric 
relations between scales that produce nonlinear effects.  
The genealogy of this intersection proceeds through the interactions of multiple 
scales: subpersonal components, the body and its microfeatures, the local, urban, global, 
and planetary. The rough edges of the different scales overlap without interlocking. The 
forensic architect tracks the transfers, swells, and disruptions of power as it works 
through these overlaps or moves across these rough edges. The political theorist as 
forensic architect stays attuned to the complex sociospatial dynamics of power and 
resistance. This involves cultivating sensitivities to material forces and spatial 
connections, a capacity honed by a critical materialist approach to the urban question. 
* * * 
Throughout this project I have argued against a concentric understanding of 
political spatiality in which hierarchical relations structure the nesting of bodily, local, 
urban, national, regional, global, and planetary scales. This chapter has explored scalar 
discrepancies between micro-processes and the meso-level workings of the city. Such 
constitutive frictions and elements of unevenness within connections shatter concentric 
images of ethical connection and political solidarity. Whereas this chapter has pursued 
non-concentric scalar relations through a reconsideration of the urban question, the whole 
project has also pursued non-concentric relations as they unfold through fugitive 
moments in political thought. Machiavelli attends to imperceptible material forces and 
spatial connections between bodies, cities, the region, and the cosmos.  His oft-neglected 
urbanism provides a sense of the textured power relations of the city and its encounters 
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with fortuna, his cosmological notion that conceptualizes historical processes in a new 
key. Foucault engages a spatiality of power and resistance through attunement to 
differential scales of the body, society, and the population. His work informs 
conceptualizations of the ways in which neoliberal urbanism and its attendant security 
apparatuses reflect and shape global formations of power. A multiscalar approach to the 
thought of Hardt and Negri helps to transform suggestions about the monolithic character 
of Empire into intersecting processes and forces set on different scales. Similarly, the 
figure of the multitude shifts from the appearance of an abstract and homogeneous entity, 
despite the insistence of the authors to the contrary, into a variegated, complex social 
body. Reconsidering the urban question through historical-geographical and new 
materialism lends further insight into the spatial organization of the multitude, the 
collective dynamics of humans and nonhuman animals in material assemblages infused 
by built environments and historical processes. The complex layering of the city undoes 
neat conceptions of scalar hierarchy, in which the body, population, city, state, region, 
globe, and planet correspond to nested, concentric circles. Instead, the city reveals 
numerous entangled scales of political life. 
In place of a concentric image of politics, some have offered a “flat ontology” that 
would eliminate scale, even as an entangled and nonlinear relation. Sallie Marston, John 
Paul Jones III, and Keith Woodward have been at the forefront of advancing such a flat 
ontology, arguing against political and human geographies reliant on a concept of 
scale.132 They offer a spatial imaginary that dispenses with scale in favor of singular sites 
                                                 
132 Sallie Marston, John Paul Jones III, and Keith Woodward, “Human Geography without 
Scale,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 30 (2005): 416 – 432. See also my 
discussion in chapter 2 of Ignacio Farías, Richard G. Smith, and other actor-network theorists 
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around which social relations self-organize. For Marston et al. conceptions of scale prove 
too constraining for describing spatiality. Within their account scales are given in 
advance, defining the terms of social inquiry rather than facilitating investigation into the 
structuring of space.133 Furthermore, scale implies nested hierarchies of spatial relations 
limiting the understanding of topological connections. The addition of networks to 
sociospatial thought, as this line of argument goes, simply adds a new set of coordinates 
that confuse the practice of human geography.  
The abandonment of scale within flat ontology poses a number of problems, 
however. First, the rejection of scale is based on a critique of hierarchical scalar relations. 
In contrast to this hierarchical framing, I have sought to articulate a relational, dynamic 
understanding of scale in which the task of tracing the workings of power through space 
requires us to, as Foucault suggests, “shift the object and change the scale.”134 Scale, as I 
approach it, does not fit a container model of socio-political space. It is, instead, 
intertwined with compositions of bodies and informs the workings of power.  
Furthermore, flat ontology ignores the historical constitution of scale and its 
significance for politics. For instance, Machiavelli’s writing on fortuna emerges within 
an implicit debate over the scalar relations between cosmological forces, urban politics, 
and embodied life, as shown in chapter one. Fortuna provides a starting point from which 
to think about nonhuman agencies in politics, thereby influencing ecological thought and 
collective action. Fortuna, broadened and extended, can find expression as a swarm of 
                                                 
constructed theory of scale in conjunction with his notion of flat ontology (De Landa, New 
Philosophy, 28). While I do not follow De Landa in his pursuit of flat ontology, I nonetheless see 
his work on social ontology as indispensable to rethinking spatiality. 
133 Marston et al., 422. 
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locusts that eats all the crops, a tsunami, an earthquake, rapid climate change, or a rare 
disease carried from elsewhere. It can even be a new weapon invented by an adversary 
for which you have no response, a new technology of extraction that gives you an 
incredibly flow of energy for production, or a loud uprising that disrupts transnational 
corporate transactions. Fortuna is the vicissitude of the outside bumping into the inside. 
Because this is so, it means that neither a partitioned view nor a concentric image will 
ever capture the complexity and potential volatility in cross-scalar connections. The 
historical and political significance of scale also appears in its role as a key concept 
within contemporary political movements. It frames debates over organization and 
political action in the World Social Forum, influencing the ways in which heterogeneous 
movements navigate challenges of geographic distance.135  
The flat ontologists opposed to scale seek to eliminate thinking about global 
structures, particularly what they see as the shibboleth of “globalization.” They prefer a 
“rigorous particularism” that would replace inquiry into processes of globalization with 
that of tracing “interactive practices through their localized connection.”136 Such concern 
with the language of “globalization” underestimates the conceptual precision of critical 
globalization studies. I have taken care to disaggregate the neoliberal discourse of 
globalization from other studies that find it to be a far more ambivalent phenomenon and 
a concept indispensable to understanding the workings of contemporary power. From 
Tarak Barkawi’s account of how wars and colonialism brutally assemble spatial 
connections that we come to understand as the globe, to Hardt and Negri’s thinking about 
                                                 
135 Fisher and Ponniah, 9 – 10. See also my discussion of debates about scale in the World Social 
Forum in chapter 3. 
136 Marston, et al., 425. 
  The Urban Question • IV 
246 
 
Empire and the multitude as global political formations that never quite amount to a 
coherent whole or a totalizing body, critical approaches to globalization offer more than 
reductionist and/or essentialist accounts of power, violence, and resistance.137 When 
members of the New Left and the global justice movement invoke an idiom of 
globalization to suggest that “a new world is possible,” they appeal to a spatial imaginary 
of worlds and globes. Such a theoretical maneuver involves conceptualizing political and 
social life as both irreducible to concentric nestings and stretched beyond the hyper-
specificity of “rigorous particularism.” The scaled movements, uneven edges, and 
asymmetrical connections we pursue can’t correspond merely to “particulars,” for a 
particular is a relatively stable mode that is nested within a “larger” configuration. The 
approach pursued here a multiscalar political world of breaks and dissonances flowing 
between global, local, transnational, transversal, interurban, and embodied connections. 
Flat ontology would mistakenly dismiss such efforts. 
Theorizing the processes of globalization, and by extension global scales, 
involves thinking about political-economic, cultural, military and other open systems, 
with dissonances within and between them, producing and produced by the conditions of 
embodied, local, urban, national, and regional life. This is a notion of the global scale 
with room for what Connolly calls “eccentric flows of flight, compassion, connection, 
allegiance, identification, legitimacy, responsiveness, and responsibility that exceed the 
concentric image of how political culture does and must function.”138 Their eccentric 
quality involves a decentering of political relations in which they move between and 
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across scales. In doing so, they are apt to appear strange, weird, abnormal, uncanny, or 
out of place to those captured by either a holistic or concentric image. Following 
Connolly, I see these eccentric flows and spatial connections to be more than marginal 
forces in the workings of globalization and cosmopolitan ethics. They enable “cross-
country citizen networks” and cross-border political movements for ecological protection, 
improved working conditions, boycott and divestment campaigns against apartheid, and 
opposition to the global arms trade.139 New alliances generated from these eccentric 
forces may possess more urgency, ethical attunement, and strategic value than those 
formed through nested sets of political relations within and below the national state.  
Throughout this project I have offered visions of political spatiality particularly 
sensitive to the movement of eccentric flows. These marginal and marginalized moments 
in political thought express eccentric thought in all of its meanings. They insist on non-
concentric notions of scale and in doing so appear strange to the state-centric dictates of 
political science. I wish to conclude this study with a detour through one kind of eccentric 
thought, the speculative fiction of J.G. Ballard’s short story “The Concentration City.” 
That detour may help clarify the distinctions between anti-scalar flat ontology and the 
relational, dynamic approach to scale I have developed.  
In “The Concentration City” Ballard imagines a seemingly infinite city subjected 
to physical partitions that divide space, often in correspondence with the price charged to 
inhabit each space. As more partitions are built to delineate differently-priced spaces, 
new walls within the city gravitate toward the infinitesimal. Increasingly smaller spaces 
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are walled off until the dividers become the built environment of the city itself.140  The 
proliferation of enclosures shapes fundamental conditions of thinking and everyday life 
within the city. Rather than living in a condition of claustrophobia, residents have 
forgotten, or never known, what “free space” – free of cost and free from restricted 
mobility – might look like.141 Architecture and engineering have now become the 
professions of choice, phasing out pure science and philosophy to provide a class of 
technocratic managers.142 Within this environment, real estate speculation drives the 
economy of the city. 
 The protagonist Franz M., a young physics student, is driven by a dream of free 
space and free flight. He has only dreams of these concepts upon which to build. He 
heads west by train. Seeking space without enclosure, he attempts to reach the edge of the 
city. After ten days of travel he learns that the train, without changing direction, is now 
eastbound. The geographical paradox is explained to Franz by police more concerned 
with Franz’s interest in free space than with the curvature of space that they have just 
witnessed. “How this curvature was built into the system they can’t explain, it seems to 
be some inherent feature of the City itself,” the police surgeon tells Franz.143 Upon 
returning to his point of origin Franz discovers that although he has been traveling for 
three weeks, the date remains the same as the day he left.  
As we respond to the anxiety and asphyxiation of the experience of curvature in 
“The Concentration City,” we can also sense the importance of attunement to non-
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concentric notions of scale in political thought and action. Concentration means bringing 
to a center the infinite and infinitesimal partitioning of a city that perpetually curves 
around itself. The replacement of philosophy and pure science with technocratic training 
is no coincidence. This is an urban spatiality that reigns in tendencies toward insurgent 
architecture, centering and enclosing eccentric flows within its walls and curvatures. 
Franz tests the limits of the logics of partition and curvature through his search for free 
space. Only by attempting to traverse the city, and thereby glimpsing the entanglements 
of the global and local, does Franz come to discern the spatial relations shaping the city. 
In shifting scales to the entirety of the city, he sees its fractal dimensionality, a recursive 
looping that does not resolve into a coherent or linear order. This shift to the global scale 
undertaken by Franz embodies the methodological move rejected by proponents of flat 
ontology. The “rigorous particularism” of those who subscribe to a flat ontology may not 
be concentrically nested within multiple predetermined scales, but it also refuses to 
discern how the global penetrates and helps to constitute the local. As a result it fails to 
account for the workings of power on the global scale.  
 Ballard helps us to see the limits of a concentric model of politics by turning to 
the genre of science fiction, which is to say, to eccentric thought. He takes us through a 
concentric world with Franz as our eccentric tour guide. The resulting travelogue 
assumes an uncanny quality, both recognizable to us and disorienting us. It pushes the 
workings of power in neoliberal urbanism to a logical extreme in order to reveal a world 
immobile, inaccessible, and unequal.  
Whereas Ballard deploys eccentric thought to expose urban authoritarianism, this 
project unearths visions of eccentric cities that defy concentric political thought. The 
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eccentric city is not a polis in the classical sense of a bounded territory delineating an 
urban population enclosed inside nested circles of political belonging. It embodies a 
collectivity of emergent identities, micro-organisms, planetary systems, nonhuman 
animals, and urban citizens connected through nonlinear relations. Causality within an 
eccentric city involves dynamic hierarchies, inflections, feedbacks, recursive loops, 
resonance, emergence, sympathy, and accidents. This is a city and a spatiality that is 
neither concentric nor flat. Within the eccentric city multiple scales fold and impinge 
upon one another without becoming resolved into a single center. Its urban fabric 
stretches into states, regions, and global networks. From the eccentric city, and the 
multiscalar geography it embodies, political theory can learn to appreciate transversal 
ethical connections and to navigate decentered political solidarities.  
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